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  1.  Introduction
The  American  self  has  always  been  closely  related  to  individualism,  performance, 
potentiality  and  rhetoric.  There  are  many  instances  of  the  self  –  as  experimenters  -  who  are 
changeable, mobile, transformative (such as the confidence-man, trickster figures, Dean Moriarty, 
Emerson's Poet) – and yet highly valorized despite being "founded" on persuasion, protest, illusion 
and creation by means of mere speech-acts. In contrast, silence, deactivation, ruptures in discourse 
and subjectivities have stood, even in Melville’s time, in the background of American myths of 
success,  force  of  will  and  self-reliance.  The  potentialities  of  Melvillean  "anti-heroes"  such  as 
Bartleby the Scrivener and the Confidence-man contest the rhetorical force, performance and unity 
of the isolated self represented in these myths. While Emerson's early work manifests his reliance 
on the powers of the "beyond" (Platonism) or "below" (mysticism, Gnosis), which, however, often 
cannot be clearly distinguished, the language of Emerson's late work, which has been frequently 
disregarded,  resonates  with  that  of  the late  Melville  on many levels.  The dynamic  relationship 
between Emerson and Melville has been, in my view, shaping American culture and thinking since 
the “Melville Revival” in 1920s and continues to do so in contemporary debates regarding both the 
formation  of  subjectivity  and  issues  of  performativity  and  agency.  Although  Emerson  is  often 
portrayed as "the beautiful enemy" of Melville, I will try to show that they address the same topics, 
especially  the  issues  of  power,  speech,  will,  silence,  protest  against  paternal  authority,  the 
construction of self – while emphasizing potentiality. To set the dramatic scene, we shall employ, as 
experimenters, Melville's Bartleby and Emerson's poet. 
Recently, there has emerged an intensified interest concerning the character of Bartleby who 
might, in contrast to the American ideology of self-creation and practical power, provide an instance 
of "showing" or "acting" by means of disappearing.  The contemporary interest  in "the Bartleby 
question" is connected with the issues of agency, potentiality, loss of ego, law and difference (as 
shown in C. S. Pierce, J. Derrida and G. Deleuze), as well as with a major protest against the way in 
which personal identity is performatively constituted by means of  speech (as seen in Emerson's late 
work, the school of pragmatism and theories of performativity). Yet, Bartleby is not immobile and 
inactive in all respects. I will argue that Bartleby does something, both linguistically - within the 
realm of language, signs, performative constructions (where his formula "I would prefer not to" has 
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profound effects) - and nonlinguistically (by means of his silence, suspense, presence, death). Both 
Bartleby and Emerson's poet manifest, in their selfless constitutions, power as potentiality. Bartleby, 
as will be seen, shows the limits of rhetoric (while  questioning the  Platonic  distinctions from the 
Gorgias between nomos and physis, between the self disappearing in religious-mythical forces, and 
the self led by the forces of will to power) and the American rhetorical tradition, including Austin's 
theory of performativity, James' pragmatist self and Emerson's eloquent voice, notions of the will, 
power, potentiality and agency.  The methods that I will use to argue these points involve close-
reading, plus performative and critical theories.   
In the first part of this work, then, the  genealogy of the American  self  as opposed to the 
European notion of the subject will be briefly sketched. Secondly, the self, its agency and Bartleby 
as the detached self will be interpreted from the perspective of Emerson's early work ("Circles," 
"Self-Reliance," and mainly his "Transcendentalist"- a probable source of Melville's "Bartleby"). 
Here,  the spiritual,  transcendental  (Platonic  and  Gnostic) level  of  Emerson's  thought  will  be 
explored.  Following  the  Platonic  distinction  from  the  Gorgias  regarding  two  kinds  of  forces 
constituting subjectivity (the religious-mythical  forces and the enlightenment  forces  of will  and 
power), the spiritual ascension and diving of the self shall be examined. The performative force of 
Emerson's  words  aims  here  to  enable  the  transformation,  unblocking  and  even  complete 
abandonment of the self. 
In the second part, the main topics will be the power of rhetoric, performativity,  repetition 
and presence (interpreted with the help of J. L. Austin and Gilles Deleuze) in Melville's "Bartleby." 
The power and consequences  of  Bartleby's  formula  "I  would prefer  not  to"  will  be  examined, 
together with the issues of detachment from the body,  originality and sacrifice. Both Melville's 
Bartleby and Emerson's poet, it shall be argued, speak a foreign, minoritarian language within the 
language  of  the  majority,  which  shall  reveal  new  possibilities  and/or  positions  for  personal 
identity/self.
In the third part, the self, its will, speech and power will be analyzed from the perspective of 
Emerson's late work, that is, from the perspective of immanence, which was, to a certain extent,  
later  developed by Nietzsche,  Heidegger,  Foucault,  Butler  and others.  However,  Emerson's  and 
Melville's  notion  of  power  and will  will  be  interpreted  neither  in  the  Nietzschean lineage  nor 
according to the essentialist interpretations of the resistant will of Bartleby (John B. Williams in 
White Fire: The Influence of  Emerson on Melville)  but  from a perspective which goes beyond 
pragmatism and speech-act theory. Apart from the issues of confidence and forgery in Melville's 
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"Bartleby, the Scrivener" and The Confidence-man, rhetoric, potentiality, silence, abyss, death and 
the power of the self will be examined in relation to poetic creation, gnosis, and the semiotics  of  
expressive symbols (Charles Sanders Peirce). 
Finally, the notions of the law and agency in Melville’s "Bartleby" will be contrasted with 
their  use in  Kafka's  "Before the  Law." The exploration of  Kafka's  performative "Not Yet"  and 
Melville's "I would prefer not to" together with an analysis of deferred action, order-words, paternal 
function,  and pragmatic  aspects  in  both  works  should  bring us  to  the  point  where  we see the 
necessity to revise Austin's performative theories.  
Contemporary poststructuralist thinkers such as Judith Butler or Jonathan Culler are often 
criticized  for  their  theories  of  subjectivity  which  focus  too  much  on  rhetoric,  discourse  and 
performative constructions, and not on the mystery, integrity and responsibility of the subject. While 
Jacques Derrida tries to explore the inarticulable secret of Melville's Bartleby and his responding 
without response1, Emmanuel Levinas2 stresses the infinite dimension of the "face" of the other to 
which we have to respond. Gilles Deleuze attempts to think non-identity and shows various aspects 
of repetition in speech and images. All of them are, however, still somehow preoccupied by  the 
power of speech/discourse and its importance for self/identity, which was significantly developed, if 
not  introduced,  by the late  Emerson and Nietzsche.  One of  our  aims here  will  therefore  be to 
explore Melville's  characters  –  such  as  Bartleby  –  as  "Drummond  lights"  which  illuminate 
everything around them and which offer a different way of thinking about the self and language. For 
such characters test the limits of the notions of identity/consciousness as performatively constructed 
through speech, of the self as a an inoperative power, as "different," or as a detached enigma, all of 
which are at the center of contemporary discourse on subjectivity. If Emerson is one of the greatest 
vitalists in American culture, Melville shows the implications and significance of inactivity, gaps 
and ruptures for personal identity.  
What  we witness  in  Bartleby's  case is  first  of all  a  strange kind of spiritual  and bodily 
detachment. It seems as if his main wish were to leave/escape the symbolic order of language and 
social practices altogether. This strategy of detachment has its roots in the American Renaissance, 
especially in the work of Emerson, while criticism of institutions and ideologies are also to be found 
there –not surprisingly in the work of Herman Melville (Bartleby, Confidence-man, Pierre, or the 
Ambiguities).  In  what  sense  is  Bartleby's  detached,  experimenting self different  from  that  of 
1 Jacques Derrida,  The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret, trans. David Willis (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008) 75.
2 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Springer Press, 1980) 206: "The Other faces me and 
puts me in question and obliges me."
8
Emerson's  character  of  the  poet?  While  seemingly  quite  distinct,  both  late  Melville  and  late 
Emerson, however, believe in the transformative/deformative power of speech  and silence while 
suggesting (in their own ways) the necessary processes of liberation. 
It is important to realize that Emerson's self does not relate only to the "beyond," to the 
Over-soul, Power, but also to the "below," to the abyss, to the potential, indeterminate zone, depth 
which transcends one both because of its place (limitless space of potentiality) and its time (before 
time and language, before Creation). As to his early work, it is only from the pre-linguistic "below," 
I believe, that Emerson could account for Bartleby. The beyond and the below refer to the respective 
Emersonian activities,  that of ascension and diving.  It  is  the act of diving with which Melville 
identifies. As to Emerson´s late work, Emerson shows his extraordinary talent to use language so as 
to increase the degree, the feeling of power. No longer abandoning the self, his poet acts, creates 
and keeps silent along the tracks of nature and immanent forces.  
We shall analyze the Emerson-Melville relationship in more detail in the chapter on "The 
Transcendentalist" - Emerson's early essay and probable source for Bartleby. What we can mention 
here, however, is that their relationship bears several strange signs. Melville attended Emerson's 
lectures (1848-49) but never spoke to him directly. When he became interested in the thinking of 
Thomas  Carlyle  (whose  essays  Emerson edited  and which  Melville  bought  in  February 1849), 
Melville demanded that his brother-in-law send him the letters from Carlyle to Emerson instead of 
asking Emerson himself (see the letter to Lemuel Shaw, on the 10th of September, 1849). Moreover, 
when Melville began editing Moby Dick and three years before he wrote Bartleby (in the summer of 
1853), he re-read Emerson's essays (after having read a few of them in Hawthorne's bedroom one 
morning  in  October  1850).  In  his  letters  to  Duyckinck,  he  praises  Emerson as  a  great  fellow. 
However, there is an obvious ambivalence in his approach to Emerson regarding the transcendent 
features of the self, power and rhetoric which Emerson's early work manifests – in reaction to Plato 
and Platonism, the Vedas and European Romanticism (Carlyle, Coleridge, Goethe). The Emerson-
Melville relationship, incuding the dialectic between their works, has been, in my view, constitutive 
for American notions of the self – be it the rhetorical tradition or the silent, transitive, underground, 
unsaid one.   
1.1  The Subject vs. The Self
Before we get  to  the construction and disappearance of the self  in  Emerson's  work and 
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Melville's Bartleby, let us have a quick look at the differences between the American notion of the 
self  and  the  European  notion  of  the  subject.  We  do  not  seek  to  make  any  far-reaching 
generalizations, yet it is evident, from the above-mentioned, that the American self carries with it 
several paradoxes. On the one hand, it is considered  highly mobile, changeable, detached, critical 
of society, transformative and self-creative (cf. Emerson, Melville, Puritan origins). On the other 
hand, as David Loewenthal shows, it is shaped by the problematic relationship of Americans to their 
history and their constant recurrence to the authority of the Founding Fathers as the ideal to be 
followed,  not  deconstructed.3 Even Emerson himself  experienced this  contradictory reception  – 
while  he  himself  dismissed  memory,  custom,  filiation,4 and  the  paternal  function,  he  has  been 
praised by many as a mythical thinker and as the founding father of  American thinking. In contrast, 
other commentators have interpreted his ideas as destabilizing, questioning the norms of society, 
conformity and even the integrity of the self (Poirier, Cavell).
When compared with the European notion of the subject, which draws on the works of Plato, 
Descartes, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel we notice how Emerson turned European thinking on its head. 
While still  following the Cartesian formula "I  think,  therefore I  am" and believing that  man is 
characterized by what he thinks about all day, he did not view the self as passive and receptive but 
rather as constantly active. Descartes also faced the problem of how to ensure the existence of man 
when he does not think. This issue was solved with the help of the notion of God as "watching over" 
the human being and providing it with existence. 
Furthermore, Emerson adopts to a great extent the mind-body split where the mind/soul is 
the privileged, thinking part. Descartes describes it as follows: "Because we have no conception of 
the body as thinking in any way at all, we have reason to believe that every kind of thought present 
in us belongs to the soul."5 Accordingly, Emerson focuses mainly on the soul, the individual ascent 
and not on inter-subjective bodily interactions. 
His main turn away from the European tradition can be seen in Emerson's exploration of 
human consciousness and and his description of intuition as active and reason/intellect as passive, 
which goes against the grain of the doctrine of Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, reason can 
create laws that it  gives to itself (such as moral laws, the categorical imperative) without being 
3 "the assertion of  the independence of every successive generation on their fathers and the respect for the Founding 
Fathers and their inheritance. This contrast made them relegate heroism to the past, and give the present a role of a mere 
preservation of the values established by the founders of the Republic. David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 119. 
4 Lowenthal 110.
5 Descartes, René. Passions of the soul. The philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol. I. trans. Cottingham, Stoothoff, 
Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1985) 329.
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exclusively dependent on empirical data. While intuition is passive - being a faculty through which 
objects are directly grasped, i.e. the form of space and time projected on phenomena - reason can 
create  imperatives  a  priori  (independently of  empirical  data).  Moreover,   intuition  is  related to 
sensible knowledge (as Kant never really described any intellectual intuitions) while understanding 
provides us with higher knowledge or wisdom. The European Kantian subject is therefore subjected 
to phenomena from the empirical world and to the laws and conceptions of one's own reason. One's 
thinking is subjective, because each person has different "patterns" that it uses to structure its world. 
Kant says that: 
in the world of elements, there are two main elements, the form of intuition (space 
and time) … and the matter or content which is presented in time and space … we 
can determine our conceptions a priori in intuition, inasmuch as we are ourselves the 
creators of the objects of the conceptions in time and space – these objects being 
regarded simply as quanta. In the one case, reason proceeds according to conceptions 
and can do nothing more than subject phenomena to these.  … In the other case, 
reason proceeds by the construction of conceptions, and as these conceptions relate 
to an a priori intuition, they may be given and determined in pure intuition a priori, 
and without the aid of empirical data.6
Emerson, on the other hand, interprets intuition not as a form of time and space imposed on 
the phenomena but as a creative element, the instinct which keeps the self in motion, in transition. 
Emerson says: "What is the aboriginal self, on which a universal reliance may be grounded? … The 
inquiry leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius, of virtue, and of life, which we call  
Spontaneity or Instinct.  We denote this  primary wisdom as Intuition."7 The intellect,  or reason, 
rejoices in detachment and boundaries, according to Emerson, while intuition and emotion provide 
the  power to  create  and experiment.  The poet,  the  experimenter,  is  the  Language-maker8,  who 
"feeds" on his/her instinct, on the pneuma, the divine spark; he tries to unname and rename things 
diving into the abyss which precedes Creation and already formed concepts. The consciousness of 
the experimenter in the moments of ecstasy incorporates, or "devours" the whole world and makes it 
a part of himself. The Emersonian (and Whitmanesque) self is therefore expansive, always moving 
6 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (Forgotten Books, 1958) 408.
7 R.W. Emerson, "Self-Reliance," Complete Writings (New York: H. Wise and Company, 1929) 148.
8 Emerson, "The Poet," Complete Writings, 203.
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on, creating a new circle while drawing on Power/Life-force/Intuition. Unlike the European subject, 
the subjection of the American self is not explored but repressed. Limitations are not investigated 
profoundly in Emerson's early work, and institutions are rather avoided altogether than questioned 
in detail (as opposed to Nietzsche, Foucault and Deleuze). Another issue is inter-subjectivity which 
is mainly stressed by G.F. Hegel in his dialectic of the master and slave and other chapters from The 
Phenomenology of Spirit. The problem of subjectivity and subjection is developed later by many 
critics of German idealism such as Heidegger who show that the subject (das Selbst) is a project of 
possibilities  which  is  thrown into  the  world  and  which  experiences  subjection  of  many kinds 
including anxiety,  the call  of conscience and, ultimately,  death.  These topics  are  not evaded as 
negative. The subject cares about its being and partly "derives" its authenticity when grappling with 
these phenomena. Heidegger's notion of  Selbst,  Dasein, is its possibilities through understanding 
even though these are not ever necessarily actualized; it is ahead of itself, it projects itself into its 
forthcoming potentiality-of-being. To understand means to act on one’s anticipated possibilities.9 
The moment of actualizing one's potential is present in Emerson as well. However, the existential 
dimension of Heidegger's thought can only partially be found in Emerson's work. Is Emerson, then, 
a proto-pragamtist? And if so, in what sense?
When exploring the self in an American context after Emerson, one recognizes an increasing 
influence of and turn toward psychology within the field of the constitution of the self. The focus is 
on consciousness, on beliefs, affects, power, transformation and present time. William James is one 
of  those  who  started  to  treat  consciousness  from  this  psychological  perspective  (and  not 
surprisingly,  he  is  also considered  the  founder  of  psychology in the  US).  The development  of 
psychology goes, in James' work, hand in hand with the development of pragmatism which he to a 
great extent adopted from Charles Sanders Peirce. Yet, there are obvious differences between the 
two as we will see further on. Another significant approach to human consciousness in the US is 
that  of  analytical  philosophy.  Drawing on  the  Anglo-American  analytical  tradition,  J.L.  Austin 
analyzes  language  and  articulates  a  theory  of  speech  acts  –  performatives  -  which  are  also 
constitutive for the development of consciousness. Furthermore, a combination of the analytical 
approach, pragmatism and the theory of speech acts can be found in the work of John Searle and in 
the well-known contemporary pragmatist Richard Rorty. 
We may perceive at least two fruitful lines or "connections of ideas" drawing on Emerson's 
late work. One is the deconstructive approach which was developed by Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin 
9 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) 192.
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Heidegger, Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Gilles Deleuze and others. The other is the pragmatic 
one  which  was  developed  by  James,  Peirce,  Dewey  and  Rorty.  We  shall  explore  Emerson's 
pragmatist tendencies and see whether we can get beyond the limitations of Jamesian pragmatism 
and Austin's theory of performativity. 
1.1.1  Emerson and the Self in Pragmatism
The central theme of Emerson's work, I shall argue in this work, is power as potentiality, 
potentiality of a voice (and silence) which makes democracy possible. The emphasis on potentiality 
connects his thought with the pragmatist thought of William James and Charles Sanders Peirce. As I 
shall explain later, however, Emerson's notion of potentiality moves beyond the limits of James' 
pragmatism and his tendency towards the substitution of philosophy with psychology. Let us first 
have a quick look at the notion of self that Emerson and James present in their works. 
Emerson claims that our human condition enables us "to be able to" do something, or not to 
do something. The fire of one's thought can bring to life, or actualize, the forces of nature and the 
"laws" (forces) of our own inner organization. Stressing the vital, affirmative potentiality of human 
beings, he advocates intuition and insight, as opposed to calculation, or performance done merely 
for effect. The source of that potentiality is, in his early work, as will be seen, the indeterminate 
nature, which is part of our experience when we unblock our self and let it speak. As in the case of  
structuralism, Emerson stresses relationships and relations of forces. Emerson's priority was not 
contemplation but  action.  Emerson writes  in "The American Scholar"  that:  "Action is  with the 
scholar subordinate, but it is essential. Without it he is not yet man. Without it thought can never 
ripen into truth."10 In his late work, which we shall explore in the second part of this work, Emerson 
turns to practical living and asks: How shall I live? With his focus on experience and relations, 
Emerson anticipated the thought of William James, Peirce and Dewey. 
Another  feature  common both  to  Emerson  and  James  is  the  language  of  continuity,  of 
continuous  variation  rather  than  the  language  of  finality  or  totality.11 Emerson,  as  we  have 
mentioned  above  focuses  on  the  transitory  nature  of  experience,  the  various  potentialities  and 
implications of events, rather than on the construction of hierarchies. What is important is to learn to 
read symbols coming from our constitution and to interpret the metaphors in our experience.
10 Emerson, "The American Scholar,"150.
11 McDermott 93. 
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In "The Poet", Emerson says: "Every new relation is a new word". For this, one obviously 
needs to make use of one's imagination. As in William James' work, words do not exist merely to 
connect  grammatically,  but  they  rather  make  and  remake  the  very  fabric  of  our  world  as 
experienced.12 But is our experience in any way directed or "fated" by our constitutions or external 
circumstances? Charles S. Peirce would say that the action of experience takes place by a series of 
surprises.13 Peirce, like Emerson, oscillates between a vision of the world which is fatalistic and 
chance-ridden and the power of the intellect and of method (or in Peirce's case science). As for 
Peirce's tychism, he offered in "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908)14 an argument 
to a hypothesis of God as the Necessary Being. Asserting the reality of chance, he claimed that 
"matter  is  effete  mind,  inveterate  habits  becoming  physical  laws".15 Concerning  the  power  of 
intellect and method, Peirce turns to logic as the fundamental capacity of the process of human 
knowledge. For him, logic precedes metaphysics and there is no intuition as an absolutely first 
cognition. All mental action has a form of inference. Moreover, all thought is in signs. This formal 
semiotic focuses on sign action and on inquiry as a sort of inference process. That is why Peirce's  
method develops abduction, deduction and induction. As for sign, Peirce distinguishes a sign, an 
object and an interpretant as follows:
A sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign, determined 
or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence (or a lower implied sort) with 
something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. This definition no more 
involves any reference to human thought than does the definition of a line as the 
place within which a particle lies during a lapse of time. It is from this definition that  
I  deduce the principles of logic by mathematical reasoning, and by mathematical 
reasoning that, I aver, will support criticism of  Weierstrassian severity, and that is 
perfectly evident. The word "formal" in the definition is also defined.16
The scientific method of Peirce therefore combines abduction (guessing of a new idea), 
induction  (evaluation  of  the  hypothesis,  inference  on  the  basis  of  tests;  includes  classification, 
probation,  sentential  induction),  deduction  (analysis  of  hypothesis  and  deduction  of  its 
consequences;  includes  explication  and  demonstration).  The  method  of  science  can  always  go 
12 McDermott 95.
13 Peirce, Collected Papers, 5:37.
14 Peirce (1908), "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God", CP 6.452–85, Selected Writings 358–79, EP 2:434–50, 
Peirce on Signs 260–78. 
15 Peirce (1891), "The Architecture of Theories", The Monist v. 1, pp. 161–76, via Internet Archive. Reprinted (CP 6.7–
34) and (EP 1:285–97, see p. 293).
16 Peirce, "Carnegie Application", The New Elements of Mathematics v. 4, p. 54.
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wrong (fallibilism) and is  therefore always open to tests  and experiments.  Peirce's  tychism and 
fallibilism therefore present two major approaches of his thinking. 
 As for Dewey, McDermott suggests, we might draw a parallel between Emerson's break 
with the theological language of his time and Dewey's break with the ecstatic religious language of 
Emerson.17 However, I believe that if McDermott had explored Emerson's late work, he would have 
seen the shift to an immanent language and a focus on the everyday, the common, the possible,  
physical aspects of self-creation and language itself. There he would probably not have found any 
religious  speeches.  As  he  notes  further  on,  Dewey's  thoughts  about  possibility,  celebration  and 
uncertainty  did  resonate  with  Emerson's  work.  Similarly,  William  James  likes  to  hover  in 
potentiality, indeterminacy, that is, between the poles of the objective meaning of nature, and its 
subjective meaning. In Pragmatism James claims:
In our cognitive as well as in our active life we are creative. We add, both to the 
subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands really malleable, waiting 
to  receive its  final  touches  at  our  hands.  Like the kingdom of  heaven,  it  suffers 
human violence willingly. Man engenders truths upon it.18
On  the  one  hand,  James  embraces  the  subjective  and  performative  quality  of  human 
knowledge, on the other, however, he would like to stick to the scientific method which makes use 
of implication, deduction and other scientific means. James' doctrine is that of radical empiricism, 
while Emerson's thinking is, in my view, based on potentiality, on language, and if transformation is 
necessary, he will not prevent it. Emerson, unlike James, does not primarily seek to mediate, or 
ameliorate the opposition between the subjective and the objective, between the potential and the 
actual. What James did see and approve of, however, regarding Emerson's work was the notion of 
possibility,  of  newness,  of  the  present  hour.  The main  difference  I  see (and will  explore  later) 
between James' and Emerson's thought regarding the constitution of the self is James' refusal to take 
into account the powers, energies and forces of the individual. While James read almost every essay 
by Emerson, he, nevertheless, never examined his ideas in more depth; he never took them seriously 
as to their philosophical and social import. In his "Address at the Emerson Centenary in Concord" 
(1903), he presents Emerson as an artist, spiritual seeker, who emphasized the Universal Reason, 
and subjective connection with God.19
17 McDermott 95.
18 William James, Pragmatism (Harvard U Press, 1975) 123. 
19 William James, "Address at the Emerson Centenary in Concord" (1903) p. 5. 
http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/James/1903EM.htm 
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The notion of consciousness as potentiality was, in my view, first explored in great detail in 
the US by Emerson. We will see in what follows not only how human consciousness is constituted 
by means of speech and performative acts (which shall lead us to analyze power, will and agency in 
Emerson's late work) but also by means of silence, leaving, performative failures and ruptures in 
discourse (as will be seen in Bartleby).   
1.2 Early Emerson, Performative Speech and Self-Reliance: 
1.2.1  Experimenter, Genius, Life-force and Plato´s Gorgias
Let us have a look at Emerson's "experimenter" then. What does experimentation mean for 
Emerson? Emerson, like Plato's Socrates, tests and "tries" the human being in the strange kind of 
dialogue he leads, in his essays, with himself, with American, European or other values. One can 
find contradictory arguments on any page in any essay by Emerson,  which makes any totalizing 
synthesis  of  what  he  arrived  at  impossible.  Unlike  in  Socrates´s  argumentation,  there  is  no 
consistency or common logic (logos) to be found. Moreover, one can find contradictory passages in 
the same paragraphs. What does he seek to find through this violent experimenting with language, 
consistency, logic and our consciousness? It seems that his aim is to twist and turn language and 
speech itself (including old, rigid concepts, invisible ideologies and hierarchies of values). Why 
does he need to twist it all out of joint? As will be made clear in the analysis of his late work –  for 
every event, no matter how common it may seem, one needs to select or invent the appropriate 
rhetorical means, metaphors, concepts and verbs to be able to capture or at least hint at the meaning 
of the event. To experiment then means to question, to deconstruct, to free from non-functioning 
contexts, to revive or, if that is impossible, to create anew. Such experimenting is focused not only 
on values and ideologies but also on the self. The figure of the experimenter makes use of all the 
possible rhetorical as well as transcendental means to do this work. Is it important what effects such 
a practice has on the reader and Emerson himself? Such performativity is, of course, important and 
needs to be explored. One of the main aims/effects of his rhetoric in his early work is to unblock the 
self  (as  a  channel  through  which  Power  flows),  to  transform  it or  even  to  abandon  the  self 
altogether. 
To see how Emerson oscillated between the extremes of a complete abandonment of the self 
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merging with the "beyond" (or the "below") on the one hand, and his later praising of practical life 
based on rhetoric, will and power, on the other, it  is helpful to introduce the old distinction from 
Plato's Gorgias, which examines exactly these extremes in the construction of the self. Jan Patočka 
describes  the  conflictive  forces  presented  in  the  Gorgias (where  Socrates  opposes  the  sophist 
Callicles who defends life based on will to power) claiming that there are two kinds of forces which 
both threaten to rid the human of all independence
− mythico-religious forces – where the higher world stays alien and never really accepts the 
individual.  Inspired  man  is,  according  to  Plato,  like  a  puppet  of  God;  a  passive  being. 
Human wisdom, in his view, does not grow from inspiration.20
 
− enlightenment forces – that is, the forces in the natural sense refering to human nature and 
nature in general. The human being is/embraces a play of such forces, or the play of force as 
such. It is force itself that keeps the tension and joy in our lives. The natural force, according 
to  Plato,  is  here  in  the  form of  instinctual  desire,  a  self-confident  will  to  power21 that 
represents a world of forces without any wholeness, significance and purpose.22 
What we shall test in the following work is to what extent the Emersonian self evades or 
transcends these extremes (by means of his Platonism, gnosis, or rhetoric of forces and power). 
Similarly to Plato,  Emerson believes that thinking is a process through which the human being 
comes to itself. What is important for Plato, however, is the Law as a limit, which is essential as it  
prevents the self from falling into the world of the atemporal instincts.23 Both Emerson and Melville 
shift the limits of the dominant language, the contours of bodies, effectuating transformations. They 
question the distinction between law (convention,  nomos) and nature (physis),  between laws of 
nature  and  laws  of  convention,  performatively  constituted.  Both  Emerson  and  Melville  were 
influenced by Plato's works to a great extent. As Furlani writes, "by 1850 Melville had begun to 
acquire the six-volume Bohn edition of Plato's works, and the use he made of it is everywhere 
apparent in Melville's works: to no other philosopher does he allude more frequently."24 Emerson 




23 Patocka 187. 
24 Andre Furlani. "Bartleby the Socratic." Studies in Short Fiction (Vol. 34 Issue 3, 1997) 337.
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The Emersonian experimenter, as was suggested above, tries to use language in a new way, 
to  deconstruct  rigid  dichotomies,  ideologies,  systems  while  drawing  force  from  the  "beyond" 
(Power, Over-soul, Life) or "below" (abyss, silence, potentiality). To get beyond rhetoric by means 
of experimental use of language and logic is not an easy task. Melville´s Bartleby counters such a 
task, presenting a reaction to the Emersonian emphasis on performativity and the rhetorical nature 
of the self. Before we come to see what the rhetorical aspects "do" in the case of Bartleby, or any 
contemporary individual who decides to abandon/disappear from the symbolic order  of language 
and pragmatic rationality, we will focus on Emerson, on the hidden line of Emersonian thinking 
which  has  been  largely  disregarded.  This  line,  or  connection  of  ideas,  can  be  excavated  from 
Emerson's early, but chiefly from his late work, and may be discovered from his  Conduct of Life 
onwards. It is in his essay "Experience" that he finally steps down from his Greek Olympus and 
makes use of language and speech in a different way far from his early Platonic, idealistic beliefs 
and which was later developed further,  as was mentioned above, on the one hand by Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Butler and deconstruction, and on the other by pragmatists such as Charles 
Sanders Pierce, William James and Richard Rorty. Although we want to avoid any simple syntheses 
of these two directions of thought, we will see that the ideas of Deleuze and Derrida connected with 
the Bartleby issue draw on both of these influences and show various new perspectives on human 
potentiality. In order to interpret and "test" identity and agency by means of Bartleby, we will need 
to analyze personal identity,  potentiality,  power and various notions of difference and repetition 
(Deleuze, Derrida) in both Melville's  and Emerson's thinking.
1.2.2   Emerson and the Speaking Self 
Once we get to the "potentiality to disappear" which the class of silent, stammering and de-
centered subjects express (and which is described in Emerson's "Transcendentalist"), it is desirable 
to have a look at the myths and ideologies to which they react. Like ideology, says Bercovitch, 
"myth is inherently suspect, and for much the same reasons: it is (among other things) a vehicle of  
culturally prescribed directives for thought and behavior"25. American myths of self-reliance and 
individualism were already developing in  the  American Renaissance.  R.  W. Emerson explicitly 
states that one has to confide in one's own nature only, listen to what his/her "genius" tells him/her 
25 Sacvan Bercovitch, Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic Construction of America. (Routledge, 1992) 
358.
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and disregard the voices of others (including systems, governments and societies). His attitude has 
strong anarchist overtones. 
The Emersonian self is openly anti-bureaucratic and anti-governmental. Moreover, it does 
not even have to be consistent in its own thought. It can actualize any thought while leaving other, 
contradictory thoughts in the state of potentiality which may or may not be actualized at any time 
and which are valid alongside the actualized ones. Emerson does not concern himself too much with 
the truth or validity of his "system" of thinking, or his past writing. "Consistency is the hobgoblin of 
little minds", claims Emerson while continuing with his experimentation on all levels of being – 
questioning  language,  the  Church,  professing  self-creation  and  intellectual  activity.  He,  unlike 
Melville, however, identifies identity with creative thinking and self-fulfillment. The creative self, 
for him, draws on Life-force. Unlike the Kafkaesque and Melvillean characters who often suffer 
from entropy - loss or degradation of power/energy, decomposition into chaos, Emerson's figure of 
the "Experimenter", or "Poet" relies on his "genius," i.e. on a transcendental connection with (or 
participation in) the "beyond" (which, when realized, takes one to a higher level of creativity). The 
names Emerson uses to designate this "beyond" are the Over-soul, Power, Life-force. The primary 
relationship with the "other" is therefore the relationship with this "beyond." Emerson wants, in his 
early work, to let the Power flow through his self (the self is merely a channel) and get rid of 
everything that blocks this flow. The speech of such an inspired man is therefore the speech from 
beyond which effects a change in the here and now, which makes things happen. Words, according 
to Emerson, are often actions. To think is to act, as Emerson says:
A man's genius, the quality that differentiates him from every other … determines for 
him the character of the universe. As a man thinketh, so is he; and as a man chooseth, 
so is he and so is nature.26 
The uniqueness of man, of his  own thinking and speech, refers  to Emerson's  claim that 
everyone has their rightful "place" in the universe. The universe is what one sees it to be according 
to his/her "genius". Following Plato, Emerson claims that everyone "has" this genius and and that 
one can often recognize it in the works of others as one's own rejected thoughts. "Genius" makes the 
difference,  draws  the  lines  of  one's  thinking  in  a  particular,  unique,  way.  One's  opinions  are 
therefore  completely  subjective.  One's  journey  and  its  "success"  (to  become  oneself)  depends 
26 R.W. Emerson,. "Self-Reliance" Complete Writings  146, 147.
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mainly on oneself,  what one  can  do. To transform one's  thinking is  of great importance,  for it 
influences one's "place" and the roles one chooses to play. According to Emerson, nothing can stop 
the self in its ascension higher, in its expansion towards wider and wider circles of its life and 
knowledge. Every time the self feels too confined in its current situation, it has the potentiality to 
"draw a new circle" and transgress the boundaries of its old self, thereby creating a new horizon. 
The source of this change, as will be seen in the analysis of the temporality of the self, is however 
not one's enclosed self. Emerson's self-reliance is to a great extent a form of (divine)Power-reliance, 
which helps one to step beyond one's horizon into a God-like perspective of absolute possibility. He 
says in "Self-reliance:"
To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart 
is true for all men, -- that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the 
universal sense.27 
On the one hand, Emerson emphasizes here the transcendental grounds of his idealism – the 
unity of man with the universe and with himself, the oneness of man. On the other, he shows the 
common, ordinary nature of every human being. Once one gets to the bottom of one's heart he or 
she finds the same thing there which is ordinary, shared, a potential basis for democracy. It is also 
noteworthy that Emerson's imperative which aims to persuade us as much as himself says: "Speak 
your latent conviction." The stress is again on the individual, his genius and "his" (inspired) speech. 
It is a performance which "does" something in the world and it "does" something to the speaker. On 
what conditions does it work? What exactly does it enact? Nature, as we mentioned before, means 
in most cases human nature in Emerson. To give universal sense to nature then refers to the sense of  
human nature. It is a manifesto of subjectivist philosophy – our latent conviction, the lenses through 
which we see are only ours, our intuition shapes the world for us. Emerson interprets "genius" not  
as virtuosity but, as Stanley Cavell points out, as a stance, as the "name of the promise that the 
private and the social will be achieved together, hence of the perception that our lives now take 
place in the absence of either.28 The Emersonian "whim", as we will see later, refers in a sense to 
genius as a force which leads one's life. Emerson's self can therefore be led on the one hand, but on  
the other it performs, enacts itself.  And it is by means of speech, i.e. performative speech, that  
individual nature is changed and given sense. Instead of the Kantian space-time pattern, Emerson's 
27 Emerson, "Self-Reliance," 145.
28 Stanley Cavell, Transcendental Etudes, 93.
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world is enacted by spoken intuition which has the force to transform, making the universe plastic,  
fluid, moving. The aim is therefore not to enact a stable change, a stable universe of moral laws, 
values, or states (such as J.L. Austin's example of the marriage ceremony where the phrase "I do" 
creates a new legal and personal state). Emersonian performatives, as we will see, both create and 
then destabilize values, beliefs and social norms. His stress is primarily on language and self as 
processes and not on transcendental connections. The transcendental "aura" pertains to Emerson's 
thought only up to his essay "Experience". From "Experience" on, the main topic is speech, force,  
poetry and oratory as a means of liberation and heightened feeling of power. 
Emerson's rhetorical self and its spiritual liberation therefore stem from the individual. He 
emphasizes solitude: "We must go alone....But your isolation must not be mechanical, but spiritual, 
that is, must be elevation."29 Such isolation however does not equal mere self-interest. It does not 
hinder mutuality and community. Although Emerson believes that there seems to be no need to 
suffer when another person suffers, he does not advocate the ideal of a self-made man. What a 
suffering person needs is this kind of "elevation", this "detachment" by which he or she transcends 
their  current  condition.  Tocqueville  asserts  that  the  Emersonian  ideal  of  self-reliance  is  widely 
spread among Americans; they, nevertheless, rely rather on their reason: 
Each American appeals to the individual exercise of his own understanding… As no 
signs of incontestable greatness or superiority are perceived in any one of them, they 
are constantly brought back to their own reason as the most obvious and proximate 
source of truth. It is not only confidence in this or that man which is then destroyed, 
but  the  taste  for  trusting  the  ipse  dixit  of  any man whatsoever.  Every one  shuts 
himself up in his own breast, and affects from that point to judge the world.30
In other words, there is no divine or human authority which could be a better judge about 
things than the individual himself. One need not confide in any "other" (man, opinions, systems); 
his power, according to Emerson, is to be found in himself alone, nothing stands in his way, nature 
is  here to actualize his  wishes.  Such optimism, which would disregard external  limitations and 
practices, however, is not typically Emersonian. As we have mentioned, it drives Emerson's thought 
only up to his essay "Experience" (written after the death of his son) where he finally comes to fully 
acknowledge the power of circumstance (fate). 
29 Ibid.
30 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Bantam, 2004) 511-12. 
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1.3   Signs and Nature
This  short  chapter  will  introduce  us  to  Emerson's  work  Nature.  The  reasons  to  include 
Nature are  several.  First,  it  concerns  signs  and  language,  that  is,  topics  closely  related  to  the 
concepts of agency and performative action. Second, it is quite probable that Melville read Nature  
and Other Essays  (an edition including "The Transcendentalist") when he visited the Hawthornes 
before writing "Bartleby, the Scrivener." Many of Emerson's ideas from Nature were developed and 
re-formulated in a new way in his later essays ("Natural History of Intellect," "Fate"). 
Emerson understands Nature as NOT ME – it is both nature and art, all other men and my 
body. ME means, for Emerson, the spiritual being. Nature, however, is not completely separated 
from the individual. In special moments, as Emerson describes, Nature helps us perceive the unity 
of human nature and Nature, the exterior and the interior, the union, or identification of the soul 
with Nature/God/Power or the Over-soul.  
Another notion that Emerson discusses in Nature is the notion of language. In his late work, 
he describes language in a different way – as constructing and deconstructing values, individuals, 
traditions. In Nature, however, he views language as a teleological arrangement of signs. Emerson 
claims that: 1) Words are signs of natural facts, 2) Particular natural facts are symbols of particular  
spiritual facts, 3) Nature is the symbol of spirit. The signs therefore mirror nature and natural facts 
(as a kind of theory of correspondence). Yet, words are also symbols of spiritual facts. Language is 
thus seen as a set of metaphors and nature as a metaphor of the human mind. What follows from this 
is an important key to Emerson's work, that is, Nature refers in most cases to human nature. And 
human nature manifests itself mainly in action, not in words. He says:
Words are finite organs of the infinite mind. They cannot cover the dimensions of what 
is  in  truth.  They break,  chop,  and  impoverish  it.  An  action  is  the  perfection  and 
publication of thought.31 
Emerson therefore makes a distinction between action and words (which is later effaced) 
while claiming that these are not parts of brute nature, but of human nature only. As for intellect,  
Emerson views it in Nature as active, while in other essays (the Over-Soul and others) it is mostly 
31 Emerson, Nature, chapter III. Beauty, 34.
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passive and receptive while intuition is the active part. He says:
The intellect searches out the absolute order of things as they stand in the mind of 
God, and without the colors of affection. The intellectual and the active powers seem 
to succeed each other, and the exclusive activity of the one, generates the exclusive 
activity of the other. There is something unfriendly in each to the other, but they are 
like the alternate periods of feeding and working in animals; each prepares and will be 
followed by the other.32 
Emerson does  not  create  any elaborate  dichotomies here.  These are  mainly his  primary 
intuitions which he develops and articulates in more detail much later. That, of course, does not 
mean that we should expect stable definitions from Emerson. His ideas from Nature – especially 
those of analogy and his theory of correspondence are abandoned in his later works where the poet, 
the experimenter creates new concepts, percepts and enacts new realities.  There are no longer any 
essences, the world manifests an incredible plasticity. It becomes. In Nature, Emerson still holds on 
to the distinction between natural objects and human creation or crafts:
Nature, in the common sense, refers to essences unchanged by man; space, the air, the 
river, the leaf. Art is applied to the mixture of his will with the same things, as in a 
house, a canal, a statue, a picture.33
  
Here, Emerson's thinking bears visible signs of Neoplatonic thought. To see the essences 
which  shine  through  the  universe,  to  lessen  the  creative  force  of  poets,  which  cannot  be 
overestimated  or  hailed  more  in  his  later  essays  ("The  Poet,"  "Eloquence",  "Poetry  and 
Imagination"). In Nature, Emerson forces the dichotomies on the universe:
This relation between the mind and matter is not fancied by some poet, but stands in 
the will of God, and so is free to be known by all men. It appears to men, or it does not 
appear.34
These paragraphs are, paradoxically, closer to Heidegger and phenomenology than to any 
32 Emerson, Nature, chapter III. Beauty, 36.
33 Emerson, Nature, 38.
34 Emerson, Nature, 42.
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pragmatic notions of power, language and oratory (in his late essays). All in all, Emerson's essay 
Nature carries  within  itself  the  seeds  of  several  important  thoughts  developed  later  in  various 
directions.
1.4  Disappearance of the Self
Regarding the issue of selfhood as a detached, leaving (Bartleby-like) consciousness, it is 
desirable to have a look not only at the influence exerted by Platonism and gnosis on his thought 
but also on the importance of Puritanism on which Emerson, especially in his early work, drew. 
When talking about his detached, mystical experience, we will get to the issues of abandonment of 
the human as we know it and as we express it in discourse (especially in the Emersonian "lineage" 
whose influence reaches to Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Deleuze and others). In another sense, 
we find the notion of the disappearing self in Kafka's Josef K as well as the question of law. We will 
get to Kafka in the last chapter of this work. The questions that Emerson and others in his lineage of 
thought deal with are: Can we get rid of the self? Can we become inhuman in order to show the 
limits of our conceptions of the human? Can we draw a new circle within language at all? Emerson 
explains such a mystical experience of outsideness when he talks about himself as a transparent 
eyeball:
Standing on the bare ground, - my head bathed by the blithe air, and uplifted into 
infinite space, - all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am 
nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part 
or particle of God. The name of the nearest friend sounds then foreign or accidental: 
to  be  brothers,  to  be  acquaintances,  -  master  or  servant,  is  then  a  trifle  and  a 
disturbance.35 
The  transparent  eyeball  metaphor  is  difficult  to  interpret  in  Emerson's  subjectivist 
epistemology.  What  Emerson  tries  to  express,  in  my  view,  is  the  moment  of  eternity  within 
immanence,  when natural  laws experienced through the individual  consciousness become fluid. 
This eternity of/within the moment dissolves physical limits of time and space; it is an organic 
metamorphosis. Such state when one is without any direction, any orientation in space, would be 
35 Emerson, Nature, 45.
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considered a loss of identity from the modern view of the self as fixed within the spatio-temporal 
framework, or of an abandonment of human consciousness. For, there is no pattern, no framework 
of time and space, no laws, no subject position which one could experience and project on the 
universe.  The analyzing,  calculating way of  thinking is  abandoned altogether.  What  is  left  is  a 
perception of wholeness, connectedness, beauty, harmony, timelessness. An 'ec-stasis', in the sense 
of being extricated from the old norms, terms, structures and way of thinking is what Emerson, 
surprisingly, finds most authentic, most "human" and most fulfilling. By abandoning, one becomes, 
one is being renovated, one stays within the process of transition and complete eternity at the same 
time.  The  paradox  is  that  such  an  experience  almost  cannot  be  communicated  in  words.  The 
audience, unlike in his late essays, is unimportant, does not need to be persuaded, is considered 
rather a disturbance, if it does not know what Emerson is talking about in the passage. The self as a 
transparent eyeball cannot be defined in the Aristotelian categories which we still use, not only 
those used in  the description of  action.  The reader  struggles  with similar  problems concerning 
intelligibility  in  Melville's  works.  How  to  describe  the  metamorphosis  of  the  characters,  their 
becoming  inhuman?  How  can  we  do  it  with  our  humanist,  enlightenment-based  vocabulary? 
Emerson's self as "nothing" then might be a counterpart to Melville's Bartleby who do not have any 
clear direction or content; who are atemporal, potential, cyclical in their behavior and do not seek 
any destinations or goals. To find out anything about them we need to look at the margins of the 
text, at the unsaid, the repressed, at the discontinuities, or moments when language stops working, 
stops representing and offers new possibilities of interpretation. 
While  Emerson  describes  the  self  in  his  late  work  ("Eloquence",  "Natural  History  of 
Intellect") as a presence and potentiality (be it the presence of mind, of character, will or powerful 
dynamis), he draws inspiration from the disappearance of self voiced in his essay "Circles". Such an 
approach can be found in Nietzsche's work as well. The self becomes a bundle  of perspectives, of 
affects struggling to gain power over others. Consciousness and its feeling of power is then a mere 
result  of  this  struggle,  or  ascension  which  occurs  in  the  unconscious  realm  of  the  self.  This 
deconstructive Nietzschean approach, however, does not offer any positive alternative, any option 
as to what to build from the remnants of the "statue" of the self. Ultimately, Nietzsche translates it  
into a de-centred will to power (in his posthumously published work  Will to Power). Such a will 
refers to the disappearance of the self and its liberation from oppressive ideologies (including the 
state, Christianity and the masses). In Emerson, as Richard Poirier suggests, there is no need for a 
cultural revolution, as: 
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culture is treated less as a burden or impediment  than as an opportunity, as we have 
seen, for troping, for turning over or overturning, for twisting out of shape whatever 
comes to you by way of inheritance.36  
American  culture,  for  Emerson,  has  immense  potential,  possibilities  which  can  be 
actualized, developed, or transformed. While Emerson does not support institutionalized religion, 
he does not seek to eradicate it either. The same goes for the old conceptions of the self. Emerson 
gets rid of them when they seem too confining. He erases his self in moments of ecstasy, which is  
more of an event than anything calculable. In "Experience", he refuses to follow the track of cause 
and effect and claims that: 
Power keeps quite another road than the turnpikes of choice and will, namely the 
subterranean and invisible tunnels and channels of life. It is ridiculous that we are 
diplomatists, and doctors, and considerate people: there are no dupes like these.37
Here, Emerson opposes the connection between power and will, or power and decision. He 
turns to Life instead. This is also a development of his notion of "self-reliance." If we ask what the 
self actually relies on, it becomes clear that Emerson talks about a reliance on Life, on Force, on the 
unaccountable, the potential. Power, according to him then resides in the moment of transition, not 
in the construction of categories or fixed forms and selves. One cannot obtain power by means of 
will. The whole notion of will is redefined in Emerson's later work, and it can no longer act or  
effect things itself. Intentionality, as in the case of Bartleby, collapses. But we will get to that later 
on.  Poirier  also  stresses  the  decentralization  of  the  self  when  suggesting  that  for  Emerson, 
Nietzsche and Foucault the human being is no longer the center of the world, intellect does not 
reveal clear and distinct "truths". What is important is the style of the person, its potential. Self-
eradication can be, according to Poirier, exhilarating and culturally beneficial.38 Emerson says in 
"Circles": 
Every man is not so much a workman in the world, as he is a suggestion of what he 




should  be.  Men walk  as  prophecies  of  the  next  age.  Step  by step  we scale  this 
mysterious ladder:  the steps are actions; the new prospect is  power.  … The new 
statement is always hated by the old.39
 If the human is mainly a potentiality of becoming, what then is the "nothing" from his 
phrase "I  am nothing; I  see all"?  What occurs is  a certain eradication of will,  a loss of ego, a 
transgression of limits. Would we want everyone to live in this mode of being? All the time? And 
does this "ex-tasis" include any "action"? Or is it a moment of inaction, inoperativity, passivity and 
endless possibility – in a Bartlebian fashion? It seems as if Emerson was saying in both "Self-
Reliance" and in "Circles" that the less self-form one has, the more power one experiences. Self-
reliance is in this sense rather an abandonment of oneself to Life. 
This approach is close to William James's pragmatic notion of the self. James claims that the 
ideas and even the self occurs to one, in a similar way as "truth happens to an idea." He says that the 
self is discovered by you only as and when it "works," and it is to be continuously rediscovered.40 
The Emersonian self, for Poirier, suffers from the same problem: the self can rely only on those 
workings which in  turn reveal  it;  its  identity can therefore never  be fixed or  solidified.41 Both 
Emerson's and James's performative statements about words as action and the importance of action 
are pronounced mainly to make the two writers active. Emerson mainly persuades  himself in his 
essays. It is one of his chief aims, his own psychotherapy. He wants to be active, that is why he  
repeatedly preaches the importance of activity.  That is what keeps him in motion, in transition, 
active  and  believing.  His  melancholy  would  prevent  him  from  creative  work.  He  writes 
performative statements because he has to. But can abandonment also be performative? Can we 
speak with abandon? What does that mean? Is that a resolute speech which speaks one's belief, 
one's latent conviction wherever that may lead?     
1.4.1 Disappearing and Consciousness: "Circles", "Self-Reliance", "Intellect" 
The issue of the abandonment of the self, as we have seen, is connected with the Platonic 
notion of participation. One is an impersonal channel through which Power/Life flows. We need to 
ask then: What kind of agency is in force in this abandonment? What does such disappearing do to 




us?  In  "Circles"  Emerson  says:  "The  way  of  life  is  wonderful.  It  is  by  abandonment."  The 
Emersonian  voice (or contradictory voices)  dissolve(s) everything around it,  including customs, 
conventions, his own texts and his own self. He is always ready to leave the center and move to the 
periphery of experience, to the margins of consciousness to draw a new circle from there. He knows 
all  too  well  that  this  new circle  will  solidify itself  again  and take  a  certain  form – it  will  be 
performatively constructed through a language that still follows the rules of old logic, rhetoric and 
structures. To enact a new self is therefore a great challenge, especially through the writing process. 
To  get  rid  of  the  old  language,  consciousness  or  to  create  a  space,  a  possibility,  a  zone  of 
potentiality within it for a new self is the greatest task, which even Emerson himself often finds 
impossible. Speech and writing, however,  are the fundamental practical acts in Emerson's early 
work. In his later work, he often turns to music, art, painting, dance and other non-textual modes of  
expression. How can one actualize the voice within oneself when language limits us so? The voice 
as the "genius" communicates with Emerson directly. It causes the ongoing transition which, when 
written down, when passed through reflection, no longer captures the becoming of the self.  That is 
why it is so difficult to describe in words not only how the self gets created but also what "genius" 
is. Genius comes when we "abandon" the self. Genius, or the influx of divinity/energy into the 
world, is received by us and speaks to us by means of images before intuition brought them to light  
as words. Language, however, distorts the message with ideas and forms inherent in the language or 
discourse (such as the idea of subject vs. Object, the self, the other, stable existence...). How can 
"genius" free us from the constrictions of our culture when it speaks through the language of this 
culture? 
Richard Poirier in his  Renewal of Literature  tries to elucidate the problematic relationship 
between Emersonian genius and American culture. He quotes Emerson from "Circles": "history and 
the state of the world at any one time are directly dependent on the intellectual classification then 
existing in the minds of men." Poirier comments on it: "It is hard to see how any individual, except 
vaguely  or  intermittently,  could  manage  even  to  recognize  those  facts  which  necessitate  or 
accompany "a new order of things," a new "circle" or discursive formation."42 The notion, or voice, 
of "genius" is therefore not a solution to the problem of language. Emerson realizes that when the 
words of "genius" are written down as a text they become a part of history and their message is 
confounded (for any future readers). Emerson's dislike of rigid selves, the past, solid values and 
hierarchies is close to Plato's fear of written text, which can, as PHARMAKON, both heal, soothe 
42 Poirier 78.
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the  soul,  and poison.  Luckily,  Emerson's  voice manages  to  dissolve,  or  shift,  in  his  texts,  any 
petrified forms or ideas  (of  self,  culture,  intellect,  soul).  In  "Circles",  Emerson emphasizes  the 
transitoriness of both human and external nature. Reliance, for him, is a simplifying, external way 
of seeing. He says: "There are no fixtures in nature. The universe is fluid and volatile. Permanence 
is but a word of degrees."43 For Emerson, the mind or intellect can dissolve the "facts" of the world 
and  understand  the  law  (which  very  often  means  for  Emerson  "forces",  "vectors  of  forces", 
"direction"). He claims that "Every ultimate fact is only the first of a new series. Every general law 
only a particular fact of some more general law presently to disclose itself. There is no outside, no 
inclosing wall, no circumference to us."44 Such open-mindedness then refers to pure potentiality and 
indeterminacy.  Emerson  praises  the  forces  of  life:  "Nothing  is  secure  but  life,  transition,  the 
energizing spirit. No love can be bound by oath or covenant to secure it against a higher love. No 
truth so sublime but it may be trivial to-morrow in the light of new thoughts. People wish to be  
settled; only as far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them."45 
This ongoing, onward movement both of human nature and of external nature provokes a 
question whether we can really know, or ascertain that there is an outside and what it is. It also 
suggests that one can never really fully grasp this changing nature of the world but only try to 
attune to it. Emerson stresses the importance of widening of one's consciousness, of thinking, of 
following silently the tracks of nature. One can interpret such broadening as either an ascension (or 
diving), or as an extension of consciousness. Also the way one proceeds can be perceived as a 
continuous movement (as in a spiral) or as a discontinuous movement, a jump, from one's current 
circle to a wider circle (which often occurs after certain liminal situations such as the death of a 
parent, the loss of one's partner, shock, or revelation). But one of the main questions concerns the 
nature of thinking. Can one get anywhere by means of rational thinking? Is it not something that 
rather needs to be abandoned? How does it enact, ascertain, name us and thus make us exist? 
The question of thinking and its value in Emerson's work, is a complex one. We should 
distinguish between what he calls intellect (which could be equivalent to some extent to the Kantian 
notion of reason, for it  involves reflection which is, however,  receptive) and thinking (intuition 
which  is  to  a  great  extent  a  processual  activity bringing images  to  light,  constructing  ideas  as 
words). What is therefore most creative in Emerson's work, is intuition. Intellect often borders on 
perception, for it is passive, receptive and should be broadened to"receive" as much as possible. 




That refers also to sensibility as a measure of the nature of different individuals. We will get to these 
questions regarding the self and consciousness again later, when we interpret Emerson's late work. 
In "Circles" Emerson says: "The key to every man is his thought."46 Thinking refers here, in my 
view, to the way each man thinks (having an "idea" of his self), to the patterns he repeats, to the 
amount of "facts" he is able to perceive -  himself being the channel. Is that opposed to whim, or  
can it coexist with rational thinking? He explains whim as follows:
I have my own head and obey my whims, let me remind the reader that I am only an 
experimenter. Do not set the least value on what I do, or the least discredit on what I 
do not, as if I pretended to settle any thing as true or false. I unsettle all things. No 
facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker with 
no Past at my back.47
We can interpret Emerson's "whim" here as a force in nature, as a call  of genius which 
opposes utilitarism and vulgar pragmatism, effects, consistency and science. But what is the whim 
Emerson talks about in relation  to the self? If whim tells one to take a different road in life who is it 
that is speaking? Is it the divine inspiration that the Poet experiences or does it proceed from his 
constitution,  temperament  or  character?  If  Emerson  preaches  transition,  onward  thinking  and 
existence in the present time, no stability or consistency can be ensured. The self works rather as an 
organizing and disorganizing principle of mutable forces as vectors, of affects, of possibilities that 
can  be  actualized.  This  onward  thinking,  however,  does  not  continue  without  stopping.  The 
Cartesian "I  think,  I  am" does not always apply,  we do not think all  the time. Furthermore,  in 
timeless states, the mind does not count or calculate moments, there is no past or future, everything 
is unsettled, moving. When talking about time, whim, motion and change, Emerson draws on Plato 
and  Goethe.  Especially  Goethe's  notion  of  metamorphosis  can  help  us  understand  Emerson's 
notions of whim and the growth of consciousness. 
 
1.4.1.2 Plato, Goethe, Emerson: Time and Metamorphosis
Emerson,  when  talking  about  eternity  and  life  above  time,  draws  on  Plato's  dialogue 




imperfect, incomplete representation of change from Timaeus where God, according to Socrates, 
sought  to  make  the  universe  resemble  eternity  as  much  as  possible.48 Eternity  was,  however, 
unmoving and the universe was moving, which meant that the universe could not reproduce the 
original perfectly. Thus there is this disparity between the original and the copy.49 When we think 
about time, we actually project the segments (seconds, minutes) on the changing prototype while 
there is no inherent past, or future in time; humans devised it themselves. Emerson is also aware of 
the projection,  but he stresses the powers of the present  moment and often disregards the past  
altogether. Socrates says in Timaeus:
God determined to make a moving image of eternity, and so when he ordered the 
heavens he made in that which we call time an eternal moving image of eternity 
which remains for ever at one. 
In contrast to Plato's distinction between perfect forms and their imperfect, moving, copies 
in the world, the chronologic monad of Emerson persisted in time and confirmed time's continuity 
with  eternity.  Emerson writes  in  "The  Over-soul":  "After  its  [the  soul's]  own law and not  by 
arithmetic is the rate of its progress to be computed. The soul's advancements are not made  by 
gradation, such as can be represented by motion in a straight line; but rather by ascension of state, 
such as can be represented by metamorphosis – from the egg to the worm, from the worm to the  
fly." Our vanquishing of physical limitations (of time and space) comes through the activity of 
intellect which can convert solid matter into fluid law. Imagination plays a huge role here. For, the 
laws of nature can be accessed in one's inner nature, through inner experience, growth. They are 
therefore products of construction, of imagination, like works of art. 
What Emerson seeks is the growth of individual consciousness. What is the emblem of this 
organic growth? As Guthrie points out, it is the "monad" (a term adopted from Pythagoras, Leibniz 
and Goethe).50 Thanks to Goethe, Emerson found the connection between the spiritual and scientific 
dimension of  metamorphosis.  Goethe  wrote  in  his  "Metamorphosis  of  Plants"  in  1790 that  he 
wanted to limit himself only to one subset of metamorphosis, that is to the "regular," or progressive, 
metamorphosis that describes the growth of the plant from seed leaf to fruit as the transformation of 





the propagation through two sexes.  51 He understood the plant growth as successive periods of 
expansion and contraction.  Goethe's  four principles (of organic holism,  polarity,  intensification, 
transformation, which he also explained on musical composition) are not related merely to botany 
but also to human ascending qualities that Emerson talks about in his essays. 
 Metamorphosis  therefore  served  as  a  paradigm  for  both  the  growth  of  individual 
consciousness and as a descriptor of palpable natural processes.52 The monad meant for both Goethe 
and Emerson the persistence of character in a sea of change. Guthrie claims that this notion of 
monad was connected with their notion of representativeness, that is, the presence of the one in 
many,  and the many in one.  53 On a temporal level,  this  principle was seen in a  moment as a 
concentrated eternity. Goethe said: "Every moment has infinite worth for it is the representative of 
all eternity." The moment is therefore eternity realizing itself in time.54 Both Emerson and Goethe 
stress this immanence of eternity in the moment as opposed to a transcendental stance above time. 
Coming back to the issue of whim, Emerson says that in moments of inspiration one needs 
to follow the whim whatever it is. He says: "I shun father and mother and wife and brother when 
my genius calls me. I would write on the lintels of the door-post, Whim." Stanley Cavell interprets 
the passage as follows: 
I will not repeat what I have said elsewhere concerning Emerson's marking of Whim 
in the place of God and thus staking his writing as a whole as having the power to  
turn aside the angel of death. The point I emphasize here is only that the life-giving 
power of words, of saying "I", is your readiness to subject your desire to words (call 
it Whim), to become intelligible, with no assurance that you will be taken up. ("I 
hope it may be better than whim at last, but we cannot spend the day in explanation"). 
Emerson's dedication is a fantasy of finding your own voice, so that others, among 
them mothers and fathers, may shun you.55   
Whether "whim" is an equivalent of God, as Cavell claims, or the call of genius, which I  
believe, is not of essential importance. But we need to ask what is the relationship of intellect to 
whim. For, Emerson does say that the act of saying "I" is performative, but he also stresses silence 




55  Cavell 93.
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and abandonment as relevant for self-reliance. He says in "Intellect":
The ancient sentence said, Let us be silent, for so are the gods. Silence is a solvent 
that destroys personality, and gives us leave to be great and universal. …. But whilst 
he gives himself up unreservedly to that which draws him, because that is his own, he 
is to refuse himself to that which draws him not, whatsoever fame and authority may 
attend it, because it is not his own. Entire self-reliance belongs to the intellect. One 
soul is a counterpoise of all souls, as a capillary column of water is a balance for the 
sea.56
Silence, for Emerson, liberates personality by means of destroying it, transforming it. The 
limits and forms that speech imposes upon one are melted down. In this way, one can transgress the 
boundaries of his constructed self  and allow oneself  to be led. However, Emerson is careful to 
distinguish who or what can lead one. The antagonism toward other souls is still present. Whatever 
position of authority is offered him, whatever fame, he is to reject it because it does not draw him. It 
would make him inauthentic and not the source of his activity. Intellect here is manifested as that 
source, as the force that lies behind genius. It dissolves fire, gravity, laws, method. It is difficult to  
separate  the  action  of  the mind from knowledge and other  actions.  Also,  Emerson claims  that  
intellect separates the fact considered from one's self. One is tyrannized by the considerations of 
time and place, of oneself and others, of profit and harm. Intellect is the means of detachment; it is  
capable of abstractions. Such a detached platform from which one can view and move one's present 
life  is  literature.  We might  ask:  Is  therefore  what  Emerson  does  a  literary  endeavor?  Or  is  it  
philosophical? 
As we have seen, Emerson's thinking is not an enclosed system or doctrine. However, he 
explicitly deals with philosophical issues such as the mind-body split, the Cartesian cogito, Kant's 
notion of space and time and develops these in his own way. From my point of view, his dialectic 
which never arrives at a final synthesis can and should be considered a part of a philosophical 
endeavor and questioning. The argument that Emerson draws on intuition, which for some might be 
seen as non-philosophical, is only partially true. Emerson does draw to a great extent on other 
thinkers (be it Heraclitus, Plato, Plotinus, Boehme, Goethe, Descartes, Kant, Hegel) and without 
this knowledge, he would be unable to express his views the way he does. Although he preaches 
about the necessary return to instincts and intuition, one needs a lot of knowledge to be able to get  
56 Emerson, "Intellect," 230.
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rid of petrified forms of behavior. What Emerson does believe, however, and what becomes much 
more clear in his  late work is that intellect  is  dependent on the unconscious.  We cannot really 
determine what we think. The basis of intellect is not pure reason but the instincts and affects that  
underlie it. Thinking is a spontaneous process and even though it can transform circumstance and 
make it  plastic,  there are still  events which we cannot control,  which befall  us and need to be 
accepted. We are thrown into a place in the world which we did not select. There are situations 
which  present  many  external  impediments,  limitations,  what  Emerson  calls  the  power  of 
circumstance. Life is a combination of power and form. As we will see in Conduct of Life Emerson 
conceives of our self as  constituted not by means of pure reason but in a non-rational world where 
instincts,  spontaneity  and  intuition  play,  or  should  play,  a  major  part.  To  abandon  rationality, 
calculation and simplifying logic means to come back to the primordial, instinctual, natural origins 
of the human self and knowledge. To trust our instinct, as George J. Stack argues, is also a part of  
trusting the "genius" which helps enhance our existence. He says that "the cognition of 'the genius' 
is neither discursive nor follows in accordance with the pattern of deductive inference. Rather, it is 
essentially "spontaneous."57 Our ideas therefore cannot be explained by pure reason. Rather, it is 
essential to stop the calculative, pragmatic rationality, to let things and events come to us. Emerson 
says: 
The one  thing  which  we seek  with  insatiable  desire  is  to  forget  ourselves,  to  be 
surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory and to do something 
without knowing how or why; in short to draw a new circle. Nothing great was ever 
achieved without enthusiasm. The way of life is wonderful; it is by abandonment.58
Enthusiasm refers here, I believe, to the exact etymology of the word which has meant a 
state when one is "filled with God" or Life, Force. It is therefore not something one can do, or 
effect. As with the call of genius, such a state is a state of powerlessness, a mode of being between 
authenticity and inauthenticity. A moment when one's  experiences are extratemporal, that is when 
one experiences eternity within a moment. If experience creates the time matrix, then any possible 
widening of experience changes the perception of time as well. The walls of time are dissolved into 
water. All that ever was is now. Emerson often uses the Heraclitean concept of fire as a figure for 
thought.  For,  thought  as  well  as  fire  could  melt  matter  back  into  its  constituent  forces/laws. 
57 Stack, George, J. Emerson and Nietzsche: An Elective Affinity (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1993) 189.
58 Emerson, "Circles," 220.
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Together with the constancy of change (Emerson uses the metaphor of metamorphosis), the two 
concepts create the "pillars" of Emerson´s subjective idealism. The influence of Heraclitus and Ovid 
can be perceived mainly when Emerson talks about the symbolic nature of language and metaphors. 
We will get to the issue later on when discussing the Poet.
1.4.2  Emerson's "Transcendentalist" as a Potential Source for Bartleby
One of  the  questions  that  many commentators  of  Melville  have tried to  solve  (i.e.  Dan 
McCall, Hershel Parker, Christopher W. Sten) is whether "Bartleby, the Scrivener" was inspired by 
Emerson's  early  essay  "The  Transcendentalist."59 The  thinker  Emerson  describes  in  this  essay 
resembles to a great extent the character of Bartleby. It is then important,  I believe, to explore 
Emerson's early work not only because it provides the necessary context for Melville’s criticism of 
transcendentalism but also in  order  to  understand the shift  towards  immanence and philosophy 
concerning power, potentiality and will that took place in both Emerson's work (after he wrote his 
essay "Experience") and Melville's work (after his completion of Moby Dick). 
It  is  noteworthy that  even  though  I  consider  the  Emersonian  influence  upon  Melville's 
"Bartleby, the Scrivener" to be the most important single influence, there are two more sources 
which  Melville  made  use  of  when  writing  the  story in  the  summer  of  1853.  As  Dan McCall 
mentions in his book  The Silence of Bartleby, the second source is most probably a newspaper 
article published in The New York Times and The New York Tribune, called  "The Lawyer's story; 
or on the Wrongs of the Orphans. By a Member of the Bar." from February 18, 1853. It reads as  
follows: 
"In  the  summer  of  1843,  having  an  extraordinary  quantity  of  deeds  to  copy,  I 
engaged,  temporarily,  an extra  copying clerk,  who interested me considerably,  in 
consequence  of  his  modest,  quiet,  gentlemanly  demeanor,  and  in  his  intense 
application to his duties. … The clerk answered I would prefer being near my sister. 
… Hope for the future is dead within me. … The lawyer said: I urge you to view the 
matter differently."60
59 Emerson, Nature; Addresses and Lectures (1849) (Elibron Classic Series, 2006) 309. "The Transcendentalist" was 
first a lecture read at the Masonic temple in Boston in 1842, then published in 1849 as part of Emerson’s Nature;  
Addresses and Lectures, which contained a reedited and republished version of Nature, along with a number of other 
essays.
60 Dan McCall, The Silence of Bartleby (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,1989) 6.
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The situation is surprisingly similar to the setting of  "Bartleby, the Scrivener." Although 
Melville erased all the women from the story (the wife of the lawyer and the sister of the scrivener), 
the dialogue between Bartleby and the lawyer deals with the same issue and involves a similar 
misunderstanding on the part of the lawyer.
The third most probable source for Melville’s Bartleby refers to several verses in the Bible, 
which are, as McCall suggests, mainly Christ's injunction in Matthew 25:34-40. For, Melville has 
the lawyer say three times that he is not related in any way to Bartleby: "but, really, the man you 
allude to is nothing to me - ". Or, another example: "I know nothing about him." In Mark 14:71 , we 
read: "I know not this man of whom ye speak."61
The first, and most influential source, as I argue here, is, however, Emerson's writing. We 
know from Melville’s correspondence that Melville heard Emerson lecture in the winter of 1848-49. 
He writes: "I have heard Emerson since I have been here. Say what they will, he's a great man."62 
And in the next letter: "Let us call him a fool; - then had I rather be a fool than a wise man. - I love  
all men who dive.63 Further on, he describes Emerson as a man who comes back with blood-shot 
eyes,  resembling  the  unaccountable  and indeterminate  whale.  The blankness  of  the  whale  also 
resonates  with  Emerson's  characteristics  of  the  poet  who  helps  to  enact  such  blankness,  such 
creative potentiality within his  readers.  We shall  find "blankness" in  Bartleby as well,  yet  in a 
different light. 
From what is known of Melville's reception concerning "The Transcendentalist," Melville 
read the essay with considerable care. Sophia Hawthorne wrote to her sister, Elizabeth Peabody, 
that on one visit, Melville "shut himself into the boudoir and read Mr. Emerson's essays "all one 
morning.64 He read these essays a few months before he wrote Bartleby. 
Emerson talks, in "The Transcendentalist" about a class of men (into which one could easily 
include Bartleby himself) who are "like fairies, they do not wish to be spoken of. Love me, they say, 
but do not ask who is my cousin and my uncle" ("The Transcendentalist"). Bartleby, in a similar 
manner refuses to talk about his past. He wants the lawyer to see the answer in Bartleby's face, to  
divine it himself. Emerson speaks for the sensitive class of men: "if you cannot divine it, you would 
not understand what I say."65 A person from such a class claims: "I do not wish to perform," and: "I 
61 Ibid. 4.
62 24th of February, 1849, in a letter to Duyckinck.
63 3rd of March, 1849, in a letter to Duyckinck.
64 Quoted in Christopher W. Sten, "Bartleby, the Transcendentalist: Melville’s Dead Letter to Emerson," Modern 
Language Quarterly" 35 (March 1974) 31.
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do not wish to do one thing but once. I do not love routine."66 In a similar vein, Bartleby "prefers 
not to." In Sten's interpretation, this means that Bartleby refuses to work. Sten argues that it  is 
difficult for him to view Bartleby as a transcendentalist because he is speechless and we cannot say 
much about his thinking. As Branka Arsic argues, on the other hand, Bartleby's speechlessness and 
impassivity refer to a thought that does not "have" itself and can only be lived "without giving an 
account of itself."67 I agree with Arsic that Bartleby follows Emerson who supports the thought of 
an open mind, a mind become an influx.68 I, however, do not agree with her notion of open thinking 
as impersonal suffering. I believe that, for Emerson, open thinking does relate to abandonment of 
personality  which  is,  nevertheless,  expressed  as  animating,  actualizing  ecstasy  and  not  as  a 
Bartlebian suffering. Later on, Arsic claims that such indeterminate "suffering" (which she derives 
from the word pathos, patient, patientia) is only a hope and no poet has fulfilled it yet. What is at 
stake in Emerson is, I believe, a state of blankness, transparency outside of any fixed form or self; 
the state of eternity immanent in the moment. I agree with Arsic when she says that Emerson, for 
Melville, represented, as a whale, the possibility of new thinking.69 Emerson could be understood as 
a  "Drummond  light  which  lights  everything  around  it."70 For,  Emerson  says  in  "The 
Transcendentalist": "the Transcendentalist … believes in the perpetual openness of the human mind 
to a new influx of light."71 Bartleby's blankness, I believe, could also be seen as a light, which being 
formless, reveals to us the objects in their forms. What Bartleby does is that he makes one abandon 
the  "I"  of  one's  thinking  so  that  one  may plunge  into  indeterminacy and  potentiality.  That  is 
obviously what frightens the attorney the most.    
When Emerson describes in "The Transcendentalist" the class of extraordinary persons who 
need to be respected within a society, it is not clear whether he identifies with them. He says:
It is a sign of our times ...  that many intelligent and religious persons withdraw 
themselves from the common labors and competitions of the market and the caucus, 
and betake themselves to a certain solitary and critical way of living, from which no 
solid fruit has yet appeared to justify their separation.  They hold themselves aloof: 
they feel the disproportion between their faculties and the work offered them, and 
they prefer to ramble in the country and perish of ennui, to the degradation of such 
66 Emerson, "The Transcendentalist," 104. 
67 Branka Arsic, Passive Constitutions or 7 ½ Times Bartleby (Stanford University Press, 2007) 101.
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charities and such ambitions as the city can propose to them. They are striking work, 
and crying out for somewhat worthy to do! What they do, is done only because they 
are overpowered by the humanities that speak on all sides.72
The spirit of these people, their writing and conversation are lonely. In a Bartlebian fashion 
they repel influences and shun society. Such abandonment, as Emerson notices, is not well liked in 
society. Yet, such shunning does not proceed from any whim; it comes both from temperament and 
from principle. Another reason why they shun society is the desire to experience equality. They 
wish for a just and equal fellowship, or none at all, says Emerson. "They cannot gossip with you, 
and they do not wish, as they are sincere and religious, to gratify any mere curiosity which you may 
entertain." Again, Emerson stresses the fact that they do not "wish to." It is not that they would not 
"will to," for this is not a problem of will. They have no will. Unlike John B. Williams in  White 
Fire:  The Influence  of  Emerson on Melville,  I  argue  that  Bartleby cannot  be interpreted as  an 
extreme example of self-reliance which is based on will and independence. Bartleby's will is a mere 
organization of his becoming, of his potential. It is not a self-assertive will, which would also be 
power, the power to act otherwise. Bartleby's action is not direct. It occurs and it affects us on the 
margins of our consciousness.  
Emerson also noticed that people are imperfect. Like Melville, he believed that every piece 
has  a  crack.  Emerson says:  "'T is  strange,  but  this  masterpiece  is  a  result  of  such an  extreme 
delicacy, that the most unobserved flaw in the boy will neutralize the most aspiring genius, and 
spoil the work."73 But he claims that the good and wise people must learn to act and save "the  
combatants and demagogues in the dusty arena below."74 The second instance, as we mentioned 
earlier, when Emerson pronounces his "I do not wish to" is when he speaks about the necessity of 
action. He says:
Unless the action is necessary, unless it is adequate, I do not wish to perform it. I do 
not  wish to  do one thing but  once.  I  do not  love  routine.  Once possessed  of  the 
principle, it is equally easy to make four or forty thousand applications of it. A great 





reigning Idea of his time.75
It is important to realize that when Emerson distinguishes the materialist from the idealist, he 
stresses the spiritual dimension of events and objects in idealist thought which is also adopted by 
the transcendentalist. What is interesting, however, is that he mentions the name of the German 
philosopher Jacobi (whom he classifies as a transcendental moralist) who sees the measure of right 
and wrong only in the determinations of private spirits. Emerson's reading of Jacobi tells us two 
things.  First,  knowing  Jacobi  suggests  that  Emerson  was  acquainted  with  the  Dutch  pantheist 
thinker Baruch Spinoza (which becomes increasingly obvious in his late work). Second, Jacobi was 
a thinker of immanence, an atheist. If Emerson, however, calls him a transcendental moralist, it 
means,  in  my  view,  that  Emerson's  notion  of  transcendence  did  not  necessarily  involve  any 
connection to religious or spiritual faith in the "beyond." It would also suggest that Emerson was a 
pantheist  himself  who  found  the  source  of  all  energy,  life  and  force  within  nature.  Emerson 
advocates the waiting of the Bartlebian class of people, till they be activated. He responds to the 
argument:
" But whilst you wait, you grow old and useless.' 
"Be it so: I can sit in a corner and "perish," (as you call it,) but I will not move until I 
have the highest command. If no call should come for years, for centuries, then I 
know that the want of the Universe is the attestation of faith by my abstinence."76
It  does  not  seem,  however,  that  Bartleby waits  for  the  highest  command,  for  a  divine 
activation of his forces. His blankness, formlessness provokes his colleagues who try to activate 
him. Yet, Bartleby will not accept the mode in which they do that. He keeps abandoning everything 
fixed. In an Emersonian way, he remains a zone, a potentiality, outside of law itself. Is Emerson 
able to describe such abandonment? 
1.4.3 Emerson and the Legacy of Puritanism
  
Talking  about  Emerson's  aim  "to  disappear"  from the  spacio-temporal  pattern,  another 




explored in the following chapter), the Puritans also played their role in the context of Emerson's 
construction and deconstruction of the self. The Puritans sought "to disappear," but in their case the 
reason for losing the self was their desire to be filled with Christ. Sacvan Bercovitch sums up the 
influences of Puritanism on Emerson in his book  The Puritan Origins of the American Self.  He 
describes their identity issues and images in the mirror as follows:
For  the  writers  from the  humanist  Renaissance  (Richard  Mather,  Dell,  Baxter)  the 
mirror radiated the divine image. They never sought their own reflection in it, as did 
Montaigne, ….They sought Christ. … Manetti, Ficino, and Pico held up the Christic 
mirror to show man his own splendor. The Puritans felt that the less one saw of oneself  
in that mirror, the better; and best of all was to cast no reflection at all, to disappear. … 
You must  be  empty if  ever  Christ  fill  you,"  went  the  pulpit  refrain,  "You must  be 
nothing if you would have Christ."77   
The whole body of sin, according to Bercovitch, had to be washed, transformed, emptied, 
rendered pure.  Such "saintly"  characters who draw on (divine,  natural)  Power can be found in 
Emerson's writing as well. Emerson always reaches for the future, emphatically and performatively 
constituting the new poet whose aspirations and aims are as wide as the land itself. He is to be 
everything and nothing – a character who makes use of all his talents, a "jack-of-all-trades" with 
moral integrity. Bercovitch relates the "new man" in Emerson to Puritanism by saying that Emerson 
sees man as a "new man in a paradisiacal New World.  He is  a fallen creature,  to be sure,  but  
comparable nonetheless, as a latter-day American saint, with Emerson's Young American, aspiring 
in troublous times towards a lost organic wholeness which he only darkly understands and of which 
he remains largely undeserving."78 When Emerson talks about the young American he stresses that 
he should obey his heart and the nobleness of the land.79 Bercovitch takes this idea further and 
interprets Emerson's view of American identity as the equation of "man as America"  and the land. 
The land was to serve as the salutary influence which "promises to disclose new virtues for ages to 
come."80 Connecting the "land" with "nature", Bercovitch says: 
77 Sacvan Bercovitch, The Rites of Assent: Transformations in the Symbolic Construction of America (Routledge, 1992) 
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 Emerson interpreted the self through the medium of American nature; his model of 
spiritual growth reflected a teleology that eliminated the tension between process and 
fulfillment. It gathered meaning by its proleptic identification with the destiny of the 
New World, of which American nature was the symbol.81
On the other hand, however, we should not disregard, in my view, Emerson's stress on the 
"psychology" of the self as something that exists apart from the land. For Emerson, the concept of  
"nature" very often meant "human nature", as we mentioned above. What he was claiming when he 
talked about nature in connection with power, life force, instincts and signs referred mainly to the 
development and transformation of the singular, unique self. Emerson's "hero," as he constructs 
him, is not here for others to imitate; furthermore he does not primarily imitate America. Imitation 
is something that Emerson, in contrast to the Puritans, considers highly inauthentic. For him, each 
self has to find  its unique way of life, its direction and ascent higher (in a Platonic fashion) as much 
as possible. That is a part of Emerson's Romantic heritage.  
Bercovitch rightly claims that Emerson's Romantic naturalism and Puritan hermeneutics are 
to a certain degree interconnected.82 When talking about identity he explains the Puritan concept of 
intermediate identity. Puritans adopted the notion from Augustine's passage about  experimentum 
medietatis,  the "trial  of the center",  in which the ego overcomes the soul.  For Romantics,  says 
Bercovitch, it  resulted in "the victory of the soul."83 The Romantic "model of selfhood was the 
inspired perceiver. In effect, they freed the individual to choose (invent) his identity, and then to 
impose his own patterns upon his experience, including his experience of history, nature, the Bible, 
Christ Himself."84 Imitation of Christ was therefore a process of duplicating oneself and of showing 
faith in one's own image, which depended on narcissism and autonomy.85 Such duplicating of self 
based on the (projection of oneself onto Christ) of Christ is not, I believe, present in Emerson's 
writings. It is true that Emerson often led a dialogue with himself, being an inspired perceiver, but 
he was aware that he could not impose his own freely created patterns upon his experience. There 
was a limiting factor, the circumstance, which hindered any fully narcissistic projection.  







of Carlyle and Goethe. Emerson led a lifelong correspondence with Carlyle and was influenced by 
Goethe's  notion  of  time  and  metamorphosis.  However,  Bercovitch  goes  as  far  as  to  say  that 
Emerson was creating his own mythology. He says: "Emerson expressed himself by expressing the 
myth of America."86 In my view, Emerson is much more focused on the individual phenomenology 
and perception than on the expression of the myth of America. According to Bercovitch, Emerson 
distinguished between American and un-American identity. Un-American identity was interpreted 
as the genius of humanity (intellects such as Plato, Napoleon) which was atemporal (as history 
repeated itself).  The motive of history as an ascending spiral was connected with the American 
identity. This is, according to Bercovitch, clearly shown in Emerson's essay Circles. However, it is 
not clear from Emerson's writing that he believes in the repetition of history, in what Nietzsche later 
called the eternal return of the same. Rather, his focus is on the present moment, which can include 
eternity as a part of the present moment, in immanence. In creative, or artistic ecstasy, one perceives 
the eternity, the boundlessness of the moment. 
Bercovitch stresses that the Puritans, like Emerson, valued subjectivism, I-in-process and 
personal assertion. Such assertion often led to downright militancy, where they saw America as a 
place of universal rebirth. Bercovitch comments on the secular aspects of Puritanism: "The 'self-
made man' of business, for example, was not simply a secular version of the visible saint. He was a 
sort of mercantile imitation Americae, representing a union of personal and historical ideals, both of 
these grounded in the belief that America was ready for the ultimate confrontation with God."87 
Emerson, according to  Bercovitch,  adopted Puritan secular  hermeneutics,  which arrived to  him 
through  Mather  and  Edwards.  In  combination  with  Emerson's  ideas,  the  implications  for  the 
concept  of  American  identity  were,  according  to  Bercovitch,  twofold:  Calvinist  depravity 
(Edwards)  and  Emerson's  cosmic  optimism.88 However,  we  must  not  overestimate  the  Puritan 
influence on Emerson, because he was able, as we will see, to transform his Platonic, Puritan and 
Romantic  heritage into an amalgamation of his own.
 1.4.4  Emerson's Confidence in Himself
 
Another important aspect of his writing concerns Emerson's appeal to self-perfection. Self-





support  the idea of the self-made man, his journey is spiritual and rhetorical – it has no clear end, 
no  completion.  What  Bercovitch  describes  as  Emerson's  "synthesis"  is,  in  my  view,  slightly 
misleading,  because  Emerson's  dialectic  never  truly  arrives  at  any  stable  synthesis  (which 
distinguishes him from Hegel). What we get in Emerson's writing is usually a paragraph – a thesis – 
followed by another paragraph which often claims the opposite, being a perfect antithesis to it. 
There is no synthesis that would stop the dialectical process. Emerson's discourse is a journey of 
transformation,  directed  by  "whim,"  his  "genius,"  or  his  current  "mood."  There  are  no  fixed 
statements  which  hold  for  a  longer  time,  no  stable  practical  effects  which  would  explain  his 
concepts. Being the master of antithesis, difference and new perspectives, he is ready to break down 
any established notion and "truth" whenever he feels like it. And he does just that quite often. There 
are  usually at  least  two standpoints  in  his  essays  which  struggle for  victory,  or  which ask for 
synthesis,  but  Emerson never  lets  them finish the  rhetorical  process,  never  bringing them to  a 
synthetic conclusion.  There is  no completion,  no complete figure (which Bercovitch stresses in 
regard to the Puritans) in Emerson's writing.89 The process of exploration and experiment, as we 
mentioned above, goes on, sometimes quite incoherently and openly against all conformity. 
I would not therefore so universally emphasize Emerson's reaffirmation of the vision of 
Puritanism90 even though in his essay  Nature  he draws on the Puritanical mode of exegesis. The 
same goes for Emerson's "system," for there is, luckily or otherwise, no such thing to be found in 
his writing. I attempted to show that Emerson's essay Nature and its conception of words as signs of 
natural facts and other ideas were his early conceptions which he developed in his later writings. In 
his late work, from Conduct of Life on, his focus is on language, discourse, his approach being both 
creative,  constitutive,  as  well  as  deconstructive.  Very  often  he  deconstructed  his  own  (self-) 
confidence and had to re-enact it in a new way by means of performative speech.
I agree with Bercovitch that, "Emerson's confidence is mainly an act of faith in himself" and 
that American Scholar is Emerson's autobiographical hero and that he projects himself onto the 
hero.  Self-reliance  is,  according to  Bercovitch,  the  consummate  expression  of  a  culture  which 
places  an  immense  premium on  independence  while  denouncing  all  forms  of  eccentricity  and 
elitism, in opposition to, say, Nietzsche. He says that: "The self-reliant American may declare his 
whim superior to the entire legal code, but he remains by definition the hero as guide and national 
benefactor."91 We have seen this paradox in the reception of Emerson's work as well. On the one 
89 Ibid. 165.
90 Ibid. 160.
91 Ibid. 171. 
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hand, he is considered the Founding Father of American thinking, the authority which one needs to 
obey. On the other hand, Emerson is seen as a deconstructive philosopher following his whim, like 
Nietzsche, who hammers down rigid structures, contentless values, imitations and traditions. In this 
way, he is often quoted by feminists, post-structuralists and post-colonialists. 
    
    1.5   Power and Performativity in Emerson’s Early Work 
     1.5.1 The Performative Power of Words
            Emerson's philosophy of following one's whim, or "genius," leads us into several difficulties 
and various surprises. In his early work Emerson always emphasized spontaneity, a connection to 
the  beyond and sincerity.  He openly opposed all  kinds  of  conformity (which  for  him was the 
counterpart  to  "whim"),  overturned  traditional  concepts  (of  the  self,  of  time,  of  society),  and 
enacted new ways of thinking. In other words, we can talk about the immense power of his writing 
to transform everything around him, including himself. That means that his writing is performative, 
it does something to us, it effects a change in the world, it is series of performative acts that shape 
even personal identity. J. L. Austin introduced the term "performative utterance" to make clear that 
to say something, in some cases, is to do something. However, as J. L. Austin says further on in 
How to  Do  Things  with  Words,  for  a  performative  to  work,  it  must  take  its  power  from the 
preceding "formulas" repeated within a tradition in a certain context. This refers to conformity. The 
performative formula needs  to  draw on preceding formulas  in  the same "ceremonious" context 
(such as the "I do" performative act in a wedding ceremony).92 The question whether a performative 
is  separable  from  the  situation  it  emerged  in  is  therefore  extremely  important.  It  is  relevant  
especially  when one addresses the status of individual intentions, sincerity or speech as a resource 
of power.  
What Emerson does, however, is rather a revolution, overturning these "ceremonies." How 
do his performatives work then? Where do they draw their power from? Another prerequisite for 
performatives is sincerity. Sincerity, however, does not necessarily refer to seriousness. J. L. Austin 
excludes from the realm of performatives sentences pronounced within literature or theatre, jokes 
and any other non-serious use of language. Jacques Derrida and others successfully challenged this 
claim of Austin by saying that everything we say is already a citation, not only theatre plays but 
also  our  everyday  speech.  The  distinction  between  serious  and  non-serious  use  of  language 
92 J. L. Austin. How To Do Things with Words (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1975) 130. 
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therefore cannot hold. 
As for sincerity, that is a more difficult issue. Emerson says that when his "genius" calls him 
he is ready to live with the devil if necessary. He does not shy away from anything. He is only an  
experimenter, following his whim in a sincere way but not claiming absolute truth for his sentences, 
including performatives. His performatives are acts and they are to a great extent related to the 
courage to express one's unique potential, to break from a conformist society, to speak one's latent 
convictions and let them be seen as making sense for others as well. His endeavors seem sincere, 
yet neither himself nor anyone else can draw the distinction between truth and falsity in his work. 
All of us are fictional characters. It is not Emerson's aim to unmask confidence-men. Also, the 
simple theory of truth as correspondence does not hold in Emerson's later work which includes the 
processual notion of truth where one co-creates events and events co-create him. For, Emerson does 
not try to simply "make sense" of the world around him and appease his readers. Rather, he puts old 
concepts into new contexts, challenging everything one had believed up to that point. How can such 
an overturning activity be performative? How can something new take its force from the old? J. 
Hillis Miller describes such overturning, or  revolution as follows:
 
A revolution, however, is a performative event that definitely does not fit Austin's 
criteria for a felicitous performative. A genuine revolution, one that makes a decisive 
break  in  history,  cannot  depend  on  pre-existing  conventions,  laws,  rights, 
justifications, and formulations, however much it characteristically attempts to claim 
that it does. A revolution is a performative act of a particular, "nonstandard" kind, 
namely the anomalous kind that creates the circumstances or conventions that validate 
it, while masking as a constative statement. A revolution is groundless, or rather, by a 
metaleptic future anterior, it creates the grounds that justify it.93
While  Austin  creates  such  a  "revolution"  in  philosophy,  even  though  he  claims  to  be 
following Kant, Emerson does not preach revolution in any of his works. He introduces new terms 
and "a new language creates a new realm, a whole new world."94 Yet, he does not mention its 
political implications nor is political change his primary aim. In Austin's case we remain in the 
domain of speech-act theory. In Emerson's and Melville’s case, linguistic acts always imply much 
more than just what was said. They point to the silence, the non-selected potentialities lurking on 
93 J. Hillis Miller, Speech Acts in Literature (California: Stanford U Press, 2001) 27. 
94 Ibid.
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the horizon, which make concrete speech possible. In what way are these performative? In the final 
chapter of this essay we shall ask: Is Bartleby a performative failure? What does it say about the 
distribution of subject positions, the order of time and the law? Now, however, let us have a closer 
look at Austin's notion of performatives.
 Austin was examining the category of constatives – statements that can be either true or 
false, when he discovered that language not only has the capacity to represent but also to make 
something happen. That is why he introduced the category of performative speech acts. There are 
two types: The illocutionary act is concerned with what an actor is doing in saying something (e.g.  
when someone says ‘hello,’ he is greeting another person).95 The perlocutionary act involves the 
unintended consequences  of  an utterance and refers  to  that  which an actor  is  doing by saying 
something (e.g. when someone says ‘hello’ and the person greeted is frightened by it).96 However, 
every performative can also be a failure. Austin calls these performative failures infelicities.97 There 
is  a  distinction,  for Austin,  between the individual  text  and the situation,  the "total  speech act 
situation," which surrounds it. In order for an illocutionary act to be successfully performed, certain 
conditions, as we mentioned above, must be met (e.g. the priest in the marriage ceremony must be 
authorized to  perform the ceremony).98 Besides the context,  the performative utterance itself  is 
unambiguous as well.  The words of an illocutionary act have to be expressed sincerely; if not, 
Austin  discards  them as  a  parasitic  use  of  language,  as  we  have  seen  above.  If  we  say  that 
Emerson's work is performative because it does something to us, increasing the feeling of power 
within us, opening a space of potentiality for us, taking away our fear and "enabling" us to let Life 
take over, then we need to ask in what context can such encouraging performatives work. Are they 
successful in our contemporary condition? What is it  about our culture or situation that allows, 
invites or preserves their power? And what situation, on the other hand, makes Bartleby's formula "I 
would prefer not to" so alluring even though it seems to lead to destruction? Or is Bartleby's speech 
a performative failure?
Melville  realized  the  performative  power  of  words  and the  influence  of  society on  the 
individual,  as  can  be  seen  in "Bartleby,  the  Scrivener."  He  criticized  social  systems  and 
constructions of identity as well. Although he often opposed the early theory of Emerson and his 
idealist  notion of power (as participation in the beyond, following of one's  whim),  he has also 






into the realm of potentiality and that it need not occur by means of speech. In the Confidence-man, 
which is  full  of language games,  Melville  claims that  a  consistent  character  is  a  rara avis;  to 
distinguish fictions, imagined performances from real life performances, is quite impossible. In this 
book, Melville mocks Emerson's pragmatic rhetorical role of the "experimenter."  On the other 
hand, however, his Confidence-man is a kind of an experimenter who throws light on things that 
could not be seen otherwise as will be shown later on (in chapter 3.3 dealing with forgery).
1.5.2    Power in Emerson's Early Work
To elucidate the notion of power as potentiality,  it  is essential to explore what Emerson 
means when he speaks about the power of the individual, the other and the world in his early work. 
Power, in Emerson, is closely related to agency. For thinking, as well as speaking, is action. To 
enlarge the field of perception, to be more receptive increases one's power and expands one's field 
for action. As will be seen, Emerson abandons the idea of participation in a transcendental Over-
soul, or Power, in his late work and turns to physics and an immanent conception of consciousness. 
What he preserves, however, is his understanding of the performative power of words. One can 
clearly see the practical effects  of his  sentences (both in Emerson's  life and in the lives of his 
readers, such as an increased feeling of power, courage and inspiration to create) which to a great 
extent explain his concepts. One then draws on one's experience and not on some pure intellectual 
understanding which is a notion that Emerson seriously questions in his late work. 
In  his  early  work  (Essays  First  and  Second  Series),  to  "have"  power  still  designates 
abandonment, or one's participation in Force, Life, Light, a divine flow of energy. Emerson is here 
drawing on the idealist doctrines of Plato and on gnosis. 
               1.5.2.1  Emerson and Plato: the Soul vs. the Body in the Gorgias and Phaedo
Emerson described the force of Plato´s work as follows: "Plato seems to a reader in New England 
an American genius. His broad humanity transcends all sectional lines."99 For, he,  according to 
Emerson, keeps both unity and difference in his work. Plato  claims that the soul sees unity (the 
same), the senses perceive the difference. Emerson also believes in the possibility to perceive unity. 
He explains it further: "Art expresses the one or the same by the different. Thought seeks to know 
99 Emerson, "Plato, or the Philosopher," Collected Works, 565. 
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unity in unity; poetry to show it by variety; that is, always by an object or symbol. Plato keeps the  
two vases, one of aether and one of pigment, at his side, and invariably uses both."100 
The  dichotomy of  the  soul  and  the  senses  (or  the  body),  which  Emerson  embraces,  is 
explained in Plato's  Phaedo. The slow mortification of the body and preparation for death (as a 
liberating  event)  should  be,  according  to  Plato,  the aim of  every thinker.  Such  extreme  soul-
reliance, including gradual detachment from the body, is also manifested in Melville's "Bartleby, the 
Scrivener." The  emphasis on the soul is present in Emerson's early work as well. He sees in Plato 
"a certain earnestness, which mounts, in the Republic and in the Phaedo, to piety."101 However, too 
much philosophizing is not good for anyone. Emerson paraphrases Callicles´ speech in the Gorgias: 
"For philosophy is an elegant thing, if any one modestly meddles with it; but if he is conversant  
with it more than is becoming, it corrupts the man."102 In the Gorgias, the argument serves Callicles 
in his aim to ridicule Socrates, who, thanks to his dialectics, his  elenchos  (method of testing and 
revealing  inconsistencies  in  his  opponent's  speech), is  impractical  and  could  not  even  defend 
himself in court  if necessary. Emerson develops the argument in a different direction. He claims, 
here and in other  similar  quotations, that the power of rhetoric can corrupt the man, making him 
either impractical and indecisive, or using words to manipulate the speech in his favor. In the latter 
case, the power of words, the force of rhetoric, can corrupt the man as much as political power. 
That is why Plato's doubt, piety and sense of boundary, as well as abandonment, are so important 
for Emerson. Abandonment is closely connected, as we have seen above, with ascension, which 
Emerson admires in Plato's works, especially in the Phaedrus.103 It is in the Phaedrus that Plato also 
accepts rhetoric as important and useful but only if it is based on philosophical grounds and related 
to the ideas of the Just, the Beautiful and the Good. The power of speech lies, according to Plato, in  
the leading, guiding of the soul; that is why the orator needs to be knowledgeable of the types of 
soul (rather than body type) to be able to choose the right words for the particular soul type. 
In  the  Phaedo,  Plato  concludes  that  the  body  cannot  teach  wisdom.  For,  what  Plato's 
Socrates  shows in the  Phaedo is  a  strange kind of  withdrawal,  detachment  from the everyday 
world;  a  process  which  can  take  place  simultaneously on  both  the  physical  and mental  level. 
Socrates, like Bartleby, is waiting for his death in silence – that which cannot be said is suddenly 
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thus points to what cannot be contained in any argument.104 That makes Socrates step away from 
Socratism, from his own method, from his indeterminacy. The silence, face to face death, forces 
him to give a  positive account  of the real,  actualized,  human existence.  The main emphasis  is 
therefore on the soul and its nature. For, the soul is not a power to know but the power to decide 
and take up various positions, levels of human life. Plato´s point of departure is the living human 
being, a realm of possibilities and contradictions. To attune the soul to its proper purpose, Socrates, 
like Emerson in his early immaterialism, suggests a slow secession, drifting away from  the body. 
While Plato affirms the significance of corporeal life, he warns that it can make one passive. It does 
not help us differentiate between the true/eternal and the illusory. There is in the  Phaedo a clear 
distinction between the corporeal and the eternal, which drives his dialectic. Plato believes that the 
universe is full; there are no ruptures, no blank spots, no abyss. However, that does not mean that  
there are no blank spaces in memory, in the process of recollection. What happens if the movement 
of forgetfulness regarding the eternal is  extended? We get a Bartlebian character with no will. 
Patočka says that such an individual has no will, no unity, no drive for self-preservation, no desire 
to keep his form, or the form of his species. We get what is in fact a passive, lifeless, immobile  
body.105 Yet, even Socrates´ life is decentred, oscillating, not fully a whole. The desired unity can be 
gained only after death. In the meantime, Plato recommends a katharsis (purification) of the soul 
which involves one's concentration on the eternal. Fullness, or plenitude cannot be attained but only 
approximated in this life. Emerson, on the other hand, brings eternal moments into his life and 
works from these inspiring ecstasies. Be it the prospect of the Over-soul, or the Abyss (following 
the gnostic tradition), he is ready to explore it, coming back, as Melville says, with bloodshot eyes.
1.5.2.2 Emerson and Gnosis: Words, Plenitude and Silence
        Emerson´s work contains certain elements of mysticism (he was fascinated both with Jacob 
Boehme and Swedenborg) which seem to be drawing on the Gnostics (pre-Christian philosophers, 
Valentinus, Basileides, 2nd century A.D.) who stress the ascension of the soul through various layers 
(the 7 spheres in Valentinian Gnosis) to eventually reach 'fullness' (pleróma – the source of energy 
and spiritual power). Although Emerson does not relate his approach to historical Gnosticism, he 
addresses its key concepts including gnosis (knowledge/wisdom), the abyss, the silence, the pre-
linguistic, absence, nothingness. Gnosis, when connected with Emerson's stress on words as seeds 




the word (as a seed of LOGOS – order, word, logic). When certain words are heard they start a  
"fire" in the soul, a transformative burning, or light, which can be cultivated; thus one becomes an 
inspiring element for others and begins to disperse LOGOS among others. The fire (of mind, soul 
and words) which transforms things around us is an important metaphor that Emerson uses a lot 
throughout his entire work. Those who are able to express this fire are the best interpreters-creators 
of the universe. Emerson often calls them poets or orators. Still, not everybody, according to the 
Gnostics, is willing to cultivate wisdom and some are even unable to perceive it by virtue of fate or 
predestination (those who are mainly attached to matter and materiality which they do not see as 
spiritual). That can be seen in the school of Valentinus who believed that there were three classes of 
people  characterized  by  their  main  ruling  element  –  hylokoi  (matter),  psychikoi  (soul)  and 
pneumatikoi  (pneuma).  Only psychikoi  and pneumatikoi  could reach gnosis.  Valentinus  further 
claimed  that  "there  is  in  invisible  and  ineffable  heights  a  pre-existent  perfect  aeon  (i.e.  a 
supernatural being) whom they also call Pre-beginning, Forefather and Primal Ground (Bythos), 
that he is inconceivable and invisible, eternal and uncreated (or: unbegotten) and that he existed in 
great peace and stillness in unending spaces (aeons)."106 Aeon is a region, unalterable, imperishable. 
The inner man (pneuma), for pneumatikoi, equals the seeds of light which need to be cultivated so 
that pneumatikoi enter aeon. Harold Bloom interprets Emerson's gnosis and his self-reliance as a 
reliance on a deeper, alien God within, not psyche but the pneuma, "the spark, the uncreated self, 
distinct  from that  soul  that  God  (or  Demiurge)  created.  Self-reliance,  …,  is  the  religion  that 
celebrates  and  reveres  what  in  the  self  is  before  the  Creation,  a  whatness  which  from  the 
perspective of religious orthodoxy can only be the primal Abyss."107 Such an idea, or rather, affect, 
was related to what he mentioned in his journal in 1866 about the return of the primal Abyss which 
he called Necessity.108 Further on, Emerson says: 
There may be two or three or four steps, according to the genius of each, but for every 
seeing soul there are two absorbing facts, - I and the Abyss.109 
        To interpret the notion of the Abyss (and later on, in the third section of this work also 
Emerson's poem Terminus), it is helpful to mention his view on gnosis (knowledge, wisdom). 
         What is important, in relation to our future discussions about will and potentiality, is the 
106 Kurt Rudolph, Gnosis: the nature and history of Gnosticism. Continuum, 1998. 




notion of the abyss as unaccountable depth, indeterminate potentiality from which everything arises 
(and which Bartleby to a certain extent epitomizes). According to Valentinus, the first principle is 
called Aeon or the unfathomable. It  is the primeval depth, the absolute abyss,  bythos,  in which 
everything is sublimated before the beginning or before the Father. Aeon is the activating force. The 
transition or unfolding of the One is diáthesis (arrangement), and this stage is also called the self-
conceptualizing of the inconceivable (katálepsis toú akataléptou), which is a concept later to be 
found in the Stoic philosophy as katálepsis (grasping, conceiving). Emerson, in his late work and 
poems also addresses the abyss, the nothing from which all things are articulated or not articulated. 
There is, however,  nothing material  about this  abyss of consciousness. Other Gnostics,  such as 
Markos, call the first principle the unthinkable, anennóetos, and non-existence, anoúsios. It is that 
which proceeds into the determinate, monótes. Another name they use to denote the first principle is 
pure stillness, sigé (silence). From the silence evolve Ideas and the aeons. Each aeon contains its 
own world within itself, in a way similar to the Leibniz´s monad. Such a depiction of potentiality 
reminds us both of Bartleby and of late Emerson. In his poem The Sphinx (often quoted by Charles 
S. Peirce), Emerson writes in the poem: 
Kind  leaves  of  his  covert/  Your  silence  he  sings./  "The  waves  unashamed,/  In 
difference sweet/ Play glad with the breezes,/ Old playfellows meet;/ The journeying 
atoms,/  Primordial  wholes,/  Firmly draw,  firmly drive,/  By their  animate  poles.  / 
"Sea, earth, air, sound, silence,/ Plant, quadruped, bird,/ By one music enchanted,/ 
One Deity stirred, -  ….110
The journeying atoms which Emerson mentions remind us of the aeons, primordial wholes, 
developed from silence. Here, as above in the section about the Abyss, Emerson sees the origin in 
silence.  Yet,  many commentators  such  as  William James,  Melville  and  Hawthorne  object  that 
Emerson did not peer very deep into the abyss and that there was a distinct lack in Emerson, "too  
little understanding of the morbid side of life."111 When we compare his use of the terms "words, 
speech" as opposed to "silence," there is an obvious preference for the speech. However, when 
James re-read Emerson later in his life, he affirmed that he felt real greatness in his works. Silence, 
in my view, is the unaccountable potentiality from which he writes and which he tries ultimately to 
turn into music. Emerson's "I am nothing. I see all," would mean, for a second-century Gnostic, that 
the knower finds himself in a primordial fullness, before Creation. This can occur thanks to the 
110 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Poems (Read Books, 2006) 21.
111 William James, Partial Portraits, 1888, 31. 
51
contemplative "ascesis," a sensory deprivation which is common to mystical experiences. Joseph 
Kronick explains Emerson's use of the term Abyss112 and shows how he drew on Jacob Boehme. In 
a journal entry, in November, 1845, Emerson says: 
There must be the Abyss, Nox and Chaos out of which all come, and they must never 
be far off. Cut off the connexion between any of our works and this dread origin and 
the work and the work is shallow and unsatisfying.113   
The  abyss  is  an  original  potentiality,  emptiness  preceding all  creation.  Emerson tries  to 
connect  the  mental  and  cosmic  Abyss,  as  if  he  wanted  to  witness  the  Creation.  In  this  way, 
Emerson's poet could plunge into the potential, before Demiurge created time and before language 
was introduced, and thus overcome history. It is from this point that the human being shall draw its 
always  new circles.  Every  man  is  able  to  evolve,  according  to  Emerson,  to  draw energy and 
inspiration from the potential, which Emerson at this stage interprets in transcendental terms as the 
Divine Force, Life, and the Over-soul but which actually refers to the Abyss as well. He writes, in 
"Circles," that: 
The life of man is a self-evolving circle, which, from a ring imperceptibly small,  
rushes on all sides outwards to new and larger circles, and that without end. The 
extent to which this generation of circles, wheel without wheel, will go, depends on 
the force or truth of the individual soul.114
Pursuit  of  power  refers  predominantly  to  the  activities  of  the  mind/spirit  (without 
mentioning  the  more  immanent  topics  such  as  success,  persuasive  language,  will  and  the 
practical/public sphere which can be seen in Emerson's late work).  Actions correspond to ideas in 
"Circles"; Emerson claims that: 
Step by step we scale this mysterious ladder: the steps are actions; the new prospect 
is power. Every several result is threatened and judged by that which follows. Every 
one seems to be contradicted by the new; it is only limited by the new.115
112 Joseph Kronick, "On the Border of History: Whitman and the American Sublime," in The American Sublime, ed. 
Mary Arensberg (SUNY, 1986) 54.
113 Ibid.
114 Emerson, "Circles," 216.
115 Ibid.
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One's consciousness here is still strongly attached to the future which is also an essential 
sign of hope and of self-reliance. Emerson suggests that one shall not be afraid of the new, the 
different.  The  man  projects  himself  into  the  world  as  a  set  of  possibilities  which  need  to  be 
actualized; he casts his designs into the future, ensuring his individuality in this way. Power, in this 
sense, is therefore a widened prospect: when we climb up and arrive at a higher point, the new 
prospect opens up in front of us. Our consciousness is wider and we have a feeling of power. Power 
is therefore not a cause of our action, something we need to "have" before we begin to act but rather 
the reward we get when we expand our horizons (through participation in the beyond). 
            Emerson’s early essays reveal quite well the points of departure of Emerson’s thinking – the 
theory of circles, the Over-soul (from Vedas and  Platonism),  the dynamic aspect of knowledge 
"ascending" higher, the transformation of the mind,  inspiration, power residing in  transition and 
movement. Drawing on Power also means, in this sense, that one has the right to develop one’s 
potential in a practical way which is also valid for the "other", not only for the individual self. The 
"beyond" on which the other can draw is also related to the relationship one has with the other. If  
one draws on Power, if one "has" it, one also has the right to act on it. That is the basis of Emerson's 
democratic thinking.
1.5.3  Power as Right
Emerson associates the notion of power with the right to express this power but also with the 
right to execute what one has the "power" to do, or to create. According to the early Emerson, the 
natural world is in sympathy with human nature which wants to fulfill one's designs. The aim of this 
power is  therefore not  mere self-preservation but also self-expression.  Individual power can be 
understood as conatus – the drive for self-preservation, but also as a dynamic, creative force. Such a 
notion of power is much more rooted in the everyday world (as opposed to Power viewed as a 
Platonic form). Emerson will develop this insight later in The Conduct of Life, Society and Solitude,  
and  other  essays  where  it  is  associated  primarily  with  language,  health,  success,  wealth  and 
practical life. In his essay "Power" from  The Conduct of Life,  as we will see later on, Emerson 
views power  as  an affirmative,  immanent  force.  Such an interpretation  follows in the steps  of 
Spinoza (the revolutionary 17th century philosopher from the Netherlands) who distinguishes the 
brutal power of the masses and the dynamic power of the individual based on conatus. Conatus is 
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one’s  drive  for  self-preservation.  Yet  it  encompasses  other  aspects  of  the  self  such  as  self-
expression, the desire to overcome limits and other dynamic features.
Conatus or the resistance to self-destruction is formulated by Spinoza in terms of a human 
striving to continue to exist. In this way, Spinoza describes an inclination of things to increase in 
power; rather than just existing statically, all beings must strive towards perfection. All existing 
objects  and subjects act when such an action preserves or augments their  existence.  And when 
following their conatus they have the right to express themselves. What Spinoza also claims in the 
Ethics (1677)  is  that  the  conatus is  of  "indefinite  time;"  it  lasts  as  long as  the  object  does.116 
Emerson, following Spinoza claims in his late work, that one should do what increases the feeling 
of power and enhances life in general. The time of such action, when one's power increases, usually 
cannot  be measured  in  the  ordinary spatio-temporal  pattern,  for  one  abandons  the  self.  It  is  a 
moment of transition. Similarly, Emerson says in "Self-reliance:"
Power is, in nature, the essential measure of right. Nature suffers nothing to remain 
in her kingdom which cannot help itself. … Power ceases in the moment of repose; it 
resides in the moment of transition from a past to a new state. … the soul becomes.117
The equivalence of power and right marked a revolutionary turn in political theory in the 
17th century. What it says is basically this: Whatever we have the power to do, we also have the 
right to do. Spinoza adopted Hobbes' equivalence of power and right and developed an elaborate 
analysis of affects around that. We shall explore the power (and potentiality) to speak and the right 
to speak. Whether one always has the power and right to speak, whether speaking requires a will, a 
presence of mind, will be tested with the help of Bartleby.
2. Bartleby, Action and Discourse 
 If R. W. Emerson and American myths of self-reliance gave most of the power/right to the 
individual, Herman Melville saw the other side of this "idealism" - the power structures, relations, 
subtle ruses of ideology and technologies of manipulation which quite considerably limited the 
116 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics (Penguin Classics) 66-67.
117 Emerson, "Self-Reliance," 146.
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power of the individual. Melville detected these in the processes of industrialization, alienation (as 
did Emerson who specifically discusses alienation) and the transcendental illusions of freedom and 
the  ascending  immaterial  soul  which  were  common  in  his  era.  Bartleby  as  a  disappearing 
consciousness  opposed  the  unifying,  empowering  rhetorical  force  of  the  Transcendentalist 
movement and the early Emerson which held on to the notion of Idea that creates and fuses things 
together. His character mocks the rule of capital, rhetoric and pragmatism. To interpret Bartleby 
within the American rhetoric of self-reliance and the force of the voice is quite problematic. To see 
him from the vantage-point of Emerson's late work, which is already substantially Nietzschean (as 
Nietzsche used Emerson's late work for his essential writings such as  The Joyful Science, Thus  
Spoke Zarathustra,  etc.) and pragmatist, means to abandon the idea of the self as participating in 
any transcendental beyond and to explore the power of will, language and sensibility. It means to 
focus  on  Bartleby  as  a  de-centered  individual  who  "redraws"  the  lines  of  our  thinking  about 
performativity and agency while making/becoming difference, all of which greatly resonates with 
Emerson's late thought, showing both its positive contributions and its limits. 
2.1 Bartleby’s Story
The story of "Bartleby, the Scrivener" is quite easy to sum up, yet quite difficult to interpret. 
Its  potential  for  inspiring  various  interpretations  is  remarkable.  Bartleby,  a  young,  pallid  man, 
arrives one day at a law office to get a job as a copyist. There he encounters the attorney. This  
"unambitious lawyer, who practices  snug business among rich men's bonds, and mortgages, and 
title-deeds"118, accepts him because of what he "reads" as pallid innocence and obedience. Bartleby, 
is provided with a desk in a corner of the lawyer's own office, behind a folding screen so that  "in a 
manner, privacy and society were conjoined."119 On the third day, Bartleby is asked to help the 
attorney proofread some documents. In response he says, "I would prefer not to." Baffled, but being 
in a hurry, the attorney asks someone else to help him. A few days later, the same situation repeats 
itself.  "Why  do you refuse?" inquires the attorney, to which Bartleby responds again,  "I would 
prefer not to."  Having been criticized for his behavior, he makes everyone understand "that […] his 
decision was irreversible."120 The attorney, however, postpones ‘the consideration of this dilemma,’ 
to the next day when he ponders:




Nothing so aggravates an earnest person as a passive resistance. If the individual so
resisted be of a not inhumane temper, and the resisting one perfectly harmless in his
passivity, then, in the better moods of the former, he will endeavor charitably to
construe to his imagination what proves impossible to be solved by his judgement.
Even so, for the most part, I regarded Bartleby and his ways. Poor fellow! Thought I,
he means no mischief; […] his eccentricities are involuntary. He is useful to me. I can
get along with him. If I turn him away, the chances are that he will fall in with some
less-indulgent employer, and then he will be rudely treated, and perhaps driven forth
miserably to starve. Yes. Here I can cheaply purchase a delicious self-approval.121
This situation is maintained for some time. Then Bartleby, however, reveals that he prefers 
not to do any writing at all. The attorney responds that in that case he must leave, to which Bartleby 
reacts  again  by saying that  he  "would  prefer  not  to."  The attorney finds  himself  in  a  state  of 
"nervous  resentment."122 Yet,  he  calms  down  when  he  recalls  the  divine  injunction,  "A new 
commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another."123 Having accepted Bartleby’s decision, 
the attorney believes the status quo could be preserved "were it not for the unsolicited and
uncharitable remarks obtruded upon me by my professional friends who visited the rooms,"124 upon 
the peculiar ‘unaccountable’ presence of Bartleby in his offices. In the end, the lawyer, completely 
at a loss, decides to leave his own premises. Bartleby, however, stays there and "persists in haunting 
the building generally, sitting upon the banister of the stairs by day, and sleeping in the entry by 
night."125 Consequently,  he  is  removed to  a  prison as  a  vagrant.  The attorney visits  ‘the silent 
man’126 twice in prison. The second time he finds him "strangely huddled at the base of a wall." 
"Eh!—He’s asleep, ain’t he?" asks the grub-man, upon which the attorney says ‘With kings and 
counselors.’"127 His last exclamation is "Ah, Bartleby! Ah, humanity!"
There are several movements in the story when meanings are shifted and several ethical 
stances are questioned. From the point when the attorney perceives Bartleby as an individual to the 









not  manage to see the singularity of Bartleby,  treating him as an impersonal,  almost inhuman, 
"brother," as he was taught by Christian ethics. How can his 'humane' treatment can render Bartleby 
inhuman? Following an ideal image, or form, of a human being instead of perceiving the real, 
corporeal, singular man with his needs reminds us of the dangers of Kantian formalism. It is then 
duty  rather  than  sympathy  or  shared emotions  which  lead  one's  behavior.  Such  an  objective 
approach to the value of a concrete individual obviously cannot help Bartleby. What is, however, 
surprising is how Bartleby's formula alters his surroundings.  
 Melville shows the deconstructive effect of Bartleby's formula, which he repeats several 
times in the story. Bartleby manages to infect half of the law office with his  "I would prefer not to." 
Subsequently, he stops eating and dies of starvation, not finding any meaningful human relationship 
in the alienated space of the law office.  Even the attorney himself,  however,  begins to use the 
phrase. He says:
Somehow, of late, I had got into the way of involuntarily using the word "prefer" 
upon all sorts of not exactly suitable occasions. And I trembled to think that my 
contact with the scrivener had already and seriously affected me in a mental way. 
And what further and deeper aberration might it not yet produce?"128
 The attorney is afraid of the power of the formula, of this new logic. And so he would rather 
leave Bartleby's secret undeciphered than renounce his conformity. Let us now turn to the repetition 
and difference, as constitutive parts of performative force. 
2.2  Repetition, Identity and Difference 
In "Bartleby, the Scrivener," speech, as a repetition of a certain formula, can no longer create 
an  independent,  self-creative  self  as  it  did  in  Emerson.  In  contrast  to  Emerson,  repetition  in 
Melville's Bartleby decomposes rather than composes the surroundings and the character itself. We 
deal here with a different kind of performativity – one that does not work as a creative force but 
rather one which effects the neutralization of laws, which de-activates, decentralizes and eliminates 
both  the  preferred  and  the  non-preferred.  For,  Bartleby's  formula  does  not  mean  anything  in 
particular  (which  is  close  to  Emerson's  embracing  of  vagueness,  or  ecstasy,  even  though in  a 
128 Melville 123.
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different form). Yet, it holds every claim in suspense. Does Bartleby merely replicate the same to do 
this?  As can be seen in contemporary mass media the repetition of empty formulas, or exhausted 
pieces of information which no one is able to "resuscitate" cannot provide us with any sense or 
meaning,  with  anything  new.  Such  repetition  of  the  same,  such  replicating,  often  leads  to 
destruction, loss of energy and meaning. In both "Bartleby the Scrivener" and The Confidence-man 
Melville shows that  empty rhetorical linguistic games lead only to further confusion and chaos, 
which is not creative.  Bartleby's formula, however, shows the limits of rhetoric, of such empty 
language games because he enacts a whole new order of affects, a whole new logic, as Deleuze 
suggests, the logic of preference. The significance and performative force of the formula consists 
then in the deconstruction of non-functional,  meaningless machines, order-words and pragmatic 
monsters.
It is impossible to talk about Bartleby and repetition nowadays without mentioning the work 
of Gilles Deleuze, especially his essay "Bartleby, or the Formula"129 and his ideas from Difference 
and Repetition. Deleuze introduces in the latter the notion of repetition as transgression as opposed 
to repetition as replication of the same. Repetition as transgression makes it possible to understand 
what constitutes Bartleby as an agent who enacts "difference" from a wholly different stance (the 
foreign language within language) and semiotic ground (Bartleby as a zone of indistinctness, pre-
linguistic potentiality). Deleuze helps us understand difference in a new way. He seeks to explore 
difference which is liberated from the identical and which is without negation, and without the more 
profound structures of "hidden repetition in which a 'differential' is disguised and displaced."130 For, 
such structures "give raison d'etre to the mechanical repetitions of the same."131 Bartleby's self, his 
deconstruction of the identical (the attorney, the law) may be an example of modern thought as 
described by Deleuze:
Modern thought is born of the failure of representation, of the loss of identities, and 
of the discovery of all the forces that act under the representation of the identical.  
The modern world is one of simulacra. Man did not survive God, nor did identity of 
the subject survive that of substance. All identities are only simulated, produced as an 
optical 'effect' by the more profound game of difference and repetition. We propose 
to  think  difference  in  itself  independently  of  the  forms  of  representation  which 
129 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 68.
130 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (1968), trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia Univerity Press, 1994) 
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reduce it to the Same..."132
Not to reduce difference to the same is a claim that both Emerson and Nietzsche embraced 
as well. Nietzsche criticized modern science for its inability to cope with the alien, the dangerous, 
the unaccountable which does not fit any of its categories and is therefore eliminated or changed 
(subsumed, translated) into that which fits the categories. Bartleby, in my view, does the complete 
opposite,  because he translates  or dissolves  the identical  (the typical  notions of  stable  identity, 
language games, authority, work) to a potentiality, to a preconceptual, indistinct zone, the abyss, 
before Creation. That is why his formula carries with it a strange light, seed of a new order, which, 
when planted within his colleagues, splits and confuses them completely. The attorney tries to find a 
suitable  subject  position  within  the  system,  the  machine,  and  provides  Bartleby with  a  list  of 
possibilities, jobs, and lifestyles so that he can choose. Yet, it is obvious that none of these would fit  
Bartleby's  mode  of  being  and  the  different  logic  which  he  enacts  by  means  of  his  repeated 
performatives and silent presence. 
One  thing  is  clear,  Bartleby's  "power"  consists  in  his extraordinary  gift  to  disarm  his 
audience – both his employer (the attorney) and the reader of the story. His modality of being, his  
silence and his formula produce the feeling of "inoperativity," de-activation, in others. He himself 
‘prefers’ this inoperativity to the pragmatist notion of power. This completely contradicts the power 
that the attorney relies on. The attorney’s power and authority rest on several factors, one of them 
being "power as consistency." He possesses faith in the power and dignity of reason, coherence and 
common sense, relying on logical methods and language (LOGOS) with functional commands that 
he  blindly inherited  from others.  When encountering  Bartleby,  however,  his  behavior  does  not 
display  any  method  whatsoever.  Instead,  he  manages  to  invent  "survival"  strategies  to  avoid 
Bartleby’s  deconstruction of his  sovereignty,  self-interest  and faith.  As for Bartleby’s  being,  he 
displays method much more than the attorney; the combination of his obstinacy and indeterminacy 
work together as a counter-machine, producing a difference, rupture in discourse, deferral of action. 
His formula, as an organic machine, takes power away from the attorney and his colleagues; it 
dissolves their selves as well as his own. The rupture/difference provokes new affects in others, 
taking them beyond language (the attorney roars, or he is silent). Yet, Bartleby’s personality does 
not show any drive for self-preservation or desire. Instead of willing, he prefers. For him to do 
something, the force would have to come from the outside, as with physical violence. The attorney 
132 Deleuze Preface.
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seems to perceive this. He keeps postponing any violence against Bartleby who, in the mean time, 
begins to re-signify, to re-draw the lines, the borders and differences in the attorney’s system of 
thinking. 
2.3  Bartleby's Formula 
The whole story of Bartleby revolves around the speech act  "I would prefer not to." Its 
effect, as we mentioned above, is highly subversive, turning the lawyer’s office with its machine-
men  into  a  chaos  while  disrupting  the  automatism  of  the  office's  everyday  procedures  and 
commands. It breaks with all contexts. As Gilles Deleuze notes, it constitutes a new world, a world 
where preference dominates and where laws are not binding anymore.133 Such a world appeals even 
to the attorney himself who, in my view, represents common sense and vulgar pragmatism based on 
the effects, or cash value of events. The formula gains its power thanks to its shifting potentiality (to 
displace  orders,  to  postpone  decisions)  and  perhaps  also  from  the  subconscious  desire  for 
preference in those surrounding him); it is used systematically,  constituting new situations. In this 
sense,  Bartleby  can  be  understood  as  an  organic  machine  (which  Emerson  describes  as  not 
inanimately mechanical) that produces new planes of signification while questioning the everyday 
language and regime in which we live. He represents a Difference, a rupture, as Derrida would have 
it,  an opening towards the future. His indeterminacy allows for a projection of words into new 
contexts. The performative, changing force of this one sentence which makes others go crazy also 
shows that the relationship between reason and language is more problematic than we may think. If  
language constitutes consciousness and enacts laws, does it not precede reason itself? Could not 
language enable (and then also deconstruct) the workings of rationality? We can definitely see its 
effects on both Bartleby and the attorney. But let us analyze the formula itself now. 
As Gilles Deleuze writes in his essay on Bartleby, the formulas that Bartleby utters seem to 
be the same at first sight. Bartleby "introduces" the formula 10 times over the course of the story. 
Yet,  they always  include  an  internal  difference,  which  opens  the  road to  the  other  and which 
prevents our thinking from settling on any already established fixed concept. At the same time, the 
formula cannot develop itself into any concrete faith, particularity or system; it is ideology proof. 
Being a difference, Bartleby always postpones any definite stance, decision or belief that anybody 
would  present.  Even the  attorney keeps  postponing  his  decision  about  expelling  him from his 
133  Gilles Deleuze,  Essays Critical and Clinical, transl. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. (Minnesota: University 
of Minnesota Press) 1997.
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premises. The formula manages to deconstruct his world, to draw the lines of his ordinary thought 
in  a  new way;  it  produces  new affects  and perceptions  in  him.  The effect  it  has  on Bartleby, 
however, cannot be disregarded either. It deconstructs his last attempts at finding a meaningful thing 
to do, a center on which to start building a "house" (Emerson’s metaphor of the house), a source 
from which he could draw, turning to something that would not be a mere reproduction, repetition – 
be it friendship, love, any relation to the world outside his mind. Yet, no such easy "founding" is 
possible, Melville suggests. The self is performatively constituted, which means that there have to 
be  certain  procedures,  rituals  and  beliefs  repeated  which  constantly  form  and  re-form  the 
personality. Bartleby’s ritual is the formula "I would prefer not to (repeat, imitate, control, proof-
read etc.)" and his "staring at  the wall."  One day,  however,  he will  have to  stop repeating the 
formula as well. A question lingers here now: if Bartleby was able to systematically subvert the 
system, why wasn't he able to find a source of energy for himself? Where do other revolutionaries 
take their power from? Communities? Nature? New poetics? New metaphors, or connections with 
the "beyond" or "below" like in the case of the early-Emersonian "experimenter"?
It seems obvious that the mechanical world of the law office cannot provide Bartleby with 
any source of creative power. He is stuck with his one formula, unwilling to explain it further. 
Instead, he puts others into his "place", into the zone of indistinctness, of "difference", where the 
primary ruptures take place. Deleuze views Bartleby as pure negativity, as patient passivity, saying 
that his formula, "annihilates 'copying,' the only reference in relation to which something might or 
might not be preferred. I would prefer nothing rather than something: not a will to nothingness, but 
the growth of the nothingness of the will."134 Nothingness of the will is exactly that potentiality, the 
zone of indistinction which is not nihilistic but which creates or reflects. But how can anything 
proceed from such profound denial? 
2.4  Bartleby's Non-Willing Self 
Bartleby’s character does something even though his actions are not based on will. Coming 
from the abyss, he splits things, people, ideas in a new way, conducting a kind of criticism from the  
inside, within the immanent. He obviously lacks the affirmative/expressive/self-constituting part of 
personality (typical of the Emersonian experimenter), which signals a different approach to critique 
–  he  does  not  posit  any  ideals,  organizing  principles  or  manifestos.  He  does  not  show  the 
134 Deleuze,  Essays Critical and Clinical, 71.
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inconsistencies  in  the  speech  of  others,  which  is  what  Socrates  does  in  his  early  dialogues. 
Bartleby's  elenchos, his testing, is not voluntary and it is not based on words only. Bartleby as a  
differentiating force can become thinkable only when tamed, which in his case means - only when 
dead. Before that he exhibits indeterminacy that fuels the machine he is, the process he "launches." 
Thus he cannot have an identity (which has been defined since Plato as the essence of the same), a 
stable, recognizable, representable being. Bartleby cannot be a thing-in-itself. In fact, he invades all 
such concepts, bringing a little bit of the Dionysian transformative energy into the Apollonian lucid, 
logical universe. He affects the attorney in this way, taking him to the limits of discourse, making 
him scream (which is already outside of language).
As  for  the  attorney,  he  perceives  Bartleby  as  the  wholly  other.  The  attorney’s  logic, 
unfortunately, lacks the other side of normative language which is the acknowledgment of a rupture, 
of a new situation and context being constituted, the acknowledgment of a secret. He is not at all 
open to the otherness of Bartleby, and every time the rupture "takes place," he quickly tries to fill it 
with something, block it,  revert  it  to a false Christian ethics or some other general laws. Non-
understanding is thus quickly covered with simplifications, self-projections and other stratagems. 
Why is it threatening for him not to understand? Why does he need to assimilate the otherness to 
sameness or similarity to sameness? Why should Bartleby be like him? It seems that the underlying 
notion of humanity which is in operation here when the attorney thinks and assimilates is that of 
sharing the common sense rationality. His last exclamation, "Oh Bartleby, Oh humanity!", reveals 
his thought best. It draws on the Enlightenment view of the human being, on its rationality, identity,  
metaphysics and utilitarianism. Based on these notions the attorney is disconnected from his body, 
from emotions, attachments, affects. Bartleby wakes them in him – as if he were a lover – Eros in 
the  Platonic  sense  of  leading,  ascending  higher.  But  the  attorney  does  not  follow.  When  he 
subordinates  Bartleby  (as  Difference)  to  resemblance,  identity  or  analogy135,  the  Difference 
disappears and so does Bartleby. Deleuze says that Bartleby is an Original; there is nothing either 
particular or general about him: 
Originals  are  beings  of  primary nature,  but  are  inseparable from the world or from 
secondary  nature,  where  they  exert  their  effect:  they  reveal  its  emptiness,  the 
imperfection  of  its  laws,  the  mediocrity  of  particular  features  ...  the  world  as 
masquerade. ... The original, says Melville, is not subject to the influence of his milieu; 
135 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 335.
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on the contrary, he throws a livid white light on his surroundings, much like the light 
that accompanies the beginning of things in Genesis.136
      Do we expect the emergence of the New Man from Bartleby? Can the new logic of Bartleby 
which does not "will" but evades will by simply 'preferring' be a sign of a profound transformation 
of identity? One which Emerson prophetically professed in the 19th century and whose ideal was his 
"experimenter," his "poet"? We will see that Emerson in his late work offers a conception of "will," 
emphasizing the strong will of the individual but silent potentiality as well. We will analyze his 
notion  of  power  and  will  which  was  later  developed  by  Nietzsche,  Heidegger,  Foucault  and 
deconstruction philosophy. The non-willing of Bartleby which, however, exerts great performative 
force,  therefore opposes to a  certain extent the conceptions of Nietzsche and Heidegger  which 
makes  it  an  extremely  provocative  case  for  the  contemporary  debates  about  will,  power, 
subjectivity and the limits of rhetoric. For, Bartleby obviously does not seek to augment his power, 
his power "stands" in passive resistance. He lives a life of atemporality. Deleuze describes Bartleby 
as follows: 
Bartleby is  the man without  references,  without  possessions,  without  properties,  
without qualities, without particularities: he is too smooth for anyone to be able to 
hang any particularity on him. Without past or future, he is instantaneous. I PREFER 
NOT TO is Bartleby's chemical or alchemical formula, but one can read inversely I 
AM NOT PARTICULAR as its indispensable complement.137 
Being no one, having no will but only preferences goes much farther beyond mere nihilism, 
or even Buddhism. Even though it was Spinoza who had already said in the 17 th century that there 
was no freedom of  the will,  because the will  as  such did not  exist,  his  appeal  to  activity and 
transformation of passive affects into active ones is far from Bartleby's passive resistance. His void 
of identity is surprisingly static. He, whose "force" moves others, remains unmoved, unmoving. 
Instead of sending himself into flight138 physically (away from unbearable circumstance), Bartleby 
stays, or actually stands still. Such fixity would, from Emerson's point of view, lead very soon to 
insanity. The other extreme, the flexibility of the Confidence-man, would, however, end in insanity 




(of himself or others) as well.  If Bartleby set the attorney fleeing instead of himself, is there a 
relation of identification between them? Does he slowly become minoritarian, like Bartleby? 
2.5  Identification and the Paternal Function
Gilles Deleuze claims that the process of identification that takes place between Bartleby 
and the attorney cannot be successful for several reasons. The logic of preference which Bartleby 
employs instead of the traditional logic of presuppositions139 breaks down the system of references 
on  which  both  constative  and  performative  meanings  are  founded.  Being  the  creature  of  the 
abyss,140 he creates a void within language. Being at first separated from the attorney by means of a 
screen and thus made non-referential, Bartleby nulls the attorney's performative acts, that is, his 
orders,  commands,  and  thus  also  his  sovereignty.  That  reveals  the  attorney's  unstable  because 
rhetorical self founded on functioning conventionality and performativity of his orders. In other 
words, what Bartleby does is that he "disconnects words and things, words and actions, but also 
speech  acts  and  words."141 The  process  of  identification  between  Bartleby and  the  attorney is 
severed from any referentiality to 1) a stable subject (Bartleby), 2) an image, or form, of the father 
(the attorney) and 3) the process of identification through reproduction which would appropriate the 
form. All three elements of the process are somehow deformed. The self of the attorney cannot be 
reproduced because it does not hold together. The paternal function, the image of the father (which, 
symbolically, also provides logos, meaningful speech and law) is disrupted, together with Bartleby 
as  a  subject.  Instead  of  the  process  of  reproduction,  or  identification,  we  get  a  process  of 
becoming142 (the attorney starts to become Bartleby, which frightens him). The Bartlebian subject 
thus becomes a zone of indistinction, the image that is not a form but a formless trait, the process of 
identification is deconstructed and it ends in the function of a psychotic, fraternal becoming. But 
how is the subversion of the paternal function, of authority, enacted in the story? 
One of the important sources of the attorney’s  performative power is his "place," his high 
function in the office. His authority is based on laws, structures, order-words. It does not come from 
his authenticity, the inner structure of his being. Such authority is external, virtual, for it falls when 
the ruling system falls, which is another reason for keeping Bartleby at a distance. Bartleby’s power, 
on the other hand, is internal. It comes from his personality, his originality, his presence. He is what 
139 Deleuze, "Bartleby, or the Formula," Essays Critical and Clinical, 73.




Melville calls a Drummond light which enlightens everything around it and makes us see things in a 
new way. The attorney cannot ignore this strange power of Bartleby; he decides to befriend him. 
Instead of acknowledging him as a person, however, he generalizes him as a subject and takes pity 
on him. Later on, when the attorney finds Bartleby in his own office on a Sunday morning, he is 
suddenly seized by anxiety, which he calls melancholy, realizing the loneliness of Bartleby (and 
probably his own as well):
For the first time in my life a feeling of overpowering stinging melancholy seized 
me. Before I had never experienced aught but a not-unpleasing sadness. The bond of 
a common humanity now drew me irresistibly to gloom. A fraternal melancholy! For 
both I and Bartleby were sons of Adam.143
The resoluteness of the attorney is shaken as Bartleby’s powerful performance re-draws the 
lines  of  his  thought.  For  the  first  time,  he  perceives  inter-subjectivity  in  the  world,  the 
otherness/sameness of human beings to one another.  He even seems to love Bartleby in a strange 
way. At the same time, however, he is afraid of what such openness could do to his "system" and 
where it  would take him. He desperately holds on to his  "foolish consistency",  his regime, his 
rituals  of  thought  and  language.  Ironically,  it  is  also  through  language  that  Bartleby invisibly 
transforms the thinking of those around him making commands fluxional, offering no ideology but 
a test of thought, embodying a rupture in the mechanical processes of the office. Such a rupture in 
language,  which frightens the attorney because it  "decentralizes" him, makes  him "inoperative" 
(leaving him on a periphery where Bartleby is as well).  It has a performative effect. Through the 
experience of anxiety, the attorney  could  make the first step to authenticity. Yet he cannot stand 
such a state of "inoperativity"/de-activation of laws. Making use of all his rhetorical abilities to 
return to the closed lonesome stable pragmatic universe, he quickly establishes a limit in order to 
accomplish a unity of the self once again, cutting himself off from the world around him. 
2.6  Bartleby: Beyond Pragmatism 
When Deleuze talks about pragmatism in "Bartleby, or the formula" he contrasts its novelty 
with the old paternal spirit of Western philosophy that "realized itself in the world as totality, and in 
143 Melville 123.
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a knowing subject as proprietor."144 He sees pragmatism as a new mode of thinking which stresses 
the transformation of the world and the subject. It is an attempt to think a new man as self-creative. 
I would argue that these features are typical of Emerson's approach. Yet, Deleuze attributes this 
sketching of the traits of pragmatism to Melville, while using a distinctly Emersonian language 
based on process and hope. He says that pragmatism is:
first of all the affirmation of a world in process, an archipelago. Not even a puzzle, 
whose pieces when put together would constitute a whole, but rather of wall of loose, 
uncemented stones ….isolated and floating relations, islands and straits, immobile 
points and sinuous lines – for Truth always has "jagged edges." … the Americans 
invented patchwork … But to  reach this  point,  it  was necessary for the knowing 
subject, the sole proprietor, to give way to a community of explorers, …, who replace 
knowledge with belief, or rather with "confidence " - not belief in another world, but 
confidence in this one, and in man as much as in God.145
Deleuze considers pragmatism to be this principle of archipelago and hope. He believes that 
pragmatism, like Melville, will always struggle on two fronts: "against the particularities that pit 
man against man and nourish an immediate mistrust; but also against the Universal, or the Whole, 
the fusion of souls in the name of great love or charity."146 The quality that prevents people from 
merging with the Whole is originality, an original sound which one produces when embarking upon 
a journey, taking to the open road, or plunging into the open sea.147 Such an original is always ready 
to free himself from constrains; to abandon, in an Emersonian way, the tradition, norms, even one's 
own family. Deleuze contrasts this democratic morality of taking to the road and not trying to save 
other  souls  with  the  European  morality  of  salvation  and  charity.  The  democratic  fraternity,  as 
Melville suggests can be attained only by original souls.148  Bartleby reflects both mistrust and the 
fear of merging with another human being. Perhaps he expects a little confidence from the attorney,  
yet  he does  not  get  it.  For  Deleuze,  the hero of  pragmatism is  Bartleby,  not  the attorney.  Too 
suspicious (of confidence-men, forgers), he makes any real relationship with Bartleby impossible. 
And a relationship based on charity and paternal care is unacceptable not only for Bartleby but also 
144 Deleuze, "Bartleby, or the Formula," Essays Critical and Clinical, 86.





for both Emerson and Melville.  
Certain commentators have interpreted the attorney as an incarnation of the late Emerson, a 
proto-pragmatist  and Bartleby as  a  detached Socratic  philosopher  (Andre  Furlani  "Bartleby the 
Socratic"). However, the Socratic testing, his  elenchos,  I believe, cannot be equaled or compared 
with the approach of Bartleby. First, Bartleby does not prove inconsistencies in the discourse and 
values of others by means of argumentation, within dialogue. He makes, with his alien formula 
based on preference,  any consistent  dialogue impossible.  Half  of  Barleby's  performative effect, 
moreover,  comes  from  his  silence,  from  his  inhuman  presence.  Although  Melville  offered  a 
criticism of Emerson’s philosophy in his satirical novel  The Confidence-man  later in his life, his 
target in "Bartleby, the Scrivener" does not seem to be vulgar pragmatism. What he criticized most 
in  Emerson was his  lack of feeling,  his  coldness,  egotism and idealist  Platonism that does not 
acknowledge the existence of evil and other issues. Knowing this, it is not very surprising to see 
Bartleby with his inoperative power standing in contrast to Emerson’s idea of the Poet, the active 
experimenter. Yet, as for the detachment of the soul, early Emerson could very well be the target of 
the criticism – because of his capacity of detachment from corporeality, society, everyday reality 
and material forces – which he elucidates in his essay "The Transcendentalist." 
2.7  Detachment from the Body 
            In what did Bartleby's failure in "constituting his self" consist?  Was there not enough 
action, or agency on his part? His mode of living was based neither on any typical action nor on 
reaction.  Bartleby  preferred  not  to  react,  because  the  circumstances  did  not  allow  that.  His 
"agency," or disappearing was both linguistic, non-corporeal and yet somehow coming from his 
presence, material-affecting, materializing a change, transforming others, their vision and himself. 
If we say that his formula "I would prefer not to" deconstructed his personality as well his body and 
the "bodies" around him, what do we mean exactly? It  would be necessary to  introduce several 
conceptions of the body in the American Renaissance (especially Emerson's  immaterialism and 
Platonism, Melville's notion of the body as a blank screen – i.e. Bartleby, the whale in Moby Dick). 
Bartleby's story serves as a great example here. What takes place, in my view, is Bartleby’s gradual 
detachment from the body and from the symbolic order, from conventional language. Through his 
words from a foreign language, Bartleby enacts a severe body-soul split, where the body loses all 
value and is subjected to starvation and death. Is this a case of some kind of Emersonian anorexia? 
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Or is he an example of a Platonic who, seeking the katharsis of the soul, leaves the temporal, the 
bodily,  and  preferring  the  timeless,  the  eternal?  Does  Melville  suggest  that  if  we  disengage 
ourselves  from the  material  world  (and  the  body)  and  enclose  ourselves  in  our  own  spiritual 
universe, we can no longer survive in a community and among people in general? What defines 
human nature? 
There are many places in Emerson's essays where he identifies nature with human nature 
and stresses the abandonment of both the body and the mind. As to physicality, however, Emerson's 
early philosophy bears traces of Platonism,  as was mentioned above,  which is concerned mainly 
with the victory and katharsis of the soul, not with any development of corporeal forces. Bartleby 
thus stands here as an extreme type of Emersonian self-reliance. Such self-reliance is no longer 
God-reliance or Power-reliance but a strange and radical kind of soul-reliance. But do we know 
what the body can do? Melville shows where such a soul-based approach might lead us if taken to 
its  utmost  extreme.  First,  Melville describes Bartleby’s  body as blank,  white,  palsied – a  body 
which slowly becomes a ghost. The body does not manifest any desire, the Spinozian conatus (drive 
for  self-preservation)  or  need.  Like  in  Plato's  Phaidon,  Bartleby,  if  interpreted  as  a  Platonist, 
mortifies his body, through a strange kind of Socratic katharsis, purification of the soul, which tries 
to  forget  about  the  body completely.  While  his  mundane,  rhetorical  "power"  derives  from his 
suggestive formula "I would prefer not to." Yet, as we have shown above, Bartleby does not use the 
method of the Socratic elenchos, he does not speak within the same discourse as the attorney and he 
does not make use of the Socratic logos either. As to his corporeality, Bartleby’s body seems to float 
in  a kind of  stoic  ATARAXIA, a  state  when one is  reconciled to  everything,  desiring nothing. 
Melville, who is clearly a writer of inter-subjectivity and corporeal experience, presents us here 
with a figure with various "lacks" to show us the untenability of this extreme soul-reliance, of the 
notion of the self as a temple separated from the world outside. It is surprising that Melville who so 
often deconstructs the boundaries between the material and the spiritual, knowledge and experience, 
the individual and communal consciousness does the opposite in the case of Bartleby – the body-
soul  split  is  produced directly in  the book by means of  the formula.  Melville  points out  other 
distinctions as well - the individual vs. society, pragmatism vs. friendship, et al. Bartleby becomes 
an "isolato" who thinks that he can be self-sufficient. He gradually stops eating and starves himself 
to  death.  Having no origin,  no obvious,  visible,  perceivable  personal  relationship  to  others,  to 
nature,  to the universe,  Bartleby relies on his own soul,  refusing to become an automaton that 
merely reproduces images or copies copies (in the Platonic sense of mimesis). The alienation from 
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others,  however,  also implies a  severe alienation from his own body and from experience.  His 
whole existence is transferred to the testing and deconstruction of law, language and conformity. 
Melville opposes here the dualities of self and other, materiality and idealism, master and slave by 
showing where such splits and the radical reliance on one of the opposing terms may lead. Yet, can 
the soul without a will leave the symbolic order and survive? That would imply in the Aristotelian-
Platonic Western logic insanity, godlike nature, or animality. Bartleby says he wants to leave his 
body in  one  place,  he  sees  material  limitations  everywhere.  When  asked  to  try  clerkship,  he 
answers: "There is too much confinement about that. No, I would not like a clerkship. But I am not 
particular." As to his "place" in the world, his immovable bodily presence, Bartleby seems to rebel 
against  mobility  of  all  kinds  (including Emersonian  spiritual  mobility).  He says:  "I  like  to  be 
stationary. But I am not particular."149 However, the conceptual and physical mobility he causes in 
others  is  remarkable.  In  this  sense,  his  spiritual  vagabondism  frees  the  concepts  (of  identity, 
freedom, friendship) from their customary, limiting categories.  
 
2.8  Derrida's Bartleby and the Formula
Derrida interprets Bartleby's "I would prefer not to" as "a response without response": it is 
not a statement, it is indeterminate, it is neither true nor false.150 Its inconclusiveness means that one 
cannot  say  anything  decisive  about  it.  The  future  is  in  the  hands  of  some  "indecipherable 
providence."151 Derrida  no  longer  focuses  on  performatives  in  speech,  but  rather  on  the 
indeterminacy of every self. He says: 
I prefer not to looks like an incomplete sentence. Its indeterminacy creates a tension: 
it  opens  onto  a  sort  of  reserve  of  incompleteness;  it  announces  a  temporary  of 
provisional reserve, one involving a proviso. Can we not find there the secret of a 
hypothetical reference to some indecipherable providence or prudence?152
Bartleby has  obviously attempted  to  leave  the  symbolic  order  of  the  conformist  use  of 
language  and  common  rationality.  He  prefers  not  to  impose  any  forms  (space  and  time)  or 
149 Melville 135.





imperatives on the world. Abandoning calculation and pragmatic rationality, his formula leads him 
into  absolute  passivity.  He  prefers  to  resist.  With  the  increasing  nothingness  of  his  will,  he 
eventually prefers not to react, not to live. Derrida shows us that we need to see Bartleby first as an 
absolute singularity and not from the point of view of universalist ethics, norms and tradition which 
would mean sacrificing him, sacrificing his singularity to the universal.    
2.8.1  Bartleby and the Secret of all Secrets
Jacques Derrida sees Bartleby's formula "I would prefer not to" as an incomplete sentence. 
We do not know what Bartleby wants to say nor what he does not want to say.153 He, like Abraham 
in the Bible, responds without a response. His formula enables and at the same time disables his 
relationship  with  others.  Is  it  a  secret  formula?  Can  it  throw  light  onto  Bartleby's  enigmatic 
personality? Similar to Abraham, Bartleby speaks in a strange, foreign language which embodies 
indeterminacy and which is not human. The indeterminacy, however, creates a tension. If Bartleby 
would prefer not to (cooperate, obey, eat, move), Abraham would also prefer not to sacrifice his son 
Isaac, yet he decides he will do it, he will make such a gift of death, and offer Isaac to God. Derrida 
says: "Bartleby's "I would prefer not to" is also a sacrificial passion that will lead him to death, a 
death given by the law, by a society that does not even know why it is acting the way it does."154 
What is  that sacrificial  passion in Bartleby?  What does he suffer from? Is passionate passivity 
possible? If his responses are not really responses and his relationships are also nonrelationships, 
how can  we  say anything  at  all  about  Bartleby?  Is  the  gift  he  gives  his  own death?  Derrida 
understands the whole text as comical and full of irony. He even likens Bartleby's irony to that of 
Socrates. For, Socrates  also questioned and deconstructed others while feigning ignorance.155 Yet, 
the way in which he does so is difference.
Bartleby's irony also enhances the "uncanny feeling" of the story. Nobody feels "at home" 
in his roles, positions and  beliefs anymore. The communication that Bartleby and Abraham initiate 
with the external world is based, most ironically, on the "unsaid". Abraham, like Bartleby in certain 
moments in the story, does not say anything at all, and in that he says everything. For, Abraham's 
secret (that he is going to sacrifice his son) is unspeakable. For, if Abraham had said what he was 
determined to do, nobody would have understood the message anyway. The message would not 




have reached them. Bartleby who had been working in the Dead Letter Office before he arrived at 
the Law office knows what such a failure of communication means, be it written or said. Both 
stories at a certain point lead to the unsettling realization that any letter may be a "dead letter". 
Jacques Derrida suggests that a letter can always not arrive at its destination, meaning that it can 
always go astray. We can ask, together with Bartleby, what it means for meaning to arrive - of what 
it in fact means for something to mean at all. 
In the Gift of Death Derrida arrives at two revealing claims. First, that any decision is, in the 
end, always secret, even in the very instant of its performance.156 This is because no decision is 
guided or controlled by knowledge. Derrida says: "Such, in fact, is the paradoxical condition of 
every decision: it cannot be deduced from a form of knowledge of which it would simply be the 
effect,  conclusion  or  explication."157 At  the  same time,  Bartleby's  and Abraham's  decisions  are 
absolutely responsible decisions. How can that be? If not based on knowledge nor reason, how is 
any ethical decision possible? When we compare their manner of deciding to the Kantian manner, 
we see that their decision could not be defended in front of any law, any tribunal. They respond to 
the wholly Other. And that forces them to neglect the others. That is the main idea behind Derrida's 
explication of absolute decisions. Even though Bartleby and Abraham would prefer not to, they 
decide to (do it, to kill). They sacrifice all of the others because of that one Other with whom they 
communicate and to whom they give the gift of death. 
What  stands  behind this  is  Derrida's  "secret"  formula  "tout  autre  est  tout  autre."  In  this 
(second) argument he tries to decipher the formula as follows: Every other (one) is every (bit) other. 
He uses both stories to explain what that might mean, explaining that: "God, as wholly other, is to  
be found everywhere there is something of the wholly other."158 And because everyone is singular, 
solitary, inaccessible, transcendent and cannot be presented originally to my consciousness, Derrida 
makes  the  claim,  by  means  of  analogy  with  Abraham's  story  that,  "what  we  can  say  about 
Abraham's  relation  to  God can be  said  about  my relation  without  relation  to  every other  (the 
neighbor, husband, teacher...)."159 Every other is an indecipherable mystery. But what is appalling 
here is that the I is always responsible for the decisions it makes (when he "responds" to the wholly 
other or to others). Such an absolute decision, however, sometimes leads to an absolute disregard 
for the human, accepted, ethics based on generality. Can such a decision be ethical? Who are we 






give itself a law (such as "you will not kill") that can be accepted by everyone, that is, generally,  
universally, then what happens to our responsibility towards others? That is the gift of death which 
one sometimes has to give to the others when responding to the wholly other. Derrida says that this 
relates to Jews, Christians, Muslims and everyone else – for every other in its relation to the wholly 
other.160 Levinas' criticism of this Kierkegaardian explanation regards his belief in the generality of 
ethics. Levinas says: "Generality can neither contain nor express the I's secret. Now, it is not at all 
certain that ethics is where he sees it. Ethics as consciousness of responsibility towards others ... far 
from losing you in generality, singularizes you, poses you as a unique individual, as an I. ... In his 
evocation of Abraham, he describes the encounter with God at the point where subjectivity rises to 
the level of the religious, that is to say, above ethics. But one could think the opposite: Abraham's 
attentiveness to the voice that led him back to the ethical order, in forbidding him to perform a 
human sacrifice, is the highest point in the drama. … It is here, in ethics, that there is an appeal to 
the uniqueness of the subject, and a bestowal of meaning to life, despite death."161 Now, why are we 
saying all this? How does it relate to Bartleby? We will focus on two things here – on Bartleby as 
the wholly other and on the most dramatic moment in the story.
What communication does Bartleby have with the wholly Other? Is there anything at all 
speaking to him? To what extent can we equate God as the wholly Other and the other (human 
being)? His argument is that there is no real difference between the face of my neighbor and the 
face of God. For, if every one is every bit (wholly) other, then we cannot distinguish between the 
generality of ethics and "the faith that turns towards God alone, as wholly other, turning away from 
human  duties."162 Levinas,  on  the  other  hand,  according  to  Derrida,  does  not  differ  from 
Kierkegaard, because he wants to distinguish between the infinite alterability of God and the "same" 
infinite alterability of every human being.163 That erases the border between the ethical and the 
religious. Derrida claims that Levinas' ethics is already a religion. The Derrida-Levinas argument 
has been analyzed elsewhere in more depth and falls outside the purview of our considerations so 
we will not analyze it here. Bartleby's relationship to any transcendent God, or voice, cannot be 
found within the text. Rather, Bartleby is an immanent version of Emerson's fragile class of men 
explored  in  his  essay "The Transcendentalist."  Let  us  now turn  to  Emerson's  late  work  which 
discusses subjectivity, power, rhetoric and will.  
160 Ibid.
161 Emmanuel Levinas, Emmanuel. Proper Names. Transl. Michael B. Smith. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996)  76-77.
162 Derrida, Gift of Death, 84.
163 Ibid.
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3. Emerson's Late Work: Towards Deconstruction and Pragmatism 
Focusing on characters such as Bartleby who cannot see their secret (which only the "other" 
can voice for them164),  we get a specific outlandish perspective that makes us tremble and that 
shows  us  the  limiting  structures  we  live  in.  Being  an  indeterminate  "gap"  of  potentiality,  or 
"cancellation of all difference", Bartleby as a decentered subject, deconstructs with his performative 
formula and foreignness the myth of self-reliance and willful power, showing his readers that one 
needs to approach such an almost "inhuman" otherness not only for recognition but also for self-
knowledge. According to Melville, self-reliance (and Transcendentalism) was a suspicious ideology 
-  an ideology which disregarded the suffering of the "other", and which was anticommunitarian, 
antisystematic and detached from the non-intellectual issues of his day. However, Melville did not 
seem to realize that what he calls Emersonian Transcendentalism is always counterbalanced with 
Emerson's use of language as a deconstructive means that refutes anything we might understand as 
a fixed belief (which places him among the thinkers of the deconstructive tradition, i.e. Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Butler, Deleuze). Emerson subverts the system and discourses of his time from within – 
by means of tropes, metaphors, performative statements that enact new possibilities for subjectivity. 
To criticize it as ideology is, I believe, untenable. To treat Emerson's late thinking as a part of the 
"metaphysics  of  force",  where  Jan  Patočka  places  Nietzsche  and his  will  to  power,  would  be 
reductive as well  and it  would ignore Emerson's  praxis of secession,  of abandonment.  Patočka 
views the "metaphysics of force" as an inauthentic fiction, as a mythology.165 For, it stresses the role 
that we play (and with which we fully identify) and not our  "ownness" which is irreplaceable. I  
shall argue in this chapter, however, that Emerson's notion of force and will does not correspond to 
any interpretation that understands Nietzsche's concept of will to power as Domination, or rule of 
the stronger. Instead, Emerson's power expresses itself as potentiality. Emerson in his early work 
(including "Self-Reliance") emphasized the transcendental, the connection one has with the Over-
soul,  or  Life-force.  While  Melville  focuses  to  a  great  extent  on the  deconstruction  of  external 
impediments which block the construction of identity, Emerson's early rhetorical force turns to the 
creative self and the infinite, the "genius" in the individual. In his late work, however, he explores 
164 Derrida,  The Gift of Death, 93.
165 Jan Patočka,  Heretical essays in the Philosophy of History, trans. Erazim Kohák (Carus Publishing, 1993) 117.
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society,  immanent  forces,  rhetoric,  success,  will,  the  organization  of  affects  and  performative 
strategies. 
3. 1  Speech that Creates a Self: Eloquence
3.1.1. Thinking and Speaking: Descartes' "I think, I am" formula
Can one (re-)constitute one's consciousness by means of speech? By acknowledging, naming 
who one is? Is it possible to do so only temporarily, or can it ensure our long term existence? Is one 
the author  of oneself?  These are  the major questions which are dealt  with in Emerson's  "Self-
Reliance" where he comments on Descartes'  Meditations.  Emerson claims in his essay: "Man is 
timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; he dares not say 'I think, I am,' but quotes some saint 
or sage."166 Stanley Cavell draws attention to the full quote in Descartes' Second Meditation where 
Descartes  expresses  his  insight  as  follows:  "I  am,  I  exist,  is  necessarily true every time that  I 
pronounce it or conceive it in my mind." Emerson also emphasized the fact that one needs to say 
the "I" in order to exist.167 But what happens when one does not speak or think? Does it mean that 
he no longer exists? The question is, what does this  saying of the "I"  mean. Cavell offers two 
interpretations taken from Jaakko Hintikka and Bernard Williams. Hintikka understands the formula 
"I think" as a basis of inference. Williams, on the other hand, sees it as an expression of some kind 
of performance. I agree with Williams that the cogito, in naming its existence, enacts a kind of 
performance.  As  Cavell  points  out,  once  I  say  "I  exist",  I  must  exist.  It  follows  from  the 
performative force of the first person singular. It is impossible to coherently say "I do not exist."168 
How do I, however, distinguish myself from others? For Descartes, there are no others and that is 
also partially why he needs God to be the perfect one, the author of my existence, thus providing 
me with existence. For Descartes, moreover, man always thinks. Emerson does not follow this line 
of reasoning up to these two conclusions. He asks whether the "I" really gets into my speaking and 
thinking (or whether it is genius that speaks through me). Further, he asks what happens when I do 
not  think.  And he  says  that  those  who do not  stake  their  claim in  the  world  by staking  their  
existence really only haunt the world as non-existent. Cavell suggests that such an answer has two 
weaknesses – he does not say what the I may in the end be; the proof only works in the moment of 




its  enunciation.169 For  Emerson,  self-authorship  is  to  a  great  extent  possible  and  indeed 
recommended. He calls the uncreated life the life of conformity.170 However, there is a paradox in 
Emerson's  rejection of quoting others. Cavell  is right to point out that Emerson himself  quotes 
Descartes here and other authors quite often. Can we not repeat others? Can we be the original 
authors of our sentences? Derrida would say (and it is also a part of his argument against Austin's 
criticism of the nonseriousness of artistic and theatrical speech) that all saying is citation, including 
'serious' everyday talk. Language is something we inherited in a certain form and with rules and 
words. One always subjects oneself to intelligibility. In an effort to enact his self, Emerson performs 
it. Cavell locates the performance of Emerson's cogito in Self-Reliance: "My life is for itself and not 
for spectacle. … Few and mean as my gifts may be, I actually am, and do not need for my own 
assurance or the assurance of my fellows any secondary testimony."171 It  is clear that Emerson 
knows that we are visible to one another, the theatricality of the self is obvious. But we may to a  
great extent control and transform what we show as our self, as who we are. One must not let one's 
consciousness  be  controlled  and  limited  by  the  stare,  by  the  watching  of  oneself  by  others.  
Emerson  knows  that  the  boundary  between  the  private  and  public  is  a  thin  one.  It  is 
impossible  not  to  be  influenced  by  the  "external,"  public  gaze  and  the  normativity  arising 
therefrom. He, however, preaches a necessary detachment from the theater, from the stage of life. 
That can be attained either through the workings of "genius" within oneself, or by means of self-
reflection and the reflection of the surrounding society, performed by the intellect. That was exactly 
the problem of Bartleby – the effort to evade public space, the public gaze and disappear from the 
power structures and rhetorical power games. But is that possible? Emerson's answer would most 
probably be negative. What Melville emphasizes is the visual "speaking" of Bartleby's presence. 
For, Bartleby's presence is already a visual presentation of meanings. The public space provides 
perfect "soil" for the theatricalization of his body. Melville, in contrast to Emerson, stresses the 
body  and  physical  space.  He  suggests  that  the  public  space  is  not  anchored  in  ideas  but  in 
corporeality  which  reflects  the  individual  by  means  of  the  public.  From  the  perspective  of 
semiotics,  we  could  understand  Bartleby  as  an  expressive  symbol,  as  will  be  explored  when 






Emerson claims in his essay "Eloquence" that right words can save every occasion. All one 
needs is to be a good orator. His reliance on speech can be seen in almost all of his late essays. Even 
a mute, even Bartleby perhaps, according to Emerson, could become an orator and begin to change 
his surroundings and himself. He says: 
because  every man is  an orator,  how long soever  he may have  been a  mute,  an 
assembly of men is so much more susceptible.172 … There is no calamity which right 
words will not begin to redress. … The end of eloquence is to alter in a pair of hours  
perhaps in half hour's discourse, the convictions and habits of years.173
What Emerson emphasizes here is the idea that words are performative and can become 
actions under certain conditions. The power of statements, for Emerson, is connected, however, 
with moral sentiment and affirmative truth. It must invigorate the hearer. It has to promote activity. 
Such  an  attitude  stands  in  stark  opposition  to  Bartleby's  formula  which  leads  to  a  complete 
nothingness of the will and inactivity but which also shows the shortcomings of identity based on 
speech. For, how can Emerson ensure that the world will not soon be filled with confidence-men of 
all kinds, misusing speech and leading one subsequently to skepticism and nihilism? He simply 
cannot and does not. He experiments, he attunes and provides energy for one's own thinking. The 
responsibility is up to each individual himself. He claims that:
Eloquence is attractive as an example of magic of personal ascendency. The orator 
changes the face of the world; he commands his passions and affections. ... [The] 
[o]rator  attunes  the  audience,  manipulates  moods  of  people  like  a  musician. 
Experimenters are improvisators.174
On the one hand, Emerson's confidence in performative speech, in eloquence, has no limits. 
He is well aware of the manipulation that every orator makes use of and he approves of it. It is also 
clear that the orator must improvise and experiment. His statements, however, need not be logical. 
Emerson claims in "Poetry and Imagination" that the poet makes use of a joyful science (a concept  
172 Emerson, "Eloquence," 639.
173 Emerson, "Eloquence," 640.
174 Emerson, "Eloquence," 664.
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on which Nietzsche bases one of his works). Poetry is science, and the poet a truer logician. He 
builds,  adds,  and  affirms,  while  the  critic  destroys  :  "the  poet  says  nothing  but  what  helps 
somebody; let others be distracted with cares, he is exempt."175 The poet is the law-giver, according 
to Emerson, the exact reporter of the essential law. Self-knowledge is one of the main prerequisites 
of  a  good  orator  and  poet.  Another  one  is  the  abandonment  of  the  world  of  common  sense. 
Repetitions  of  a  phrase,  which  form a  rhyme,  help  the  poet  "launch  on  the  sea  of  ideas  and 
emotions: we pour contempt on the prose you so magnify; yet the sturdiest Philistine is silent."176 
Rhyme is a kind of music and it also has the privilege of speaking the truth which no confidence-
man can challenge. Thus, the character of the experimenter, or poet, draws on his own intuition and 
emotions, enacting a new logic if necessary, constituting "difference" in the world while being a 
decentered self. It is obvious that while Emerson's late work still stresses the affirmative side of 
performatives, it leaves space for the non-identical, for the self as "differentiating," a rupture in 
discourse. Overcoming circumstance or limitation, can therefore be enacted not by means of ascent 
or descent but by means of deconstruction from within discourses themselves.   
Emerson connects eloquence with power: the orator concentrates the powers of a multitude. 
His aim is: "taking sovereign possession of the audience. Him we call an artist who shall play on an 
assembly of men as a master on the keys of the piano."177 This ability to attune the audience to a 
desired emotion, to enlarge their affections, is one of the main virtues of the orator and of the poet.  
The orator must be of radiant physical health and must have "great volumes of animal heat."178 At 
the same time, the orator has to be a supreme commander over all his passions and affections. That 
is the first but not the most important prerequisite. He or she needs to be able to see through masks, 
let Force/Life stream through his/her body and mind and convince, mesmerize the audience. Mere 
power of speech is not sufficient. Eloquence refers to a unique presence; it is "the appropriate organ 
of the highest personal energy."179 Together with personal energy, the orator needs to be able to 
make use of tropes, to condense his daily experience into a glowing symbol.180 Here we are already 
moving into the sphere of Emerson's mysticism. To electrify the audience requires that the poet or 
orator contemplates a whole and is inflamed by it. The paradox is that while the orator's eloquence 
must  be grounded on facts  (he must  keep his  feet  on something),  he  at  the  same time offers 
symbols of all kinds and colors to be able to free the audience, to transform its emotions, to keep its 
175 Emerson, "Poetry and Imagination," 510.
176 Ibid.





attention. What connects these two realms, is, I believe, affirmative power, or as Emerson calls it 
moral sentiment. The success of the orator is measured by his ability to provide new energy for the 
hearer, to transfer his ecstasy to the audience. As to Emerson's proto-pragmatism, he stresses in 
"Eloquence" that one needs to develop one's character and insight and see to it that his words are 
actions. He also emphasizes the connection with power claiming that eloquence shows the power 
and possibility of man. Yet, one needs several attributes to make it work:
No act indicates more universal health than eloquence. The special ingredients of this 
force are clear perceptions; memory; power of statement; logic; imagination, or the 
skill to clothe your thought in natural images; passion, which is the heat; and then a 
grand will,  which,  when legitimate  and abiding,  we call  character,  the  height  of 
manhood.181 
The human being therefore needs to show rare power of expression. But we may perceive 
heat and energy also in the talk of tricksters. How do we distinguish genuine actions from fake 
actions, or performances? How can we tell who is an authentic orator and who a mean forger, or 
confidence-man?  In  his  essay "Success,"  Emerson criticizes  those  American  "performers"  who 
work only for effect. He says:
 
I  hate  this  shallow Americanism which hopes  to  get  rich  by credit  ….skill 
without study, mastery without apprenticeship,  or the sale of goods through 
pretending that they sell. … excellence is lost sight of in the hunger for sudden 
performance and praise.182
What Emerson attacks here is the power of confidence-men to mesmerize the audience, to 
focus only on the consequences, on the profit of their action. That sounds similar to the notion of 
pragmatism as we use it today where what counts is the effect, consequences of a conception, its 
"cash value" as William James termed it.  Emerson would, however,  disagree with the ideas of 
William James and would not move into the realm of relativist thinking. 




 Charles Sanders Peirce tried to evade the ethical problems connected with forgery.  His 
pragmaticism opposed both nominalism and pure analytical philosophy. He followed, like Emerson, 
Swedenborg  and  reached  mystical  oneness,  love  of  all  humankind,  the  acceptance  of  the 
impossibility to solve the final questions involved with ethics. On the other hand, he relied on his 
mathematical methods of inquiry. His greatest influence on the pragmatic tradition was formulated 
in his maxim: 
Pragmaticism was originally announced in the form of a maxim, as follows: Consider 
what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, you conceive the objects 
of your  conception to have. Then, your  conception of those effects is the whole of 
your conception of the object.183
 There, he defines truth as the correspondence of a sign (in particular, a proposition) to its 
object, and the real as the object (be it a possibility or quality, or an actuality or brute fact, or a 
necessity  or  norm or  law)  to  which  a  true  sign  corresponds,  such  that  truth  and  the  real  are 
independent of that which you or I or any actual, definite community of inquirers think. After that 
needful but confined step, next in clearness's third grade (the pragmatic, practice-oriented grade) he 
defines truth — not as actual consensus, such that to inquire would be to poll the experts — but as 
that which would be reached, sooner or later but still inevitably, by research taken far enough, such 
that  the  real  does  depend  on  that  ideal  final  opinion—a  dependence  to  which  he  appeals  in 
theoretical  arguments  elsewhere,  for  instance  for  the  long-run validity of  the  rule  of  induction 
(Peirce held that one cannot have absolute theoretical assurance of having actually reached the truth, 
and later said that the confession of inaccuracy and one-sidedness is an essential ingredient of a true 
abstract statement). Peirce contends that even to argue against the independence and discoverability 
of truth and the real is to presuppose that there is, about that very question under argument, a truth 
with just such independence and discoverability.
The  pragmatism  of  Peirce  does  not  resemble  "vulgar"  pragmatism,  which  connotes  a 
ruthless  search  for  political  advantage.  Peirce's  pragmatic  maxim  is  rather  the  heart  of  his 
pragmatism as a method of experimentational mental reflection.184 It is obvious then that Peirce's 
183 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. 
Thoemmes Continuum, 1998: 5.438.  
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method was, like Emerson's method, based on experimentation and not on utilitarian values. Peirce 
distinguished  between  utilitarian  and  intellectual  interests,  saying  that  the  scientific  man  (as 
opposed to  the practical  man) wants  nothing more than to  render  ideas  and things reasonable. 
Pragmatism,  according  to  him,  is  not  a  utility-oriented  practicalism but  an  endeavor  based  on 
experimentation. 
William James, in contrast, has been often attacked for his relativist and opportunistic ethics. 
Some of his rather unfortunate claims were misinterpreted into claims such as, "Do whatever is 
good for you." What is good for you may not be good/true for me. While his statements about truth 
do often lead in the relativist direction, and he was criticized for that by Ch. S. Pierce, his ethics 
rests on the values of trust and faith. To test whether a person's statement is authentic we need to 
test it from the viewpoint of a community, as James emphasizes. He explains in his work Will to  
Believe that we have to act and we cannot always wait for adequate proof when making a moral  
decision. And a decision whether someone is a forger is not a mere epistemological problem, but an 
ethical one as well. James says:
Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot 
wait for sensible proof. A moral question is a question not of what sensibly exists, but 
of what is good, or would be good if it did exist. [...] A social organism of any sort 
whatever, large or small, is what it is because each member proceeds to his own duty 
with a trust that the other members will simultaneously do theirs. Wherever a desired 
result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its existence as a 
fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those immediately 
concerned.  A government,  an  army,  a  commercial  system,  a  ship,  a  college,  an 
athletic team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, 
but nothing is even attempted.185
Such trust, or confidence in others is exactly what Melville plays with in his book 
Confidence-man. In it, he opposes both Jamesian pragmatism and Emerson's idealism which 
do not solve the problem of forgery and rely on intuition and the test of a "community of 
inquirers." How can we test authenticity and differentiate it  from speech made for mere 
effect  or  for  profit?  Linguistic  transactions  are  in  many aspects  analogous  to  monetary 
185 William James,  The Will to Believe; and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (General Books LLC, 2009) 16.
80
transactions which motivate the American self. 
3.3 Melvillean Performatives: Language, Money and the Body
Authenticity, sincerity, confidence – all of these are related to successful or unsuccessful 
performatives or speech acts. We have seen how sincerity is connected with eloquence and power in 
Emerson's work. In Melville's work ("Bartleby, the Scrivener," The Confidence-Man), the issue of 
sincerity versus forgery is one of the major topics. Melville offers no manuals as to "how to demask 
forgery" or "how to become authentic." Rather, he tests his characters and readers concerning their 
confidence in one another, in themselves, and in American society. His performatives are radically 
different from those of Emerson; they lack the drive, the hope, the rhetorical capacity to break 
through a wall. Their "force" often comes from no force at all, from moments when one is "de-
activated" by angst, stammering, silence, ecstasy or the call of conscience, all of them moments of 
timelessness. We will see later on how contemporary thought (Derrida, Deleuze) deals with these 
moments. It will become clearer what Melville's performatives can actually do to us. For now, let us 
focus  on the context  of performatives.  If  they are to  work,  there needs  to  be some amount  of 
confidence. Confidence is closely related in Melville's work to the issues of money, currency and 
the transmission of information. Transactions (monetary and linguistic) all require confidence in 
order to work. At the same time, they function as performances in all the various meanings of the 
word. A performance may win one's confidence or cancel it; it may reveal important strategies of 
forgeries, ideologies, of lying, as well as the performative aspects of charitable behavior. We have 
seen such transactions and performances in "Bartleby, the Scrivener." Now, we can have a look at 
Melville's Confidence-man where he also tests when a narrative is a performance. Together with it, 
we need  to  analyze  performance  as  such.  For,  Melville's  main  criticism of  Emerson's  work  is 
leveled at the rhetorical performance which can be fake. 
In a text, as Marie Maclean writes, we can perceive narrative as performance. Maclean talks 
about physical performance and the moving body of text: "there is an interplay of the network of 
content and the network of expression. What Deleuze and Guatarri call agencement, which means 
that energetic actions of bodies and feelings are transformed into a combination of signs produced 
by enonciation,  the act of the speaker or writer."186 We can trace such agencement machinique in 
Melville’s work as in Kafka's. Deleuze and Guattari say: 
186 Marie Maclean,.Narrative as Performance: The Baudelairean Experiment (Taylor and Francis, 1988) 62.
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On the one hand [there is] the machine-boat, the machine-hotel, the machine-circus, 
the  machine-castle,  the  machine  tribunal:  each  with  its  parts,  cogs  and  gears,  its 
processes, its mixed, embedded, disjointed bodies... On the other hand the system of 
signs or  enonciation:  each system with its incorporeal transformations, its acts, its 
death sentences and its verdicts, its trials, its "law".187
Deleuze  makes  a  distinction  in  his  latter  work188 between  the  machinique  or  energetic 
(involving  an  interplay  of  dynamism,  rhythm  and  process)  and  the  mecanique  or  mechanical 
(lifeless, artificial, not part of an organic whole).189 According to Deleuze, we get a "feel" for the 
notion, perceiving a vibration, an intensity. Once we begin to think about language and its processes 
as intensities, vectors, we begin to view the self as a multiplicity of various roles or forces. Coming 
back to Melville’s  Confidence-man, we realize that Melville's aim is to be able to "decode" the 
masks one wears, just like the character of the Cosmopolitan can, yet he knows that there is no 
unitary essence behind those masks. Such uprootedness is directly related to the theatricality of the 
American self. Maclean points out that alienation goes hand in hand with this activity: "alienation 
of self produces the theatricalization of self."190 And virtuality is just another aspect that results from 
such alienation. The self, Maclean claims, becomes the other – a multiplied other – it splits into 
several virtual selves, masks. The self [of the Confidence-man] then falls apart, it loses its unity. 
What we are left with are only different voices in constant dialogue.191 The Confidence-man is a 
novel made out of dialogues. It is a theatrical game where a part is substituted for a whole. There is  
no  essence  anymore,  just  attributes  performatively  constituting  a  rhetorical  self.  The  formal, 
rhetorical self is also, like the self of the attorney, vulnerable, volatile and open to self-destruction. 
The question for such a linguistic approach (which we present here) is not what you can make, but 
what you can perform. And performance implies shared conventions between the performer and the 
reader and the contractual nature of language.192
3.3.1  Transactions: Linguistic and Monetary Confidence
187 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari. Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Continuum, 2004) 113.






Let us now have a look at an important aspect of agency: speech acts. We will ask: What 
kind of transaction occurs when we speak? Is the linguistic transaction in any way analogical to the 
material,  monetary  one?  Melville  discusses  the  issue  of  confidence,  speech  and  silence  (both 
spiritual, linguistic and monetary) in his novel The Confidence-man and "Bartleby, the Scrivener." 
In The Confidence-man, he views America as a boat full of confidence-men who cannot be easily 
decoded. They make use of philosophical dialogue while questioning authenticity, forgery, the value 
of  knowledge,  money  and  sense.  If  trusted  or  paid  they  offer  help  in  building  up  one's  new 
personality through their performative speech. Yet, we still do not know how they do this and what 
kind of contract they establish between themselves and their interlocutor. What kind of contract is 
established between Melville's story of Bartleby and his reader? To what extent is his formula "I 
would prefer not to" performative effecting a change in the world of the reader? Maclean says in her 
book Narrative as Performance:
When we say "I will tell you...", it is a performative statement which takes us into a 
different realm of the symbolic. This shifting presupposes a contract between the reader 
and the writer which implies a sort of transaction. The transaction, however, is both an 
'act' and an enactment, "both doing and the representation of doing.193
What Maclean describes here is the contingency of every representation. It is subject to the 
caprice of the teller. At the same time, she says, all storytelling asks for something in return for what 
it  supplies.  The  'contract'  is  not  a  static  term but  rather  a  dynamic,  transformatory  and  active 
process. The reader finds himself thrown into the contractual relationship, into the frame of the 
story. If there is a speech act in the story, such as "Then he said: Let's get married', and "I believed 
him," the act may be fictional, a second-order act.194  Yet, it works. 
The transformative effects of storytelling can occur in various forms. Even if it is merely a  
second-order, fictive act, it does something to us as well as something to the character in the novel.  
Searle and Austin doubt the effects of such fictive speech acts. Austin claims in the argument about 
the  non-seriousness  of  speech  acts  in  fiction  and  theater:  "a  performative  utterance  will,  for 
example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on stage, or introduced in a poem, 
or spoken in a soliloquy.195 The void of the utterance implies that there is no communication, no 
193 Maclean 72.
194 Ibid.
195 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 9.
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contract  between  the  performer  and  the  audience.  That  is  not  plausible,  however,  because  the 
audience clearly perceives the impact of a performative act within a play just as a reader does in a  
book.  And  the  'contract'  between  the  speaker  and  the  listener  may  include  both  'counterfeit' 
statements as well as sincere utterances. Mary Luise Pratt says:
The assumptions of natural discourse may … be deliberately suspended or replaced 
by other conventions operating for both 'speaker' and 'listener.' In such circumstances, 
'counterfeit' - that is fictive – utterances will, like stage money, have a positive value, 
as will also the listener's not crediting the speaker's words or not taking what he 'says' 
as meaning what made him 'say' it.196
        The positive value of 'counterfeit'  utterances takes us back to the virtue of "decoding" a 
performance – of insincerity in a narrative or a play. Such insincerity, or theatrical, fictive speech, 
which we know may be mystifying, serves as a mirror for us to see the conditions of our own 
thinking and of patterns and ideologies that we unquestioningly accept (as in the case of Bartleby 
who reflects the attorney to a certain extent). Moreover, a theatrical speech act, even if it is not a 
'serious' speech act in Austin's sense of the word, can be valid within its virtual world. It may still 
reveal certain truths. Anne Ubersfeld suggests that a "theatrical speech act be marked with a minus 
or a negative sign, precisely because a situation of self-reflexivity, such as a play within a play, will 
juxtapose two negatives and thereby reveal a positive, the truth of fiction. The opposite of self-
reflexivity is forgery – when one persuades us that the fictitious is real."197 According to Pratt, the 
major  benefit  of  fiction is  the doubling of experience.  We therefore do not  need to  cancel  the 
validity of  theatrical  speech acts  and consider  them non-serious  and therefore useless.  We can 
inhabit  the two worlds – the world of fictional or theatrical discourse and the world of natural 
discourse without having to mix them. There are truths in both of them. We pay the producer of the 
text (with various currencies) but what we receive in the transaction can never be fully converted 
into  either  the  money  or  the  praise  that  we  give  for  it.  Roland  Barthes  considers  fiction  a 
commodity or even a piece of merchandise (and later in The Pleasure of the Text as a gift which has 
its worth) and written narrative as both a product and production. Is Melville responsible for the 
effects  he produces  by means of  Bartleby?  Regarding the relationship of  fictional  discourse to 
196 Mary Luise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1977) 
101. 
197 Anne Ubersfeld, Reading Theatre (1977) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 186. 
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natural discourse, Barthes says:
fictional discourse has no responsibility vis-a-vis the real: in the most realistic novel, 
the referent has no 'reality': suffice it to imagine the disorder the most orderly narrative 
would  create  were  its  descriptions  taken  at  face  value,  converted  into  operative 
programs  and simply  executed.  In  short...  what  we call  'real'  (in  the  theory of  the 
realistic  text)  is  never  more  than  a  code  of  execution:  the  novelistic  real  is  not  
operable.198 
It is important to realize that in fiction, the referent cannot have any reality, it cannot be put  
into practice. When these two systems/discourses merge, we can only become confused about what 
is real and what is counterfeit, as can be seen in Melville's Confidence-man. For, the confidence-
man juggles with the discourse of language and the discourse of money – as with two symbolic 
forms  of  communication.  There  are  counterfeit  and real  money present  as  well  as  words  and 
promises. Both discourses are created by humans. As Maclean points out: "thus natural discourse, 
like currency is in itself a fabrication, only 'true' if we agree on its use. Fictive discourse is also a  
fabrication but of a different sort, a simulacrum of the natural […] It is distinguished from natural 
discourse by socially acceptable criteria of validity, just as the distinction between forged money 
and  genuine  money is  made  by the  ruling  social  institutions."199 Fictive  discourse,  like  forged 
money, can therefore become a means of questioning the conventions of audience creation, social 
institutions and help to establish their respective boundaries. Such testing of conventions is one of 
the tasks of both Melville’s confidence-man and Bartleby. Mary Douglas describes the means of 
such testing and the similar nature of ritual and the discourse of money. Maclean subsequently 
substitutes the term ritual for the term language throughout the whole quotation. The homology 
between money and ritual/language is described by Mary Douglas (and modified by Maclean) as 
follows: 
The metaphor  of  money admirably sums up what  we want  to  assert  of  language. 
Money provides  a  fixed,  external,  recognizable  sign for  what  would  be  confused, 
contradictory  operations;  language  makes  audible  external  signs  of  internal  states. 
Money  mediates  transactions;  language  mediates  experience,  including  social 
198 Maclean 78: quotation from Roland Barthes, S/Z , transl. R. Miller (New York, Hill and Wang, 1974) 80. 
199 Maclean 88.
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experience. Money provides a standard for measuring worth; language standardizes 
situations and so helps evaluate them. Money makes a link between the present and 
the future, so does language. The more we reflect on the richness of the metaphor, the 
more  it  becomes  clear  that  this  is  no  metaphor.  Money  is  only  an  extreme  and 
specialised form of language."200
It is the mediation of experience, which both ritual and language provide, that interests us 
most  when considering language,  transactions  and confidence in  "Bartleby,  the Scrivener." Can 
Bartleby's experience be communicated in the language of the attorney? It seems that it cannot. He 
himself  is  not  intelligible  within  the  discourse  of  the  law.  Be  it  a  past  trauma  or  different 
experiencing of the present situation, the sensibility and logic of Bartleby is different from that of 
the attorney. That is why Bartleby creates a foreign language within the conventional language. Is 
confidence based on shared convention? The word confidence in The Confidence-man connects in 
itself both meanings – the language of trust (to confide in someone) and the language of money (the 
confidence  man  asks:  Will  you  have  confidence  in  me?,  which  often  also  means:  Will  you 
contribute money to our common enterprise?). Money (as a representative/sign of performed work) 
thus may be a form of language, a form of transaction, but only within an agreed code. Maclean 
admits:  "when we change the  context,  we change the currency,  thereby invalidating our  initial 
means of exchange."201 The context of the transaction is therefore essential. If the confidence-man 
presents us with a fiction which we believe, he must not break the rules of belief. It is interesting to 
notice that the attorney wants to make Bartleby his man of confidence. However, he soon ceases to 
confide in him. What are the reasons? Are they mainly linguistic – based on Bartleby's formula 
which enacts a logic of preference – or does he break their contract in a different way? It is clear  
that the attorney is the first one to break the pact when he asks Bartleby to leave the "space" he 
designated for him and do some extra work. He was trying to make him leave his separate realm, a 
world elsewhere, which could, like fiction in general, mirror his everyday world and the natural 
discourse.  Maclean  believes  that  if  we  decode  a  'fiction'  which  a  character  presents  to  his 
interlocutor in a work of fiction or drama, we get to a certain truth, or revelation, which is valid 
within that discourse. If a fiction, such as Melville's,  uses such self-reflective means, it  has the 




3.3.1.1  The Forger
The figure of the forger (Confidence-man) will help us understand the breakdown in the 
notions of 'truth' and 'reality' which opens the way to an irreducible multiplicity. Deleuze says in his 
work on time, cinema and fiction: 
The power of forgery only exists in the form of a series of powers, which always refer 
back from the one to the other and pass from one into the other. To such an extent that  
investigators, witnesses, innocent or guilty heroes, will participate in the same power 
of forgery whose levels they will incarnate at each stage of the narration. Even 'the 
truthful man ends up understanding that he has never ceased lying,' said Nietzsche. So 
the forger will be inseparable from a chain of forgers into whom he metamorphoses. 
There is no single forger, and if the forger reveals something, it is the existence behind 
him of another forger, who may even be the State... The truthful man will form part of  
the chain, at one end, as will the artist, power of forgery to the nth degree, at the other. 
And  narration  will  have  no  other  content  than  the  display  of  these  figures,  their 
shifting from one to the other, their metamorphoses one into the other.202
      Forgery  is  closely  connected  with  art,  which  is,  as  Maclean  points  out,  a  part  of  a  
transformational chain with multiple future possibilities. The gift of a forgery is then analogous to 
the gift of fiction, its value and its implications.203 If we cannot get to the stable, unalterable truth, 
why is The Confidence-man or "Bartleby, the Scrivener" 'worth' reading? What kind of contract is 
established between the reader and narrator and various incarnations of forgers? One of the answers 
would be, as was mentioned above, self-reflection. The characters offer self-reflection, they reflect 
one another, America, the narrator. The narrator in  The Confidence-man acts as a speculator, as a 
literary  critic  who  seeks  what  is  "worthy"  in  the  America  of  his  time.  What  Melville  shows, 
however, is that value and values can be enacted in a performance, that they are only performed and 
can be devalorized at any time. There are several cases of such devalorization in the novel – the 
character wants to increase his own value, he desires a charitable reputation and also a good deal. 
But the exact opposite occurs, he decreases his value instead. The confidence-man unmasks his 
charitable endeavors and shows the emptiness behind it,  its  empty referent.  Similarly,  Bartleby 
202 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image (University of Minessota Press, 1989) 175.
203 Maclean 85.
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unmasks the inauthentic charity of the attorney and the emptiness behind human relationships in the 
law-office. 
3.3.1.2  Dream within a Dream, Frame within a Frame
There is a strategy which Melville uses a lot in his Confidence-man, which is called mise-
en-abyme. It is a great way to "force" one into self-reflection. In literary theory the notion refers to 
the inter-textual nature of language. Representing a frame-within-a-frame concept,  mise-en-abyme 
constantly defers our judgment, our action. We can therefore never reach the basis, the foundation 
of  reality  through  language,  because  it  refers,  in  the  frame-within-a-frame  manner,  to  another 
language, that leads to another and so on ad infinitum. One discourse mirrors another and that one 
mirrors another in  The Confidence-man, so it is not surprising that we see no end to the strange 
process of progression. In "Bartleby," two discourses, languages meet but nothing substantial is said 
or  revealed.  It  seems  that  in  "Bartleby,  the  Scrivener,"  unlike  in  The  Confidence-man,  the 
way/process in which they interact is not dialectical. While in  The Confidence-man  we may ask: 
Does their communication establish anything new? A new America?, in "Bartleby, the Scrivener," 
any change is potential and more probable in the world of his readers than in the world of the 
attorney. Melville creates a dreamy atmosphere of indistinctness, where the old European rationality 
arrives at its limits. Ubersfeld talks about the generative power which dreams have: "the dream 
within another dream speaks the truth. Through a twofold denial, the dream of a dream produces 
truth.  Likewise,  theatre-within-the-theatre  does  not  convey  reality  but  rather  what  is  true, 
transforming the sign of illusion and identifying as illusion all that is mounted on stage."204 Thus, 
such self-reflection can make one recognize his/her illusion (such as when the attorney, on the basis 
of his experience with Bartleby, realizes that personal identity is not a simple essence based on the 
narration of one´s past, or when the reader realizes the possibility of the logic of preference). If, as 
Maclean says, self-reflection of fictive acts produces the recognition of fiction, which in the end has 
a positive perlocutionary effect on the reader, then we cannot talk about the non-seriousness, the 
emptiness of speech acts in fiction and drama. Their effects are obvious and visible. The strategies 
which produce these effects are various, not limited to mise-en-abyme. Revelation/recognition of 
illusion or lies may proceed from other paradoxes which Melville brilliantly presents. He questions 
not only the stability and reality of the referent, but also the nature of the sign as such. Umberto Eco 
204 Ubersfeld 28.
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says about signs and lying: "A sign is ... something … which stands in place of something which is 
absent, which could not even exist, or at least not be present anywhere at the time at which I use the 
sign. This means that the fundamental characteristic of the sign is that I can use it to lie. So that 
everything is a sign that can be used to  LIE (since everything that serves to tell a lie can also be 
used, in the right circumstances, to tell the truth)."205 Now the question is whether we accept the lie 
that pretends to be truth, or whether it self-reflectively reveals certain mechanisms in ideologies, 
whether we accept the counterfeit as genuine, or whether we accept it as counterfeit and continue 
"in confidence" ourselves.
3.3.1.3  Confidence and the Counterfeit
Lucien  Dallenbach  offers  a  definition  of  mise-en-abyme  which  perfectly  suits  our 
endeavors in interpreting American confidence. It deals with the symbolic code of language and the 
symbolic code of money as payment/confidence. She says that there are three sorts of mise-an-
abyme, the first reflects the code which the narrator and audience must share, the second reflects 
the  enonciation,  the textual  strategies  of the speaking subject  and organizing subject,  the third 
reflects the  enoncé, all or part of the spoken message of the text.206 If we introduce a counterfeit 
coin into the flow of transactions (by giving it to a beggar, or business partner), it is a mise-en-
abyme (self-reflection) of code. Yet, if we give someone a counterfeit coin or message, what kind of 
gift is it? That depends on the receiver. The receiver can accept the forged message as:207 
1) genuine, passed on as true, undetected ---naive and lucky receiver
2) forged, passed on as forged at a profit ---the manipulator, cynic
3) genuine, passed on as genuine, detected –leads to tragedy, but perhaps to wisdom
4) forged, passed on as genuine, undetected –a few days' riches for the poor little speculator  
208
Employing a Greimasian semiotic square209, one would have to explore and "decode" in 
The Confidence-man  and "Bartleby, the Scrivener" the effects of: fiction given as reality, fiction 
given as non-reality, reality given as fiction, reality given as non-fiction. What does this tell us 
205 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (London:Macmillan, 1976) 12.




209 A. J. Greimas, Structural Semantics (University of Nebraska Press, 1984) 222.
89
about  the  construction  of  confidence,  self-confidence,  confidential  discourse  and  confidence-
games? Which messages are truly embodied in their speakers and their experience and which are 
merely  floating  systems  of  signs?  Is  Bartleby´s  unsaid  message  embodied  within  him?  Does 
Emerson´s poet embody his message?
Emerson focuses on the truly embodied messages when he talks about the poet. The poet 
cannot  be a  mere conglomerate  of  signs.  That  would not  transform anyone,  and he would not 
transfer any power onto his audience.
3.4 Performativity and Poetics in Late Emerson
3.4.1 Poetic Creativity and Potentiality 
The moments when the rhetorical force of Emerson's words transgresses the boundaries and 
inspires creation have been contrasted above with the moments of exhaustion of language, when the 
characters  moan,  stutter,  wrestle  wordlessly  or  simply  remain  silent.  While  Emerson  seeks  to 
awaken the lion inside him, the genius, which reveals new horizons and expand his consciousness, 
Melville prefers the zones of potentiality,  limitation of will  to nothing, the switching off of all 
violent forces. That, however, does not mean that Emerson's ideal orator would have to be over-
assertive. It is the helplessness of Bartleby, the fact that he could not hurt a fly, that is the worst of 
his qualities, if he has any. Emerson's poet, on the other hand, teaches people to dance above the 
abyss, to affirm and experiment with the forces of nature, to let Life take over. He thus examines 
nature from a different perspective than Melville. Yet, as will be seen, there are points where they 
meet, zones of contact, of potentiality, that the authors both inhabit and that question language, 
intelligibility and law itself. When Emerson  claims that we need to affirm Life itself, he talks about 
being without negation.  It reminds one of the old phrase by Parmenides which says: "being is, 
nonbeing is not." Emerson identifies Being with Life and creative forces:
Being is the vast affirmative, excluding negation, self-balanced, and swallowing up 
all relations, parts and times within itself. Nature, truth, virtue, are the influx from 
thence. Vice is the absence or departure of the same. Nothing, Falsehood, may indeed 
stand as the great Night or shade on which as a background the living universe paints 
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itself forth, but no fact is begotten by it; it cannot work, for it is not.210
Emerson sees  negativity  as  a  potential  background  of  our  actions.  Yet,  he  sees  it  as  a 
privation. It is this naive notion of negativity or nothingness as the privation of the good or of being 
which Melville criticized in Emerson's early thinking. Even if nothing has no existence, however, it 
still does not exclude potentiality as an indeterminate zone for future creation.  Let us now inquire 
what that poetic potentiality is.
3.4.2  Words as Expressive Symbols
Emerson claims in his essay "The Poet" that the science of the poet consists in naming, 
language-making, getting close to things and thus naming them either after their appearance or after 
their  essence,  which  rejoices  the intellect,  "which delights  in  detachment  or  boundary."211  For 
Emerson, language is a vast reserve of words created by poets. At the same time it is the tomb of  
muses in the sense that in its further use the words lost the "stroke of genius and obtained currency," 
which at the original moment "symbolized the world to the first speaker and to the hearer."212 That 
is why Emerson believes that "language is fossil poetry."213
Richard Poirier, a well-known commentator on Emerson, said that Emerson’s sensitive and 
insightful mind made him aware that there is  no adequate  narrative for the inhabitants of 19th 
century America. What they did was to "scramble to orient themselves in a cosmos of alarming new 
proportions."214 Similarly to Emerson, Poirier emphasized the value of the poet, saying that "the 
experience of each new age requires a new confession, and the world seems always waiting for its 
poets."215 Emerson through the performative statement not only constituted the absence but at the 
same time took on himself the task of filling that void. His poet does not represent the things and 
processes of the world; he creates the world anew. The new thought, the new method of the poet 
comes from the formless potentiality on which the poet draws. He affirms the potentiality to apply 
the ideal law (the order of forces that one experiences) to this moment and the present knot of 
affairs.  Further,  in  "the Poet,"  Emerson describes  the character  of the poet  in a way similar  to 
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Romanticism – the poet  is  capable of taking us to the "bottom" of being – of our self  and of 
universe: he approaches being (and not becoming) as follows:
The poet by an ulterior intellectual perception […] puts eyes, and tongue, into
every dumb and inanimate object […] so the poet turns the world to glass, and
shows us all things in their right series and procession.216
The way we see the world is very often deformed. It is up to the poet to create/correct the 
new ratios in which we perceive things around us and ourselves. The new transparency of the world 
that the poet provides for his readers should also instill a new faith in poetry within them. He leads 
the  reader  into  potentiality  (before  forms  and  conventions  are  enacted)  where  there  are  no 
superstitions, no institution, no stable essences, no secure ground and yet, one can confide in the 
potentiality of nature completely. Emerson claims that one cannot really be cheated. He says: "But it 
is as impossible for a man to be cheated by any one but himself, as for a thing to be and not to be at  
the same time. There is a third silent party to all our bargains. The nature and soul of things takes on 
itself the guaranty of the fulfillment of every contract, so that honest service cannot come to loss."217 
That is his idea of compensation in nature, the physics, law of attraction, which was, again, too 
optimistic  for Melville.  However,  there is  one more source of power,  one more potentiality on 
which one may draw. That is the public power.  
The human being is capable of a new energy, according to Emerson, that of an intellect 
doubled on itself, when one abandons oneself to the nature of things, (i.e., as structured by one’s 
own nature).  One needs to  unlock, at  all  risks,  one's  doors of perception and let  Life circulate 
through  him.  With  this  force,  "his  speech  is  thunder,  his  thought  is  law,  and  his  words  are 
universally intelligible as the plants and animals. The poet knows that he speaks adequately, then, 
only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or, "with the flower of the mind;" not with the intellect, used 
as an organ, but with the intellect released from all service."218 The power of Emerson's rhetoric 
draws on potentiality while switching off the intellect's calculation, the poet risks everything – both 
his life, sanity and inner constitution. 
3.4.3  Poetry and Imagination
216 Emerson, "The Poet," 692.
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Emerson's urge for transcendence, or mere transgression of the laws of time and space is 
connected with his desire to lose his body, to move higher,  to be a mystical shape-shifter who 
experiences different forms of life – in a blessed continuity of experience. The poet often becomes 
another; he attunes himself to the voices of others, be it to their demons or angelic message and 
brings it to the reader. In ways similar to Bartleby, he is a messenger. But what exactly does such a 
poetic experience bring with it? How does Emerson's poet "leave" his limitations, the situation he 
was thrown into? He does not. Emerson mentions enthusiasm (being filled with the Life-force) and 
experimenting.  One cannot  function  without  the  other  in  Emerson.  Intellect  becomes  intuition, 
instincts approach the sublime. Paradoxes and oppositions generate the extreme power and tension 
of Emerson's speech. Like Melville, he evades sexuality and the ways of transgressing in ordinary 
experience through bodily ecstasy (be it  sex,  drugs,  physical exhaustion).  Emerson is no tantra 
thinker.  Unlike  Whitman,  who  makes  use  of  Emerson's  dialectic  but  runs  it  through  his 
transformative perception which includes corporeality and sexuality.  In Emerson, it  is rather an 
Apollonian speech which materializes the relevant affects within the reader with Dionysian force. It 
is  this  immateriality  made  material  (or  having  material,  transformative  consequences)  which 
resonates  in  Melville’s  Bartleby.  Like  Emerson's  poetic  speech,  Bartleby's  creates  confusion. 
Transgressing  not  only  the  laws  of  logic  and  grammar  but  also  the  "laws"  of  human  nature: 
Emerson's poet and Melville’s Bartleby inhabit a zone of potentiality and indeterminacy which is 
extremely provocative and meaning-productive.
Emerson speaks about the independent action of the mind, "its strange suggestions and laws; 
a certain tyranny which springs up in their own thoughts, which have an order, method and beliefs 
of their own, very different from the order which this common sense uses."219 That is the wildness 
of the speech of the poet who allows himself to be directed by his Life-forces. Emerson believes in 
the boldness of the poet who talks about real logic. He says: "poetry is science, poet a truer logician. 
He is the law-giver, as being an exact reporter of the essential law."220 We may ask whether such a 
new logic could be Bartleby's logic of preference. But Emerson evaluates the state of the poet by 
the joy it produces and by passion, which Bartleby does not express. Emerson says: "Passion adds 
eyes; it is a magnifying glass," and  "The poet knows the missing link by the joy it gives."221 When 
talking about expressive symbols, Emerson again uses joy as his measure (cf: "Poetry is the gay 
science. Poet builds, adds and affirms." It therefore refers to science as joyful). He claims that a  




happy symbol is a sort of evidence "that your thought is just. I had rather have a good symbol of my 
thought, or a good analogy, than the suffrage of Kant or Plato. ...Thus a good symbol is the best  
argument, and is a missionary to persuade thousands."222 Symbol as an argument, as a means of 
persuasion, as potentiality resonates with Peirce's thought, as will be seen later on. A symbol, for 
Emerson, always stimulates the intellect;  therefore poetry is always the best reading. The poet, 
according to Emerson, is a potential man.223 Poetry as a power is the perception of the "symbolic 
character  of  things,  and  the  treating  of  them  as  representative.  As  a  talent  it  is  a  magnetic 
tenaciousness of an image."224 Such power is, for Emerson, as palpable as anything else. To be a 
good poet one must be able to launch oneself on the sea of ideas and emotions, to take poetry as its  
own end. For, the poet is a "symbolizer, emancipator who sympathizes with the power of possible 
forms."225 The force of poetry is explosive. One needs to get to the spirit of the thing and express it  
while passing "the brute body and search the life and reason which causes it to exist."226 The poet 
introduces words into the world. The world is a virgin soil for him. All is practical and the style of 
the poet betrays him, it reveals his character and to what extent he is able "to fuse the circumstance 
of today."227 What is  stressed here,  again,  is  the individual,  nominalistic  character of American 
thought and rhetoric in the age of Transcendentalism. The poets are transporters, messengers. What 
signs do they transport?
3.4.4  Emerson and Charles Sanders Peirce
 
If we ask whether Emerson was a proto-pragmatist, we need to ask whether there is any 
connection between Emerson and Peirce. We know that there is one between Emerson and William 
James.  But  is  there  any  acknowledged  reception  of  Emerson  on  Peirce's  part?  Peirce  knew 
Emerson's work and  even though he criticized some of his Platonic ideas, he could not refute him, 
for they shared several beliefs. One of them was the vision of potentiality. Peirce says about his 
biography:
I  may  mention,  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  are  curious  in  studying  mental 
biographies, that I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord – I mean in 








the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from 
Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of 
the East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an antiseptic against Concord 
transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having contracted any of that virus. 
Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, some benignant form of the 
disease was implanted in my soul, unawares, and that now, after long incubation, it 
comes  to  the  surface,  modified  by  mathematical  conceptions  and  by training  in 
physical investigation.228
Apart from the transcendental virus, Peirce also liked to quote Emerson's poem of the 
Sphinx "Of thine eye, I am eyebeam."229 When talking about the nature of signs, he comes 
very close to Emerson's interpretation. 
3.4.5  What Is a Sign? What Is the Summum Bonum?
Peirce asks: "What are signs, anyhow? They are to communicate ideas, are they not? Even 
the  imaginary signs  called  thoughts  convey ideas  from the  mind  of  yesterday to  the  mind  of 
tomorrow into which yesterday's have grown."230 He claims that these "ideas" are not themselves 
"thoughts," or imaginary signs, saying that:
. . . they are some  potentiality, some form which may be embodied in external or 
internal signs. But why should this idea-potentiality be so poured from one vessel 
into another unceasingly? … Ideas do, no doubt, grow in this process. It is a part, …, 
of the process of the Creation of the world. If it has no ulterior aim at all, it may be  
likened to the performance of a symphony (emphasis mine).231
Ideas  as  potentiality  and  their  growth  is  likened  to  a  symphony  which  reminds  us  of 
Emerson's claim that poetry ends in music – in multiple melodies. Peirce has another condition, 
228 McDermott, Drama of Possibility (Fordham University Press, New York, 2007) 90, quoted from Peirce, Collected 
papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard U Press, 1934) 6.86-87, 
par. 102. 
229 Peirce, Collected Papers, par. 310, 404.
230 Charles Sanders Peirce, Essential Peirce, vol. II: Selected Philosophical Writings, 1893-1913 (Indiana University 
Press, 1998) 388.
231 Peirce, Essential Peirce, 388.
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however, which needs to be fulfilled. He says that the principles of logic show there never could be 
the least  growth in idea-potentiality without embodiment in something other than symbols. The 
other  condition  of  the  summum bonum is  the  continual  increase  of  the  embodiment  of  idea-
potentiality.232 Emerson and Peirce share their interest in symbols and signs and they question the 
possibilities of interpretation itself. This is relevant especially for the interpretation of Bartleby as 
an expressive symbol, as a philosophical question regarding both agency and existence. For, agency 
involves several aspects, such as potentiality and actuality, decisions, projects thrown into the future 
and other interpretations depending on whether  we take the path of phenomenology,  semiotics, 
vitalism or analytical thought. Our aim here is to get beyond Jamesian pragmatism, which both 
Peirce and Emerson do in their own way. Peirce regards symbols as follows: "Symbol alone is 
indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol."233 We 
come back here to the Gnostic interpretation of "Nothing", Bythos, the absolute indeterminacy. For 
Pierce, the symbol determines its interpretant. Determination implies a subject to be determined. We 
may ask: What is that? Peirce says that we must suppose that "there is something like a sheet of 
paper, blank, or with a black space upon it upon which an interpretant sign may be written. What is 
the nature of this blank? In affording room for the writing of a symbol, it is  ipso facto  itself a 
symbol, although a wholly vague one."234
This sounds very much like the nature of Bartleby. He is not particular, being blank, being a 
symbol, being a blank sheet onto which somebody else can try to write something new. Being the 
messenger  of  potentiality,  Bartleby invites  one  to  open the  doors  of  perception  –  be  it  in  the 
direction of the Abyss, the Nothing, inoperativity, or in the ascending direction, abandonment of the 
body, following one's calling. Bartleby connects both choices without making a choice himself. 
Living simultaneously both in the potentiality-to and potentiality-not-to, Bartleby creates, by means 
of the repetition of his formula a shadow zone which has surprising performative power. Peirce 
talks about the self-reproduction of a symbol:  
A  symbol  is  something  which  has  the  power  of  reproducing  itself,  and  that  
essentially,  since  it  is  constituted  a  symbol  only  by  the  interpretation.  This  
interpretation involves a power of the symbol to cause a real fact.235 
232 Ibid. 322.




Peirce advocates here the power of representations to cause real facts, idea becoming action, 
in other words, the performativity of Bartleby as an expressive symbol. Being the blank table on 
which one may paint his vision of the world and therefore see it as well, Bartleby's blankness at the 
same time is  being interpreted by his  "reader,"  who constitutes  his  "identity"  which can never 
capture his being as potentiality.  In this way, Bartleby questions any endeavor to decipher anyone's 
identity, for there is none. What we get instead is a multiplicity, which may be one of many things: 
centralized, decentered, imitative, harmonious or integral.
3.4.6  Poetry's End in Music
Emerson said in "Poetry and Imagination" that poetry helps us discover new energy, new 
laws with which we may create. That is exactly what epitomizes pragmatism. He says that: 
Rhyme,  being  a  kind  of  music,  shares  this  advantage  with  music,  that  it  has  a 
privilege of speaking truth which all Philistia is unable to challenge. Music is the 
poor man's Parnassus. With the first note of the flute or horn, or the first strain of a 
song,  we  quit  the  world  of  common-sense,  and  launch  on  the  sea  of  ideas  and 
emotions: we pour contempt on the prose you so magnify; yet the sturdiest Philistine 
is silent. The like allowance is the prescriptive right of poetry. You shall not speak 
ideal truth in prose uncontradicted: you may in verse. The best thoughts run into the 
best words; imaginative and affectionate thoughts into music and metre. ... when we 
rise into the world of thought, and think of these things only for what they signify, 
speech refines into order and harmony.236 
Emerson's thinking is that of emotion and affects, as well as that of intellect. Like Bartleby, 
he does not try to appease the contradictory, he connects both within himself. What is important is 
the sensibility of the poet and the interpretant. The poet, as well as the singer, betrays himself in 
every line, with every sound of the voice. Thus, for Emerson poetry should turn into music:
Let Poetry then pass, if it will, into music and rhyme. That is the form which itself  
puts on. We do not enclose watches in wooden, but in crystal cases, and rhyme is the 
transparent  frame that  allows  almost  the  pure  architecture  of  thought  to  become 
236 Emerson, "Poetry and Imagination," 748.
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visible to the mental eye. Substance is much, but so are mode and form much. The 
poet, like a delighted boy, brings you heaps of rainbow bubbles, opaline, air-borne, 
spherical as the world, instead of a few drops of soap and water.237
Poetry, on the one hand, ends in music, on the other, it ends in silence as can be seen 
in Emerson's poem Terminus. 
  
            3.4.7 Poetry's End in Silence: Emerson's Terminus
TERMINUS 
IT is time to be old,
To take in sail: --
The god of bounds,
Who sets to seas a shore,
Came to me in his fatal rounds,
And said: 'No more!
No farther shoot
Thy broad ambitious branches, and thy root.
Fancy departs: no more invent;
Contract thy firmament
To compass of a tent.
There's not enough for this and that,
Make thy option which of two;
Economize the failing river,
Not the less revere the Giver,
Leave the many and hold the few.
Timely wise accept the terms,
Soften the fall with wary foot;
A little while
Still plan and smile,
237 Ibid. 749.
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And,--fault of novel germs,--
Mature the unfallen fruit.
Curse, if thou wilt, thy sires,
Bad husbands of their fires,
Who, when they gave thee breath,
Failed to bequeath
The needful sinew stark as once,
The Baresark marrow to thy bones,
But left a legacy of ebbing veins,
Inconstant heat and nerveless reins,--
Amid the Muses, left thee deaf and dumb,
Amid the gladiators, halt and numb.'
As the bird trims her to the gale,
I trim myself to the storm of time,
I man the rudder, reef the sail,
Obey the voice at eve obeyed at prime:
'Lowly faithful, banish fear,
Right onward drive unharmed;
The port, well worth the cruise, is near,
And every wave is charmed.' 
Terminus,  the god of  boundaries,  is  used in  the poem to set  limits  to  one's  aging self.  
Emerson's aim is no longer to dive in the limitless sea, to plunge into the Chaos which precedes 
Creation, the abyss from which Emerson wrote. The phrase 'the port is near' may signify death, 
without negative connotations, as a necessary boundary to life. The sea of eternity and potentiality 
no  longer  allures  and  seduces  Emerson.  He  openly  recognizes  and  accepts  his  physical  and 
intellectual limitations, likening himself to a tree that shall not shoot its ambitious branches but stay 
silent and accept the imperatives of temporality and fate.  Although the tone of the poem is not 
optimistic and Emerson realizes that he was unfit for either poetry or politics, it is not a poem about 
giving-up. It is clear that his typical force-voice drawing on Power, or Abyss is failing. Nature, as in 
other May-day poems, is suddenly inscrutable and mute, every wave is charmed; its secret must be 
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decoded carefully,  without passion and fancy.  For,  the power of intellect  and fancy are slowly 
decreasing as well. The Emersonian poet, however, knows that there is no final destination, aim or 
terminus for poetry.  He says in Merops:
MEROPS
WHAT care I, so they stand the same,--
Things of the heavenly mind,--
How long the power to give them name
Tarries yet behind?
Thus far to-day your favors reach,
O fair, appeasing presences!
Ye taught my lips a single speech,
And a thousand silences.
Space grants beyond his fated road
No inch to the god of day;
And copious language still bestowed
One word, no more, to say.
As Emerson says here, it is poetry as a journey what counts in the end. Not the constant 
naming and unnaming of nature. Presences taught him to use speech but it is silence, or one word 
that he can use to describe his circumstance.  To be able to interpret the situation when speech 
arrives at its limits, one can return to Emerson's fascination with gnosis, the Abyss, silence, light, 
fullness (pleroma) and the spark (pneuma). When describing the acts of the poet in one of his late 
poems called The Poet he says:
Not yet, not yet,
Impatient friend,--
A little while attend;
Not yet I sing: but I must wait,
My hand upon the silent string,
Fully until the end.
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I see the coming light,
I see the scattered gleams,
Aloft, beneath, on left and right
The stars' own ether beams;
These are but seeds of days,
Not yet a steadfast morn,
An intermittent blaze,
An embryo god unborn.
Emerson mentions the seeds of days, the embryo god unborn, silent string, coming light, 
scattered beams, which might all  refer to their  gnostic counterparts (logos spermaticos, silence, 
bythos, aeons). Yet, as was mentioned above, his philosophy of the the self and gnosis does not 
have much in common with historical Gnosticism. For Valentinus, both the body and the soul are a 
product of Creation, effected by Demiurg (the creator who brings forms and language), and not 
Nous. That  makes the body and soul inferior in comparison with the fullness, pleroma. However, 
there is the breath, pneuma, "the scattered gleams" in Emerson's poem, which may come from the 
highest logos, or nous and which can light up the human soul when breathed in. The pneuma, the 
spark gleams in silence this time. We have seen that in his early work the spark grew into fire 
through Emerson's force-voice which made everything around him plastic, transformable. Why was 
it dependent on his voice and not writing? Emerson has a tendency to cancel, or turn over any 
written affirmation that he proposed in the past, be it the past paragraph or the past sentence. For, he 
believes, as was mentioned above, neither in the past, nor in consistency. It is his voice, as a force,  
inflamed by the spark,  pneuma (breath coming from the abyss, from absence, from nothing), that 
can resist "master" all destruction. Unlike in Valentinus, gnosis can be attained, for early Emerson, 
mainly through (poetic) language, by means of the transitive force, the movement of the voice. That 
is why speech and eloquence need to be developed as much as possible. Yet, late Emerson does 
know that silence is the opposite of speech without which no knowledge, no gnosis could ever be 
attained. Silence dissolves one's personality, it beams its message, dissolving rigid forms that could 
petrify the  movement  of  the  voice.  For  silence  draws  on the  abyss  which  is  present  in  every 
dialogue, referring thus to the unsaid. The force is no longer rhetorical but it is the force as the 
Abyss. Power becomes the potentiality of the unsaid. 
3.4.7.1  The Abyss and the Unsaid
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The abyss for Emerson has several sources, Jacob Boehme's Urgrund, the abyss which is 
God, from which God emerges. Spirit emanates from this Abyss as a force or energy. From this 
energy  emanates  Nature.  Emerson  often  repeated  a  process  of  three  stages  –  contemplation, 
thought, creation (writing).  He claimed that one needed to arrive at a point between the finite and 
the  infinite,  where  God  and  man  meet.  Emerson says  that  "the  abyss  of  our  being  cannot  be 
revealed but by the appreciable phenomena of life." He opposes the traditional Western dictionary 
of morals which derives its terms from animal, corporeal life. Instead, Emerson implies that it is the 
abyss where morality comes from. He says: "[but]..for those emblems furnished by nature herself 
the moral and metaphysical world would have remained entirely buried in the eternal abyss. "238
The place of the aboriginal self is, according to late  Emerson, the abyss, before language, 
before thought,  before Creation.  The difference between Nature and human nature is  dissolved 
there.  Intuition  is  resistance,  that  which  resists  language,  starting  at  the  limits  of  language. 
Language emerges  as  intuition.  As  Joseph Kronick  argues,  "language must  be the  producer  of 
intuition as well as its product. The origin would be already divided, or what today we have learned 
to call writing,- differance."239 Emerson supports this view when he writes in his journal: 
"thus  all  philosophy  begins  from  Nox  and  Chaos,  the  Ground  or  Abyss  which 
Schelling so celebrates. And in every man we require a bit of night, of chaos, of 
Abgrund, as the spring of a watch turns best on a diamond. In every individual we 
require a piece de resistance, a certain abyss of reliance and fortitude on which to fall 
back when worst comes to worst.240 
The ground equals the abyss and it is accessible through language which is transitive, not 
stationary. Emerson believes that the I is the Abyss. Yet, the abyss is language in its potentiality. We 
can therefore say along with C. S. Peirce that "man is language. … the abyss inhabits the man as 
that which can never be assimilated with the Self, which in turn is unthinkable without the abyss." 
To confront  the abyss,  language is  recovered from the  past.  Man is  always  already a  sign,  an 
expressive one. Emerson calls for an original reappropriation of language, as the main aim of any 
238 Emerson, Journals of R. W. Emerson, Journal B, ed. W.H. Gilman, A.R.Ferguson (Harvard U. Press, 1965) 67.
239  Mary Arensberg, ed. The American Sublime (SUNY Press 1986) 56.
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writer.241 The poet must creatively reappropriate the past and return to the ground of language. 
Bartleby returns to this ground, but on a different level, inventing a foreign language and logos. 
Also,  it  is  not  through  writing  but  through  speech  and  silence  coming  from  potentiality.  To 
transcend the division between the I  and the abyss,  one needs to plunge into the chaos,  into a 
complete forgetting, from which a new form can arise. 
Is Emerson a new Orpheus, following Plato's spiritual purification,  katharsis, or diving in 
the way the gnostics do? Is that what makes his voice so powerful? As will be seen in the next 
chapter, there is a dialectic of strength and weakness in Emerson which cancels any real possibility 
of a proposition of new metaphysics, that of will to power. He claims in his essay "History" that 
"Man is the broken giant, and in all his weakness both his body and his mind are invigorated by the  
habits of conversation with nature.242 He stresses the power of music and the power of poetry, 
coming from this conversation.
3.5 Power and Potentiality in late Emerson and Melville’s  
Bartleby
          3.5.1   Power and Force in The Conduct of Life
Emerson’s notion of power and force in The Conduct of Life  focuses much more on the 
plane of immanence and rhetoric. His turn away from transcendentalism to the "physics" of human 
nature and analogically to the natural world influenced Friedrich Nietzsche immensely – especially 
his notion of "will to power." However, Emerson does not provide, as was mentioned above, any 
metaphysical doctrine of the will to power which would rule the world. He even abandons his all-
too-optimistic  notion  of  Nature as  something which  is  here for  us  to  fulfill  our  dreams.  From 
"Experience" on he also sees the negative, limiting side of Nature. He calls it circumstance. There is 
a lot one may do or change but there are also things one may not do. All of a sudden, Emerson sees  
life and freedom as beautiful necessity. Accepting limitations in life, he then analyzes power from 
different perspectives as if dancing around it and showing its various manifestations and influences. 
He deals  with philosophical  issues  such as  the  analogy between human nature  and the natural 




interpreting it in an anthropomorphic way. That means that he views and judges it according to the 
categories which he derives from the human mind, its mental and physical states. Nature, for him, 
reflects  or repeats the states of human nature and that  is  why Emerson can elaborate so many 
analogies between the human being and the natural world.
Another  important  aspect  is  the  "spiritual  basis"  of  material  objects,  including  human 
subjects.  For Emerson, nature (always accessed through individual human natures) is not silent, 
soundless or colorless dead matter. It is vital, always tending towards the creation of new forms of 
life, preserving the "animal heat, or energy." Its instinct is growth, development, the accumulation 
of memories and power; it  always strives for more.  As we will  see in his  "Natural  History of 
Intellect" and "Fate," what Emerson praises most in his late work is the "will" operating within the 
natural world and the will to actualization of one's potentiality. The world is therefore driven not by 
materialist,  empty,  physical  forces  but  with  vectors  of  force  which  are  intentional,  in  the 
phenomenological sense, which means that every force has an object to which it turns. 
3.5.1.1  Plato's Gorgias, Power and the Limits of Rhetoric 
The main antagonist of Socrates in the dialogue is not really Gorgias who teaches rhetoric 
but Callicles, his disciple. Gorgias, unlike Socrates and Emerson, does not see inner transformation 
as the founding element of education (paidea). What he offers to his followers is the means, the 
technique  (techne)  of  rhetoric,  and not  the  knowledge of  the  ultimate  goal  of  human life.  He 
believes that rhetoric can be used in a good way.243 Callicles, on the other hand, is a politician and 
entrepreneur who uses rhetoric only as a useful weapon. 
Socrates and his disciple Chairefont seek to prove that the basis of the sophist's techne is 
nihilism – a belief that there is no independent moral law or order and that the moral law and the  
law of  power (i.e.  the  law of  creation)  are  the  same.  The only thing  which  is  real  and worth 
pursuing is power. This may remind us of Nietzsche´s will to power, or the notion of power from 
Emerson´s late work. It will be shown, however, that Emerson does not go as far as to embrace the 
sophistic position, even though he does leaves the Platonic, transcendental stance.
Plato's  objection  to  Charles  S.  Peirce  and  his  expressive  symbols  and  metaphors  of 
symphony would  most  probably  be  that  poets  make  the  human  being  passive.  They represent 
243 Jan Patočka, Platon: Přednášky z Antické Filosofie ( SPN, 1991) 154.
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religion for Plato, which means that only god can reach what is essential and decisive in life.244 
Socrates is confident, on the other hand, that there is human wisdom, beyond the reach of human 
techne.  As we have shown above, however, neither Emerson´s poet, nor Bartleby are those who 
make people passive. They make them move, including the movement of conceptual nomadism, 
rather than throwing them into boundless emotions. 
If we explore the relationship between rhetoric as techné (art, craft) and rhetoric as dynamis 
(power), we get two different perspectives in Plato´s writings. Rhetoric, according to the Gorgias, 
can function as manipulation, as power (dynamis) to assert one's opinion. Rhetoric is the instrument 
of one´s own rule.  That is  what makes it  the main political  means.  Rhetoric  is  the art/craft  of  
persuasion, the art of make-believe, based on mere faith, not knowledge.245 In that sense, rhetoric is 
the art of victory. From a different perspective (that of Plato´s Phaedrus), rhetoric as a techné can be 
used by philosophers as well, as long as it is attached to the forms of the Just, the Beautiful, the 
Good. Such philosophical rhetoric is beneficial and should be learned. 
As for rhetoric as the art of victory,  one needs to ask: Can man dominate the power of 
rhetoric? Many formulas are performative and the power of discourse can take one to a position 
where he never planned to be. Can then the power of rhetoric make one a slave, who always wants 
to win, over everybody, at any price? 
Rhetoric, according to Socrates in the Gorgias, is not a force or power but mere flattery. The 
good equals the pleasant. The strongest advocate of sophistry and will to power, as opposed to the 
Socratic  logos,  is  Callicles.  He is  a  radical  man without  scruples  and sentiments  who inspired 
Nietzsche in his distrust  of Socrates'  poison deconstructing the forces of the tragic tension and 
Dyonisiac  Hellada.  Callicles  openly  defends  extreme  individualism  and  the  natural  right  of 
powerful individuals to rule others. He introduces the distinction between nomos (law, conventions) 
and physis (nature), saying that the weak created laws and norms to tame the strong individuals 
who  were  created  by  nature  to  dominate.  The  strong  individual  (which  reminds  us  also  of 
Nietzsche's overman) has at his disposal a boundless desire, or will to power which can never be 
fulfilled. While attacking Socrates for his impracticality and inability to defend himself, he praises 
the strong one for his ability to acquire power, and therefore also the best in life. As Carlo Ginzburg 
notices, for Callicles, nature itself reveals that it is a just thing "for the better man and the more 
capable  man  to  have  a  greater  share  than  the  inferior  man  and the  less  capable  man."246 The 
244 Patočka 155.
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dominion of the strong over the weak is a law, a law of nature.247  
Yet, Socrates claims that there is no distinction between nomos and  physis.248 For him, all 
nomos is a kind of physis, which means that the law of equality of citizens is based on nature to the 
same extent as the law of the stronger which was being defended by Callicles. The main problem 
seems to be that Callicles is unable to explain what the force or power of the will of the individual 
really means. All he manages to say is that the strong individual has a natural disposition to rule, he  
is a natural-born leader whose freedom consists in the gradation of his desire, will to power drawing 
on instincts. 
What is interesting is that both Socrates and Callicles oppose conventions and conformity to 
the majority.249 While Socrates seeks to tame one's physis, to provide a limit, or measure (metron) to 
one's boundless desires and find a purpose of one's life which then holds the self together, Callicles 
promotes the increase of desires which cannot and should not be tamed. Such a Calliclean hedonist 
would live in constant hunger for more. That seems to be the complete opposite of Bartleby, who 
negates all will and all desire. Yet, he opposes Socrates's often-enforced dialogue and the violence 
of his elenchos as well. The power of Bartleby's formula does not provide him with any power he 
could use; it opposes rhetoric as such. What does such disappearing from the order of language 
mean? In what other order can he be perceived, understood? We will show that it is the order of 
Deleuzian potentiality. Yet, even Deleuze's interpretation of Bartleby stays on the ground of rhetoric 
and  cannot  transgress  its  limits.  At  the  end  of  his  essay  on  Bartleby,  Deleuze  concludes  that 
Bartleby is the brother of us all, revolting against paternal function, logos, law. Bartleby's foreign 
language is still a language even though it encompasses the logic of preference. Yet, Bartleby does 
not prefer anything that would please him. Pleasure, according to Callicles, is a pure performance of 
power which stresses only intensity; pleasure and the good are the same for the Sophists. Not for 
Bartleby.  Socrates  sees  hapiness  in  discipline  and  self-control.  Instead  of  expanding,  however, 
Bartleby uses rhetoric to  disappear. 
Socrates posits nomos, as sophrosyne and dikaiosyne, geometrical equation, a limit, against 
the formless and boundless indeterminacy of the instinctual life. The limit and law are a being; 
limitlessness is non-being. Socrates' aim is to make people better through his speech, Callicles' aim 
is to make them more powerful. The question of rhetoric as  dynamis,  and rhetoric as  techné  has 
occupied us before. What is at stake now is the issue of willpower. Let us repeat the distinction 




from the Gorgias and focus on its second aspect. As was mentioned above, there are two kinds of  
forces, according to Plato, which both threaten to rid the human of all independence: 
− mythico-religious forces 
− enlightenment forces 
We shall ask now: To what extent does Emerson evade these two extremes in his late work? 
What is the relationship between the self, will and power? How do Emerson and Melville (in his 
"Bartleby, the Scrivener") evade the dangers of the metaphysics of force, of will to power? 
3.5.2  Force/Life/Energy
What Emerson does is a profound dematerialization of the world, which includes a direct 
opposition  to  simple  materialism,  and  mechanistic  conceptions  of  the  universe.  "Atom,"  for 
Emerson,  is  a  unit  of  "power"  or  "spirit."  As  George  J.  Stack  points  out,  Emerson  (and  also 
Nietzsche, drawing on Emerson's work) anticipate some of the conceptions of relativity dynamics 
and subatomic physics.250 Nietzsche named these units, or "centers of force," as the physicist Roger 
Boscovitch named them, "power-units," or "will-points."251 Emerson also stressed the immanent 
vital force which can be experienced within the world and which acts through all things, including 
the human being. When the human perceives this force, his field of activity expands, as Emerson 
suggests, and he has a distinct "feeling of power." Self-reliance therefore acquires a new meaning. It 
no longer refers to a divine Power-reliance but to the possibility of having the feeling of power, 
confidence and independence and well-developed inner life. We can see a clear link here between 
existentialism and late Emerson who also asks the questions: "How shall I live?", "How can I feel  
more power?", "How can I embrace the affirmative within nature and myself?". We have dealt with 
circumstance and the human condition of having been thrown into a space which s/he did not 
choose. Even though he sees all the limitations of man, Emerson still believes in the freedom of the 
mind to transform things around it; he still believes that it is important to care about one's existence 
and  to  make  it  as  much  one's  own as  possible.  A constant  movement  from the  center  to  the 
periphery,  from a  centered  self  to  moments  when  the  self  is  decentralized  is  characteristic  of 
Emerson's late work.
As to the issue of power as vital energy, as life-force, it is often tested in life and can be 
increased by means of "resistance" when one needs to overcome uncanny circumstances and issues 
250 George J. Stack, Emerson and Nietzsche: Elective Affinity, 168.
251 Ibid.
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which are both physically and spiritually demanding. In such testing and "training" of one's power 
in liminal situations the human being gets to know oneself to a greater degree which obviously 
increases the degree of power and of sensibility which one diffuses in the universe. Emerson in such 
moments resembles existentialist writers who ask "how" one is to live and not why or what one is to 
live. He also draws on the Hegelian concept of consciousness which becomes self-aware in the 
human being. Self-knowledge and the degree of power are therefore co-dependent. Before we get to 
the notion of "power" as potentiality, which I consider dominant in his late work, let us have a look 
at the notions of circumstance and limit in Emerson. 
3.5.3 Circumstance, Liminal Situations and Death
As we have  mentioned above,  Emerson's  perception  of  power  (in  nature)  changed with 
Emerson´s acknowledgment of fate or circumstance. Circumstance, as Emerson admits in Conduct  
of Life,  cannot be manipulated by us and it in fact affects and manipulates us. Can we liberate 
ourselves once and for all from unpleasant circumstances? No. It may be the first (and possibly last) 
NO in  Emerson's  philosophy.  Emersonian  contemplative  ethics  needs  to  be  transformed  when 
limitations  finally  come  into  play  with  all  their  force.  These  are  the  same  limitations  which 
Melville, Foucault, Deleuze and we ourselves in our present situation have to face. What are these? 
How do we face them? Emerson talks about positive and negative power. The negative one, the 
power  of  circumstance  needs  to  be  overcome.  In  Bartleby's  case,  such  overcoming  is  made 
impossible by his very nature. While Emerson's aim was, like Melville's, to suggest possible ways 
of constituting the self, Emerson looks for solution in a direction diametrically opposite to Melville, 
as if  the aim were to avoid limitations,  to avoid looking at  unpleasant circumstances.  Emerson 
represses death and anxiety – to be able to function, to speak, to move on. His late work exhibits 
such dancing above the abyss of nihilism, enacting his reality by means of performative speech 
acts, persuading himself that life is worth living and that affirmative power needs to predominate. 
"We have  to  consider  two  things."  Emerson  (1929)  says:  "...positive  power  and 
negative  power,  or  circumstance...the  circumstance,  and  the  life...Nature  is  the 
tyrannous circumstance....  Nature is, what you may do.  There is much you may 
not.... It is wholesome to man to look not at Fate, but the other way: the practical 
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view is the other."252
This is a clear manifestation of pragmatism in Emerson. The practical view, that is, the one 
that gets things done, is the other. Although Emerson was constantly haunted by the negative and by 
death in his life, he rarely mentioned it openly. Yet, in one of his late poems ('Terminus"), Emerson 
explored the Abyss, the Bythos of the Gnostics. Creativity and expressivity within langauge are no 
longer the chief purposes in life.
3.5.4  Power, Natural Law and Right
Emerson admires the drive and courage of those who seek the sources of power, or intensity, 
everywhere within the everyday world.  He loses sight of his  earlier  idealist  and transcendental 
views and focuses on the "natural," "technical," "creative" features of man. He also believes in 
"compensation," which means that while our efforts will sometimes have their desired effects, they 
will also, as often as not, produce unanticipated, unintended, and surprising primary or collateral 
effects. We may ask what the relationship between the force of human desire and the force of 
natural law is. Emerson claims that we need to exert power. We need to express ourselves, discharge 
the energy that was given to us. Even when we discover that there is Fate and that we are thwarted, 
we will see that it also is a disclosure of power.
If  one  has  the  feeling  of  power,  or  dynamis,  together  with  the  ability,  talent  and  the 
sensibility to do something, one also has the right to do it. Every new action in the world has a law-
giving aspect  in  it  (as  we have seen  in  Bartleby).  It  enacts  new modes of  subjectivity,  a  new 
hierarchy of values which may or may not be adopted by others. Emerson, however, suggests that 
the forces of such powerful personalities work as  magnets and make others follow.  Emerson, of 
course, deplores the mentality of the mass, of the herd, which merely follows a leader. What right 
do  these  personalities have  to  enact  new orders  of  thinking?  The  idea  of  power  as  right  was 
developed in various forms in  Emerson's work. The earliest mention of this creed is to be found in 
"Self-Reliance" as was noted earlier. Emerson draws here on Hobbes and Spinoza who first dealt 
with  the  topic and related  it  to  the  problem of  masses,  of  society as  dictating  conformity and 
punishing the nonconformists and to the individual and his natural rights. In his late work, Emerson 
talks about eloquence and the right to express oneself, to speak. It is connected with will, at this 
252 Emerson, "Fate," 524, 527.
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stage. He says: "Will is the advance to that which rightly belongs to us, to which the inward magnet 
ever points, and which we dare to make ours. The revelation of thought takes us out of servitude 
into freedom. So does the sense of right."253 Emerson emphasizes in "Politics" that this right applies 
as much to the individual as to all others; and the right of others should never be overriden by the 
individual´s equally valid right.
3.5.5  Power as Presence and Resoluteness
Emerson, on the one hand emphasizes power as the presence of a person, on the other, he 
focuses on the power to be in the present time, to perceive it,  to epitomize it,  to express it.  In 
"Power," he claims that "Power is an affair of presence of mind, of attitude, of aplomb. It is a  
question of stomach and constitution."254 Such power ceases in the moment of repose and in the 
moment  of  conformity.  It  is  important  to  decide  from  one's  own  sensibility based  on  one's 
receptivity. Imitation of others is suicide. The trick is then not only to augment one's power but not 
to lose power. Signs of power, according to Emerson, are visible mainly in the decisions of man. 
Emerson is, in this way, a predecessor of Heidegger’s notion of resoluteness. Emerson claims that: 
Many men are knowing, many are apprehensive and tenacious, but they do not rush to 
a decision. But in our flowing affairs a decision must be made, -- the best, if you can;  
but any is better than none. … A man who has that presence of mind which can bring 
to him on the instant all he knows, is worth for action a dozen men who know as 
much, but can only bring it to light slowly.255
The  notion  of  resoluteness  has  its  strong  and  weak  points,  especially  when  related  to 
difference,  otherness  and the unsaid.  The practical  process  of  quick  and well-founded decision 
making, however, includes a synthesis of as many perspectives as possible in a given moment. Such 
an actualization of our "total" knowledge found resonance in Nietzsche’s Joyful Science where he 
describes the most powerful/wise man as the one who is able to hold as many perspectives/affects 
as possible in the present moment and use them when making a decision or when re-evaluating 
accepted values. Resoluteness, the ability to decide, to actualize one's knowledge in the moment 
253 Emerson, "Natural History of Intellect," 1265. (Emerson also uses the phraseology "The revelation of thought takes 
us out of servitude into freedom" in "Fate.")
254 Emerson, "Power," 538.
255 Ibid.
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requires  a  high  degree  of  concentration.  However,  Emerson  realizes  that  the  other  side  of 
resoluteness is waiting and patience. It is our intuition which brings ideas and images from the 
subconsious into the light of consciousness, mind, reflection. Yet, such a process cannot be planned. 
Getting a new idea, or emotion is something that happens to us and it has no relation to whether one
´s  self  is  centralized  or  dissipated.  The  oscillation  between  abandonment,  selfless  constitution, 
waiting, and the resolute action is present in Emerson´s late work a lot. Yet, his stance is still that of 
affirmative,  joyful  thinking  even  though  he  realizes  the  power  of  the  negative.  One  must  not 
dissipate affirmative power in a difficult situation but, instead, stay connected to it. Emerson claims 
that:
Success goes thus invariably with a certain plus or positive power: an ounce of power 
must balance an ounce of weight. ... The one prudence in life is concentration; the 
one  evil  is  dissipation.  …  Temperament  is  important.  Or  drill.  Success  is 
constitutional; depends on a plus condition of mind and body.256 
Emerson differentiates various modes of the "search for power." One of them is the pursuit 
of worldly success, others are desire for domination, for conquest, for preeminence – be it political 
or individual. As Emerson has claimed before, social and political powers are like natural powers; 
they can  be  constructive  or  destructive.  On the  individual  level,  one's  constitution  is  the  most 
decisive factor regarding one's degree of power, for physical and spiritual aspects of the body can 
no longer be distinguished. However, one is not allowed by circumstance to actualize every whim, 
or every desire of his constitution. In a way similar to Heidegger's concept of the self which he calls 
Dasein (being-there), one is thrown into the world, according to Emerson, and nature acts through 
one. Courage and concentration are therefore not enough to actualize all our possibilities, for there 
is Fate, or circumstance, that limits us. Emerson expresses the change in his thinking as follows: 
"We have two things – the circumstance and the life. Once we thought positive power was all. Now 
we learn that negative power, or circumstance is half. Nature is the tyrannous circumstance..."257 All 
of a sudden Emerson sees that certain kinds of circumstance (circles that limit us) cannot be easily 
overcome. That however does not mean that we may stop trying. Freedom is not a choice but an 
imperative,  a  necessity,  even  though Emerson sees  it  now as  the  Beautiful  Necessity.  We can 
therefore do a lot; and we actually must act as if we were free even though our desires are often 
256 Emerson, "Power," 541-2.
257 Emerson, "Fate," 524.
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thwarted. 
That is why the question of The Conduct of Life – i.e. How shall I Live? - is so important. To 
be able to recognize what your constitution "tells" you, to concentrate and to harmonize yourself 
with the "laws" and forces of (individual, human) nature, means not only to gain power but to be 
able to transform yourself, react to events, act, have knowledge of events. To be able to live in the 
present  time,  to  receive hints  from nature is  the aim of most  of  the late  Emerson's  endeavors. 
Emerson says in "Power":
All  power is  of one kind,  a sharing of the nature of the world.  The mind that is  
parallel with the laws of nature will be in the current of events, and strong with their 
strength.  One  man  is  made  of  the  same  stuff  of  which  events  are  made;  is  in 
sympathy with the course of things; can predict it. Whatever befalls, befalls him first; 
so that he is equal to whatever shall happen. A man who knows men, can talk well on 
politics,  trade,  law,  war,  religion.  For,  everywhere,  men  are  led  in  the  same 
manners.258
 What Emerson calls for here when he talks about the sympathy with the course of things is 
the ability to "synchronize" oneself with events, to change one's thinking and focus it exclusively on 
the present  time.  That  requires an augmented sensibility,  a receptiveness as regards the natural 
world. It is the expanded consciousness, the feeling of power, augmented action, detachment from 
the masses and the invention of one's own means while being synchronized with nature that create a 
"powerful personality." Emerson believes that we are lawgivers, we speak for Nature, we prophesy 
and divine. 
There is a tie between persons and events. Persons, according to Emerson, make events and 
events persons; and some persons are able to epitomize the times.259 The soul contains the event that 
shall befall it. The event is the print of your form.260 He says in the "Natural History of Intellect" 
that: "The mark of the spirit is to know its way, to invent means. … Power is the authentic mark of 
spirit."261 To invent one's means refers to the invention of new words, percepts, affects. The way in 
which certain people express the times is through performative acts. The invention of the steam 
engine is a performative, political act, the work of Plato, Kant and Goethe changes our sensibility to 
258 Emerson, "Power," 543.
259 Emerson, "Fate," 532.
260 Ibid.
261 Emerson, "Natural History of Intellect," 1269.
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temporal and moral events. 
3.5.6  Potentiality and Expressivity
Power as  potentiality  is,  in  my view, essential  for  Emerson's  thinking but  what  is  also 
important are the hierarchies of values, the order of rank, of scales of power. A powerful personality 
manages to express itself fully and with great force. That depends on its inner dynamics, on its inner 
organization of affects and beliefs. If the combination preserves its healthy inner dynamics then its 
force is visible in the external world as well. One then feels the energy of the person which attunes 
others to its particular melody and rhythm, in a nonviolent, non-intrusive way. One is drawn to the 
energy circle of such a personality by the law of attraction, both physical and intellectual (because 
these two cannot be separated). That is why Emerson also stresses the physical, savage, instinctual 
energy of a person. It is a complete misunderstanding (by the commentators of both Emerson and 
his "heir" Nietzsche) when they interpret their praise for the strong, vital human being with a raw, 
overflowing energy as a hint that the weak shall be destroyed. Emerson clearly claims that the 
presence of will in the world is not directed by material forces but by spiritual development – by the 
amplification of consciousness, the increase of agency and the movement toward higher modalities 
of form, i.e. toward greater degrees of power. 
Power is a potential reward; it is the actualized energy of the will of nature. The subjective 
feeling of energy is the goal of one's actions, not the overcoming of others but mainly the constant 
overcoming of oneself, the ability to juggle perspectives, to re-evaluate one's hierarchies, to speak 
from the potential, from the abyss, and the readiness to abandon the last circle. For this one needs a 
firm constitution, the plus factor, the surplus energy to experiment. A powerful character vivifies the 
world and is like a magnet, it naturally attracts others, for they want to experience in themselves the 
feeling of overflowing energy and enthusiasm. This power is positive, affirmative and can never 
come from negative feelings, illnesses or nihilism. At the same time, the affirmative power is no 
longer equated with the divine power but mere vital, immanent force. Emerson struggles with over-
refinement himself. As in other cases, he seeks to persuade mainly himself and increase his energy 
level and creativity. When one is oversensitive, he cannot resist the more brutal natural forces and 
cannot draw on certain, uncorrupted forms of natural force. A will which naturally seeks power 
within  the  individual,  the  instincts,  animal  spirits,  impulses  is  often  repressed  and  one  thus, 
paradoxically loses creativity and cultivation in such refinement and falls into decadence – both 
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spiritual and physical. That is also why Emerson calls for a higher degree of masculinity, the "yang" 
principle of activity which affirms itself and promotes its own expression in the world, in both men 
and women. Again, this is nothing that gender studies should wage war against. Emerson's pieces of 
advice are always addressed to the individual and could not be applied to society at large. He speaks 
performatively to himself, and also to another individual who is working on solving the same issues 
and who is ready to take the risk and experiment.  
3.5.7  The Self, the Will and Power
The question of will is a complex one as it is closely connected to the issues of power, inter-
subjectivity, creativity, recognition and speech. Emerson was one of the first (if not really the first) 
who stressed the positive, creative aspects of will within the natural world. It is quite clear that his 
writing about will and power inspired a whole new tradition (starting with Nietzsche). Emerson, 
however,  is  not interpreted here as a Nietzschean.  The reason why I  decided to test  his  proto-
pragmatism and performativity in this work is because I am interested in the practical experience 
one  has  with  literature  and  performative  speech.  The  primary  questions  were:  "What  does 
Emerson's speech do to us? What effects does it have in our everyday life?" The lack of any final  
synthesis in Emerson, is, for me, similar to the early Socratic approach, which ensures that it cannot 
be forced into a dogmatic doctrine or metaphysics. It is always open to interpretation and explores 
interpretation itself. That is why I claim that Emerson did not create any metaphysics of force, or 
will to power. His  thinking, and emphasis on abandonment, prevented him from settling on any 
fixed belief. Yet the effects of what he does induce creativity and provoke emotional states which 
may be quite permanent. Even though he clearly inspired Nietzsche's "metaphysics" of will,  he 
himself,  I  believe,  evaded  its  negative  aspects  which  the  Nietzschean  interpretation  and  other 
(manipulative) interpretations of the overman (where he abhors weakness, shuns religion, seeks to 
evade masses)  may provoke.  
Thus,  when  Emerson  deals  with  the  issue  of  will  he  relates  it  to  inner  organization, 
resistance,  and power.  He explores  it  mainly in  his  essays  "Fate,"  "Power,"  and  "The  Natural 
History of Intellect." When talking about individual will, Emerson says that a strong will "usually 
results from a certain unity of organization, as if the whole energy of body and mind flowed in one 
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direction."262 All of a sudden, he emphasizes the need for direction. At the beginning of this work, 
we were exploring the disappearance of the self, the importance of abandonment of our old circles, 
beliefs and selves in a directionless, timeless moments of ecstasy, or other modes of disappearance. 
Later Emerson  adds to  the abandonment of the self the idea of the unity of a  character,  of its 
(Aristotelian) organization. With a strong will, one can survive in a society and not become merely 
a particle of the mass, or herd. In "Fate," Emerson claims that:
 
the one serious and formidable thing in nature is a will. Society is servile from want 
of  will,  and  therefore  the  world  wants  saviors  and  religions.  There  is  no 
manufacturing of a strong will … Where power is shown in will,  it  must rest on 
universal force. . . . one must believe that one rests on truth. There is a will of all  
mind. It is poured into the souls of all men. Insight is not will, nor is affection will.263
 
One's  aim should therefore be to find the will within oneself, to cultivate it – through the 
overcoming of resistance – and keep one's self in connection with the natural, immanent, universal 
force.  If  we compare  this  notion  of  will  to  Melville’s  character  of  Bartleby,  it  is  obvious  that 
Bartleby lacks  the power of  will  which augments one's  space for  action.  Rather,  it  seems that 
Bartleby  was  given no  space  for  action.  He  was  trying  to  get  some  space  by  means  of  his 
performative formula "I would prefer not to" which is to a great extent a formula for disappearing, a 
"farewell" address. Yet, God is not with Bartleby and neither is any natural, immanent force, life or 
will to power. Bartleby is disconnected from anything that could "recharge" his batteries. George J. 
Stack comments on the connection with natural forces as follows: 
 …  the study of, and understanding of, the universe shows us that an "exercise of 
Will"  or  "a  lesson  of  power"  is  taught  in  every  physical  event.  Nature  may  be 
construed anthropomorphically as "the double" of man insofar as it  is a "realized 
will.264
Emerson  talks  about  man  shaping/constructing  nature.  Bartleby  shapes  by  means  of 
disappearing.  His disappearing is, however, performative. This holds at least for Melville’s readers, 




if not for the attorney in the long run. Deleuze talks about Bartleby's nothingness of will instead of a 
will to nothingness.265 Bartleby, for him, therefore does not embody the nihilism Nietzsche talks 
about in his  Joyful Science.  Or does he?  Would he  be  a nihilist, lacking affirmative power, in the 
Emersonian interpretation? Even when his words have such a profound effect on the world? And 
does Bartleby really believe in his formula? Is he sincere in his use of it?
Let us first see what the Emersonian interpretation of Bartleby and his will would be. For 
Emerson, in "The Natural History of Intellect," will is connected with physical as well as mental 
force. It is interesting how some of Emerson's early intuitions from "Intellect" are  developed into an 
immanent  participation  in  the  world  Life-force.  Emerson  no  longer  refers  to  the  transcendent 
"genius" but to "will" instead. He says that genius is a delicate  sensibility to the laws. It adds the 
power to express these laws again in some new form.  The laws are, however, forces. They are 
always perceived within and through one´s individual nature. The individual does not represent in 
his actions any will of the world. Rather, Emerson´s view is constructive – both language and laws 
are constructed and subject to transformation. A similar shift in meaning can be perceived when we 
juxtapose his "Circles" and "Natural History of Intellect." As to the power of will, Emerson says:
 Will is the measure of power. To a great genius there must be a great will. …  He 
alone is  strong and happy who has  a will.  The rest  are  herds.  He uses;  they are 
used.266
Such  will  resembles  the  Nietzschean  will  to  power  but  it  is  not  without  inter-
subjectivity. It is a potentiality whose expression may or may not be supported and helped by 
others who surround us. The distinction between the authentic individual and herds was used 
later by Nietzsche as one of his major ideas. However, I believe that these ideas of Emerson's 
are based on his inquiries into power issues, potentiality, power games and the disappearance 
of power. He does not promote aristocracy or elitism. Emerson again only explores himself 
and his relationship to others when he comes up with an insight that:
In unfit company the finest powers are paralyzed. No ambition, no opposition, no 
friendly attention and fostering kindness, no wine, music or exhilarating aids, neither 
warm fireside nor fresh air, walking or riding, avail at all to resist the palsy of mis-
265 Deleuze, "Bartleby, or the Formula," Essays Critical and Clinical, 133.
266 Emerson, "Natural History of Intellect," 1275.
116
association. Genius is mute, is dull ; there is no genius.267
One's sensibility is numbed in wrongly chosen company. This is true about Bartleby as well. 
He finds himself in unfit company but does not decide to leave. Even though his formula sounds 
very resolute, he does not have the required amount of insight and resoluteness to leave the place 
which "steals" his energy. Emerson would probably say that he does not see himself  as a new 
method which necessarily distributes things anew. He is in a "legal" sphere where such distribution 
is rendered almost impossible. Only the formula manages to introduce "ruptures," "gaps" into the 
monolithic discourse of the office. Another aspect which potentially takes away his energy is the 
fact that he works for another and not for himself. He is not allowed to express himself, let alone be 
creative. Thus he invents the "destructive formula" of disappearance. Emerson says about work for 
another:
There is always a loss of truth and power when a man leaves working for himself to 
work for another. Absolutely speaking I can only work for myself. All my good is 
magnetic, and I educate not by lessons but by going about my business.268 
Emerson's  advice  "to  go about  one´s  business" is  directed  to  experimenters,  to  flexible 
individuals, to entrepreneurs who draw on their instincts who are ready to take a risk. Instinct,  
however, is no longer interpreted as intuition, i.e. as something active, creative but as a negative 
delimitation. The stress is rather on the receptivity of perception and will (as a result of the right 
organization  of  our  affects  and  sensibility).  Instinct  cannot  be  articulated  for  it  has  no  clear 
boundaries; it is a "shapeless giant in the cave, massive, without hands or fingers or articulating lips 
or teeth or tongue."269 Emerson further describes instinct as follows: 
The  action  of  the  Instinct  is  for  the  most  part  negative,  regulative,  rather  than 
initiative or impulsive. But it has a range as wide as human nature, running over all 
the ground of morals, of intellect, and of sense. In its lower function, when it deals 
with the apparent world, it is common-sense.270 
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
269 Emerson, "Natural History of Intellect," 1285. ("The Natural History of Intellect" is not primarily a work by 
Emerson's hand directly; it was largely put together by his literary executor(s) from bits and pieces which he had, 
admittedly, composed himself; but it does not represent, in the main, a product of Emerson's own construction.)
270 Ibid.
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From  an  Emersonian  perspective  Bartleby  would  be  beyond common  sense,  for  that 
represents  for  Emerson  the  "natural"  drive  for  self-preservation,  the  desire  to  eat  and  to 
communicate  amongst  other  necessities.  What  we see in Bartleby,  as  was mentioned above,  is 
rather a strange kind of detachment. It is not exactly an intellectual detachment. There are no signs 
of Bartleby as an intellectual (apart, perhaps, from his physical constitution). His dematerialized 
universe is  unlivable,  however.  For the spirit,  or the atoms, according to Emerson, accumulate 
themselves in a personality, for a certain reason. One's potential needs to be fulfilled and the energy 
discharged in the right direction, otherwise one's power may quickly decline. What if one cannot 
find the right circumstances for the actualization of one's potential? Shall one enclose oneself in 
one's mind and detach oneself from the world for a while? The problem is that such detachment is 
performative, when repeated it gains force that cannot be stopped in its later stages. Emerson says 
about detachment: 
This is the first property of the Intellect I am to point out; the mind detaches. A man 
is intellectual in proportion as he can make an object of every sensation, perception 
and intuition.271
As we previously discussed, intellect plays a major part in Emerson's late work even though 
its content is somewhat changed. In his early work there would still be a chance for Bartleby to 
reconnect to divine-Power, to Life by unblocking himself to the flow of Power, becoming thus its 
mere channel. It was also recommended to abandon oneself in timeless moments, or dive into the 
primordial abyss, where intellect, however, was not in force at all. In Emerson's late work, on the 
other hand, intellect and will are essential. Intellect includes sensibility, affects, perceptions. Will 
includes a degree of practicality. Although intellect can still detach us from our surroundings and 
from ourselves,  Emerson  realizes  that  thinking  is  always  to  a  great  extent  emotional.  To  see 
something as foreign,  to see it  as an object is difficult.  For,  our moods color the world for us. 
Perhaps it is even impossible for thinking to occur outside of our own attunement. What is obvious,  
for Emerson, is that there is no pure reason in force, which could dictate us categorical imperatives 
which could then be rationally obeyed. Although he retains the notion of duty everything depends 
on the organization of our affects in the present time. Pure reason exists only in a world of illusion. 
Human scales of power and orders of rank often change, react to circumstances, new horizons, 
insights, images in nature. Yet, it is often difficult to express them. Emerson praises the receptive 
271 Emerson, "Natural History of Intellect," 1295.
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power of perception when he claims: 
We find ourselves expressed in nature, but we cannot translate it into words. But 
Perception is the armed eye. A civilization has tamed and ripened this savage wit, and 
he is a Greek. His Aye and No have become nouns and verbs and adverbs. Perception 
differs from Instinct by adding the Will. Simple percipiency is the virtue of space, not 
of man.272 
Bartleby expresses himself by means of one single formula. He does not will to perceive the 
external world anymore. He prefers not to. Perhaps all of his messages which could be delivered are 
already dead.  Perhaps  he  does  not  wish  to  be  intelligible.  The  logic  which  is  incorporated  in 
language is insufficient for Bartleby. Emerson would agree with the inadequacy of language. Yet, 
he would never advocate Bartleby's  approach, his  silent  re-signification of the world.  Emerson 
always believed in words, in the power of rhetoric and the orator. Words, for him, could redeem 
everything thanks to their performative character. That, however, does not mean that he did not see 
the shortcomings of language:  
. . . language or words are inadequate to describe the immensity and complexity of 
"what is." At best,  words "break, chop and impoverish" the richness of actuality". 
Despite this limitation language use, and action as well, signify the emergence of the 
"human form," the highest degree of "organization" in the natural world.273 
The human being, according to Emerson, is incessantly projecting its emotions and affects 
into its understanding of natural phenomena. Man is thus a reflection of the dynamics of nature, 
though on a smaller scale. Does Bartleby therefore project his mental states on the world around 
him? Does his negativity infect others? Emerson is a master of analogies and metaphors which 
signify mental states. Words, for him, symbolize moral or intellectual states. Yet, he often derives 
them from the physical  world around him – i.e.  the wind and breath signifies spirit  (in  Greek 
Pneuma, referring to the spirit of Gnostics). Emerson's semiotics stresses the metaphorical character 
of language, language as a system of arbitrary signs, the importance of relationships between signs. 
We use symbols derived from nature to describe our internal struggles and the other way round. 
What internal struggles does Melville describe in his figure of Bartleby? We have tried to answer 
272 Ibid, 1298.
273 Emerson, Nature, 44.
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this question above even though there may be other answers, such as the force of the publisher on 
Melville to "copy" his previous works about adventures so that they sell well,  or his feeling of 
alienation from his wife and from the world. 
But let us come back to the interpretation of Emerson's late work and to the question of 
power  as  dynamis. From  "Experience"  onwards  Emerson  begins  to  speak  about  a  necessary 
equilibrium between power and form in character. He emphasizes the positive, affirmative aspect of 
a will, in contrast to Nietzsche, who drew on his conception of will but who also incorporated into 
his thinking the notion of will expressed by Schopenhauer where the will refers to resignation, 
nihilism and the suppression of desire as such. As G. J. Stack points out "the priority of willing, as 
well as its association with power and the "accumulation of power,"274 is one of Emerson's most 
forceful philosophical views. The other one, which I intend to emphasize here, is the notion of 
power as possibility which may or may not be actualized. What is important in this interpretation of 
power is the dialectics of DYNAMIS and ENERGEIA (which is an old Aristotelian distinction later 
taken up by Heidegger).  Dynamis might be rendered,  in its  broad usage,  variously as "ability," 
"potential,"  "potency,"  "power";  whereas  energeia corresponds  (roughly)  to  "activity"  and  (in 
Aristotle, especially) to "actuality," in the sense of "actively existing." Plato's notion of  dynamis 
refers to physics, as an underlying, invisible process, which is later developed by Leibniz into the 
science of dynamics. Aristotle, on the other hand, stresses the priority of energeia.  He says in his 
Metaphysics that:
For  from the  potentially  existing,  the  actually existing  is  always  produced by an 
actually existing thing, e.g., man from man, musician by musician; there is always a 
first mover, and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of 
substance that everything that is produced is something produced from something and 
by  something  …  Obviously,  then,  actuality  (energeia)  is  prior  both  to  potency 
(dynamis) and to every principle of change.275
Emerson, according to  G.  J.  Stack,  also stresses  man's  essential  power (in  the sense of 
potentiality or what Aristotle called dynamis) to organize, to control, to shape, to form, to master, 
and to act upon others and on his environment. In his motto for "Compensation," he poetically 
expresses his belief that there is "power to him who power exerts," thereby joining the idea of 
274 Stack, 145.
275 Aristotle, Metaphysics (NuVision Publications, 2005) 136.
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power as potency to that of "power as something attained."276 One always seeks to increase his 
degree of power, as Emerson sees it. And as he says further: "Power educates the potentate."277  In 
this sense, Emerson again stresses the reciprocal quality, or flow of power. Let us now look at Jan 
Patočka´s account of metaphysics of power.
3.5.8  Bartleby and Responsibility: Patočka
Patočka criticized the metaphysics of force as a misleading and dangerous doctrine. I have 
tried to show that Emerson cannot be blamed for proposing such a doctrine because his dialectic  
never let him settle on, let alone create, any metaphysics. When Derrida talks about Patočka in 
relation to Bartleby, he suggests that his problem with the attorney's approach might be that the call 
of conscience he experienced did not imply any relation to the supreme being (as the origin of the 
voice). There is no mysterious voice that would call the responsible conscience278, no shining "face" 
that would make us tremble, no infinity of the human being, which we find in Levinas' philosophy 
for instance. When Patočka talks about a supreme being, he says that God is the one who "holds me 
from within, in his hands and within his gaze, defines everything regarding me, and so rouses me to 
responsibility."279 Heidegger, on the other hand, talks about the call of conscience as the experience 
of care and the original phenomenon of Dasein (the human being), which excludes any relation to 
the supreme being. As Derrida emphasizes, the silent voice that calls the Dasein cannot be identified 
and remains indeterminate; it is not the voice of anyone in particular.280 While Heidegger talks about 
the experience of the call, of conscience as about an event which befalls me, or actually falls upon 
me while also coming from me,281 Patočka says that the true responsibility always comes from 
someone – a supreme being – who takes possession of me. The question is, for Derrida, whether the 
mysterium tremendum that I experience when being called is related to the gift by God, which 
allows me to respond. Coming back to Bartleby we may ask: is he ready to die for the other? Are we 
dealing here with the issue of sacrifice?     
3.5.9  Bartleby and Death as a Limit: Deleuze
276 Stack, 157.
277 Emerson, "Power," 545.
278 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 274. 




If we interpret Bartleby as a rupture/difference in discourses of pragmatism and common 
sense, which is manifested not by means of his formula but rather by his disappearing from the 
space of rhetoric, we need to ask what his death means. Is death a limitation, a final protest against  
speech? Is Bartleby's story a story about a "gift of death", a sacrifice? Does it cancel all difference? 
Deleuze says that one face of death is its inevitable but still accidental character: "Death is inscribed 
in the I and the self, like the cancellation of difference in a system of explication, or the degradation 
which compensates for the processes of differentiation."282 It always comes from without. On the 
other hand, he talks about the other face of death which he calls 'death instinct' - "an internal power 
which frees the individuating elements from the form of the I or the matter of the self in which they 
are imprisoned."283 The death instinct is therefore not just a tendency towards increasing entropy 
and the desire to become an inanimate object. According to Deleuze, then, every death is double – it 
represents the liberation and swarming of little differences in intensity; and also the cancellation of 
large differences in extension. Death always comes from without, even when it seems a personal 
decision.284 For Deleuze, every death is accidental and violent. The internal will-to-die (the death 
instinct) never finally corresponds with death as an empirical event. Deleuze´s notion of death is, 
unlike Emerson´s and Melville´s where death comes primarily from within, connected with this 
doubleness, with the event and the instinct, with internal instincts, desires for liberation and external 
vectors of force. It is simultaneously a process of de-differentiation and individuation (based on 
protest).285 
The cancellation of differences also means the cancellation of the differentiating power of 
speech. Difference, however, as Deleuze suggested, does not need to be connected with negativity. 
In Bartleby, his subversive action and logic of preference did not make so much difference in his 
actual surroundings, yet it  makes much difference today. The power of the "image" of Bartleby 
disappearing, rather than just his speech, resonate with contemporary readers who question political 
and social involvement and agency in a world full of rhetorical manipulation and empty signs. 
          3.5.9.1  Performativity and Sensibility
Following Deleuze´s interpretation of sensibility, Bartleby brings us new feelings, new ways 





to be affected. Affectivity, or sensibility are essential for both Emerson and Melville. The feeling of 
power, according to Emerson, comes from the capacity to be affected, from receptiveness. While for 
Nietzsche, as Deleuze suggests, the will to power manifests itself as the sensibility of force (both 
reactive and active), Emerson strongly advocated the active, affirmative force.
Deleuze interprets the reactive force as follows:286 
1) utilitarian force of adaptation and partial limitations; 2) force which separates active force from 
what it can do, which denies active force (triumph of the weak or the slaves); 3) force separated 
from what it can do, which denies, or turns against itself (reign of the weak or slaves).
       Active force is, according to Deleuze:
 1) plastic, dominant and subjugating force; 2) force which goes to the limit of what it can do; 3)  
force  which  affirms  its  difference,  which  makes  its  difference  an  object  of  enjoyment  and 
affirmation.287 Emerson also mentions the plastic character of force, i.e. the force of thinking can 
make things fluid and plastic. In this way, the poet can re-shape old rigid concepts and laws. As for 
the affirmation of difference, Emerson calls for that already in his early essays ("The American 
Scholar" and others). The fragile boundary of active and reactive behavior is discussed in his later 
essays as well (The Conduct of Life). How is it related to sensibility? 
         All sensibility is, according to Deleuze, only a becoming of forces. What is dangerous,  
however, is that an active force can become reactive, and reactive one can become active. That 
might be the reason why both Emerson and Melville feared the masses as reactive forces which can 
become active. With their reactive force, they can spread their stupidity, as Nietzsche claims, or 
their unhealthy ideas, their nihilism of science, and other anti-ideals. This reminds us of Socrates 
and his debate with Callicles about nature and law. For Callicles, the triumph of the weak over the 
strong occurs thanks to the law which separates the power of the strong ones from what it can do. 
According  to  Socrates,  in  contrast,  nature  and  law  cannot  be  distinguished.  The  problem  is, 
according to Deleuze, in the notion of desire. Socrates does not understand Callicles´s notion of 
desire which is not based on the association of a pleasure and a pain.288 Pleasure is an attribute of 
reactive force which cannot provide any group of slaves with stronger force. And reactive forces 
can almost never triumph. It is only by "going to the limit of their consequences, that is, by forming 
an  active  force,"289 that  they  enact  the  transformation  from  the  reactive  mode  to  the  active. 
Completing Callicles, Nietzsche talks about the active desire, the active force, will to power as both 





affectivity and activity, that which has the capacity to be affected and which simultaneously affects 
others. 
Yet, Nietzsche does not promote active forces only. Reactive forces are not inherently a bad 
thing. Lack of action, of power, can be fascinating and open new perspectives. While being ill, one 
can reveal a healthier mode of living, creating, has time to descend to the potentiality of becoming. 
Bartleby enacts exactly this kind of split within one, cutting him off from what he can do, from his 
direction, and offering new power through deactivation of the old one. It is Bartleby who prefers 
not to react and not to act, hanging thus suspended in his potentiality of being. 
        The interpretation of active and reactive forces, and will to power which Deleuze elaborates is 
a very Spinozist one. Could what he says about these concepts in Nietzsche be applied to Emerson? 
I would argue that not completely. Emerson´s notion of force is, as we could see above, mostly 
affirmative. The negative side, the abyss, is not connected with force, such as the force of diving but 
rather  with the premordial  potentiality,  emptiness,  silence of  nature.  In  his  late  poems such as 
"Brahma," or "Terminus," Emerson composes enigmatic riddles by means of which he tries to make 
nature speak, to speak his thoughts. Instead of an influx of energy, inspiration or watery flow, he 
can only silently follow nature,  listening to the breath (pneuma),  to the wind which is elusive, 
limitless and changeable as Brahma, or Potentiality itself. Yet, Emerson cannot always participate in 
this breath, he feels that his self is detached from the Whole. That enables self-reflection as well. 
Perceiving the contours of things and bodies, the forces (laws), Emerson realizes that there is a gap 
(which makes the contours, limits visible) which keeps him from merging with the Whole, "the 
Over-Soul". Emerson leads a dialogue with nature (by exploring his own individual nature) while 
he  takes into account the limits and limitations in the form of both active and reactive forces. It is 
in  his  later  writings  (including  the  poems  "Terminus,"  "Merops"  and  the  essay  "Poetry  and 
Imagination"), where the self-reflecting mode of speech prevails the most.     
4. The Self, Law and Agency in Emerson, Kafka and Melville 
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What I seek to do in the last chapter is to show the connection of performative acts, the self  
and the law from the perspective of power not as Domination, but as potentiality. We have seen the 
semiotic viewpoint developed by Charles Sanders Peirce,  his  theory of expressive symbols and 
ideas as potentialities. We have also presented Austin´s theory of performativity. In the final part, I  
seek  to  explore  the  limits of  rhetorical  constitution  of  self  and  law  and  the  laws  of  various 
restricting roles while moving beyond rhetorical performatives and intelligible effects of action.
On the background of Plato's fundamental attack on rhetoric in the Gorgias, we will revisit 
the distinction of  nomos (law, convention) and  physis (nature) in two performative statements by 
Melville and Kafka. Laws of nature and laws of convention will be tested. This perspective will be 
developed  by  means  of  contemporary  thinking  on  subjectivity,  order-words,  expression  and 
possibility expressed by Gilles Deleuze and revising J. L. Austin. However, as I shall argue, neither 
Deleuze nor  Austin  can  fully account  for  Bartleby.  For,  Bartleby as  a  test  reaches  beyong the 
Socratic elenchos (i.e. the method that tests ideas within discourse) and beyond rhetoric as such. 
Both Austin and Deleuze deal with the performative force of language and draw to a certain 
extent (Deleuze through the deconstructive lineage and F. Nietzsche, leading to Emerson; Austin 
through the  pragmatist-performative lineage,  through J.  Searle  and W. James)  in  the  American 
(Emersonian) rhetorical tradition. However, both of them, as was just mentioned, fail to account for 
him. While Charles S. Peirce, as we could see, offers a radical step beyond pragmatism with his use 
of  indeterminate  symbols,  John  Searle  connects  in  his  thought  the  realms  of  pragmatism and 
speech-act theory in the US, turning away from transcendence (which is still present in Peirce's 
thought who wrote "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (1908)). Emerson presents a 
radical revision of transcendence and subjectivity in his late work as well. He abandons his former 
emphasis on Platonic transcendence and detachment as the main constitutive factors for identity. 
Instead, he turns to the immanent forces and potentiality of speech and silence while questioning 
both will  and power.  There are  claims about  speech (for instance in  "Eloquence,"  "Poetry and 
Imagination") which, as we could see, emphasize and glorify the power of speech and rhetoric on 
grand  scale.  What  can  also  be  seen,  however,  is  that  Emerson's  character  of  the  Poet  is  as 
ambivalent  as  Melville’s  Bartleby,  and can  be interpreted  symbolically (Peirce),  performatively 
(Austin) and literally (Deleuze). The selfless constitutions, performative force and consciousness of 
both  characters  are  different.  What  Deleuze's  interpretation  shows,  when  testing  the  limits  of 
performativity, is that the consiousness of the (post-)modern individual became so narrowed, so 
enclosed in social roles, schemes and clichés that there seems to be no pure possibility which would 
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create, but merely a possibility as a replica of the already known, or preformed. How can one find a 
way out of these limiting roles, schemes and clichés? How can one resuscitate the pure, creative 
possibility and joyful thinking? Coming back to performatives, how can Bartleby de-activate the 
order-words functioning under any statement?  We shall explore here several Beckettian situations 
(of Melville´s Bartleby, Kafka´s Josef K, Emerson´s Poet) where words and presence do something, 
action is deferred and a new field of possibilities is opened. The issue is, of course, also related to 
the difference between the laws of convention and laws of nature.  
4.1  Deferral of Action: Performatives in Melville and Kafka
There are two principal performative formulas in  Kafka´s novel  The Trial  and Melville’s 
"Bartleby the Scrivener" that cause a postponement or cancellation of action.  The first one - "Not 
yet" - is repeated by a doorkeeper in a fable told to Josef K in the chapter called "Before the Law." 
It prevents the man waiting in front of the doorkeeper to enter the doors which are meant only for 
him and which lead to the Law. The second one - "I would prefer not to" - is pronounced several 
times  by  Bartleby.  It  makes  his  colleagues  in  the  law  office  fall  silent,  preventing  Bartleby´s 
expulsion from the space of the law. The formulas, however, have both deconstructive and revealing 
effects. As for the deconstructive effects, both Josef K and Bartleby manifest a different order of 
affects, indeterminacy, a lack of any essential stable identity, or subject position, and disregard for 
their bodies. They risk everything, either willingly or subconsiously. In both cases, they deconstruct 
the Law. In Kafka´s case, the Law as a percept bears signs of something huge which cannot be 
overcome or evaded. The gaze of the Law seems omnipresent. In Bartleby´s case, on the other hand, 
law functions only as the background of the story. The law office can be seen as a metaphorical 
depiction of law as such, description of the way it distributes subject posititions, roles, the way in 
which work structures time and space. Bartleby prefers not to have any position in the hierarchy of 
power (as Domination), yet his attitude is not rebellious. He is surprisingly calm when offering a 
new possibility, new logic. He would not hurt a fly. That is the powerful and unknown potentiality  
and nonviolence which drives the attorney crazy and sets him fleeing. He even departs from his own 
premises. Such a line of escape, however, needs to occur not only on the material level but also 
within  the  mindset  of  the  lawyer.  Do  Bartleby´s  performatives  have  this  effect?  Or  do  they 
transform/deform only himself and his readers?
4.2  Bartleby as the Projector: Passive, Selfless Performativity
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As for performative constructions, Bartleby fails in constituting a successful identity as a 
copyist.  That is not surprising when we realize that he is a projector, a screen that needs to be 
activated. Bartleby obviously does not function from his own energetic resources, for he has none. 
These  need  to  be  provided  or  activated  by  others  who  see  his  originality  and  invite  him  to 
collaboration.  Only  those  who  understand/divine  where  he  comes  from,  can  work  with  him 
(Bartleby explains his conduct saying: "Can´t you see the reason for yourself?"). Then, his mere 
presence should lead others to invite him to communication. Provided they are ready to accept him 
as an equal subject. His selfless passivity and mode of constituting is, however, misunderstood from 
the very start, as we have seen above. The collaboration that the attorney offers to Bartleby is based 
on order-words, commands, which Bartleby is supposed to obey, in a machine-like fashion. That is 
obviously no invitation to action which could be creative, beneficial and respected. Bartleby, as a 
projector, blank screen, manifests an openness which would be even more creative (if unblocked). 
The attorney, to a certain extent, senses the power of Bartlleby´s opening of the space (of discourse) 
by means of his presence, even though his commonsense rationality seeks to prevent that. A silent,  
subliminal communication, takes place between them. And it is by means of his silent presence and 
the  formula  that  Bartleby  begins  to  deactivate  the  laws  which  make  others  unaware  of  their 
situation,  of  their  ignorance,  their  enslavement.  In  the  place  of  assumptions,  he  introduces 
tendencies,  preferences,  another  mode  of  living,  another  order  of  affects.  Deconstructing  the 
performatives of the attorney (order-words, commands) which shape the symbolic space of the law 
office,  he does something,  even though in a passive,  nonagressive way,  to his  surroundings,  to 
himself, to the authority of the attorney and to the reader.  He actually becomes the leader of the 
situation. For, Bartleby is aware of what is going on around him (as when he says: "I know where I 
am"). He makes himself visible by moving into invisibility, by leaving. 
Bartleby´s performative effect opposes the typical instances of Austin´s speech acts. For, 
Bartleby introduces a logic that could have been desired by many, for a long time, subliminally, but 
which nobody voiced, expressed aloud. That is the power from which the formula could gain its  
force. For,  neither the Austinian ceremonial circumstances, authority of the person, nor repetition 
of a pre-existing formula are present there. 
Bartleby therefore not only subverts the laws of the law office, the "logos" of representation, 
the disciplining of the body concerning work performance, and in the end actuality as such, but he 
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also questions the functioning of law regarding personal identity and human rights. In his failure to 
reproduce,  to  imitate,  to  effect  "identity"  between  the  original  and  the  copy,  he  becomes 
unduplicable,  nonrepresentable,  without  category  and  without  identity  himself.  The  space  of 
representation, that is, the space of the office provides him with attention, with a gaze to be under, 
but not with full recognition. His colleagues, even though they cannot see any content, any drive, or 
intention within him, nonetheless respect him. It is his body and his alien conduct, however, which 
subsequently constitute him as an inhuman creature in the eyes of others. All he gets is a violently 
humanized identity by the attorney's Christian ethics of "love your neighbor as yourself." In the 
end,  he  is  seen  as  the  embodiment  (which  is  ironic,  since  he  does  not  perceive  his  body or 
corporeality very much) of humanity itself. The transformation of Bartleby from the inhuman self to 
the incarnation of humanity itself, however, occurs only in the mind of the attorney and it has no 
positive performative effect on Bartleby's physical constitution.
It is the prologue and the epilogue which show the performative effect of Bartleby on the 
attorney.  Bartleby clearly deconstructed his notion of a fixed, stable identity – based on the past 
which explains who one is. His formula subverted the possibility of any performative success of the 
attorney's representation of Bartleby. In the prologue, the ethereal, gentle, inhuman sensibility of 
Bartleby is emphasized for the first  time. His aspect disarms the attorney. Soon after, however, 
Bartleby becomes the beautiful enemy of the attorney and they start playing their strange game in 
which Bartleby produces his formula.  The aim is not to gain more power, to beat the attorney. 
Rather, it critiques the strategies of naming, of interpellation, of production of identity, authority 
and  the  workings  of  order-words.  Apart  from  Bartleby's  performative  formula,  the  attorney 
produces several performatives as well. These are the order-words, or commands, such as: "I want 
you to help me compare this sheet here – take it."290 or "You must quit this place."291 Is it merely a 
linguistic game then? Is it about the power of language to (re-)constitute selves within discourse? In 
the case of Bartleby, we need to ask: "Can a selfless passive person resignify or constitute anything 
at all?" What Bartleby discloses is that the law is nothing but a performative; it is constituted by 
means of speech, convention, repetition. As Bartleby finds it difficult to live in the space of such 
narrowed  representation  of  the  law,  he  puts  forward  his  destructive  formula  which  moves  the 
ground on which the commands of the law are founded. The attorney, as we have seen, cannot leave 
this  delimited  space of the law without  losing his self,  his  place,  his  authority.  He can engage 
forcefully in a dialectical dispute with Bartleby,  but he is  absolutely unable to live next to the 
290 Melville, Billy Budd and Other Tales, 112. 
291 Ibid. 127.
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unaccountable scrivener in complete disagreement and conflict. That is why he flees as if haunted 
by Bartleby's nonrepresentable presence with its threatening potential of minoritarian language and 
position on the periphery.  In the epilogue, the narrator tells us how he inquired into the history of 
Bartleby  and  found  out  about  his  dead-letter  office  job  (a  "history"  which  is  by  no  means 
confirmed, or confirmable, but which the attorney chooses to accept as a means of (re-)constructing 
Bartleby). He sees this as one of the causes of his non-functioning, inactive self.  His notion of 
simple, intelligible self/identity is, however, forever shattered.   
Coming back to Austin, we see that Bartleby´s formula is, without fulfilling the Austinian 
prerequisites for a successful performative, felicitous both in the case of the lawyer (to a certain 
extent),  Bartleby  himself  (in  an  ironic  manner  leading  to  death)  and  contemporary  readers 
(revealing the senso-motorical schemes, the structuring of time they live in, power as domination, 
law as rhetorically constructed). Deferral of action in this case provides space  and  time for the 
reflection on action which is not based on will or violence but on the shadow zone of possibility 
from which new orders of affects can be not only understood but created.     
 4.3  Bartleby and the Law  
         We have seen that Gilles Deleuze, like Socrates in the Gorgias, does not distinguish between 
laws of nature and laws of convention (nomos and fysei). Emerson and Melville, however, do see a 
difference there. Emerson talks about the laws, tracks of nature to which the poet has to attune 
himself. The poet's aim is to synchronize his soul with these laws and transfer them into words, 
being  thus  a  new  law-giver  (deconstructing  conventional  laws).  Melville  also  talks  about  two 
natures,  two orders  in  the  world.  He differentiates  between  beings  of  Primary  nature  (such as 
Bartleby,  Ahab)  and  beings  of  Secondary  nature  (such as  the  attorney,  or  Ishmael).  Beings  of 
Secondary nature  represent  the  Law, they are  the prophets  who see  the  originality of  those of 
Primary nature. Still they betray them in the end, coming back to the Law. Beings of Primary nature  
are  Originals  who bring light  to  the  situation  at  hand,  making things,  selves  and social  issues 
visible. Although they are from a different order, they change, deconstruct, re-draw the lines of 
convention (Law), and conventional use of language. In Melville's universe, the two realms are 
therefore connected. Now we need to ask: What laws does Bartleby de-activate? What conventions 
does he transgress? 
Bartleby's formula "I would prefer not to" bears a strange relation to crime. It  seems to 
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constitute both the crime of Bartleby (which is  classified as vagrancy but  which could also be 
interpreted as  a  leaving  of  the  logic  of  assumptions  and as conceptual  vagabondism)  and  the 
unaccountable  crime  of  the  attorney  who  feels  guilty.  As  in  Melville´s  Billy  Budd  where  the 
situation is much more tense (the choices for Billy being either to "speak"(defend himself) or "kill" 
Claggard who insults  him),  the attorney loses his  "Christian" patience,  trying to settle Bartleby 
without any necessary use of violence. Yet, he asks, of what use is Bartleby for anyone? It is absurd  
to try to find him a job when he prefers not to work. And more absurdities follow. What law is there 
to  help  the  attorney get  rid  of  Bartleby?  The only law he  could  use  against  Bartleby (who is 
ironically a "fixture") is the law against vagrancy. That law covers the zone of indistinctness, the 
shadow  zone,  because  it  can  function  against  such  unintelligible  characters  as  Bartleby.  The 
problem here is not one transgressive act, but an absolutely "alien" and performative conduct. Does 
such conduct violate the law? Does it transgress intelligible communication  based on intelligible 
objects, desires and selves? Bartleby´s conduct bears signs of the Emersonian anti-social, anarchist 
behavior but in the passive mode. Yet, his is a passivity that creates. No system seems to be able to 
decode the mystery of Bartleby. Perhaps it cannot be said, put into words. His is a foreign language 
within language, a minoritarian language which seduces the majoritarian, logical one into becoming 
minoritarian as well. The attorney is, however, not willing to adopt this other language, which shifts 
the contours of bodies, social practices and common sense rationality. Unable to stay in the conflict 
with Bartleby, he goes as far as to invent and realize his "crime," to give form to the appalling 
situation he finds himself in. 
4.4  Crime 
 First,  the attorney thinks  about the literal  and figurative incarceration of Bartleby,  and 
possibility of his subsequent literal/figurative death. He thinks about whether to enclose Bartleby 
between the walls and let him die. That would mean that he would live up to the crime he feels  
hanging "on his back." He seeks to commit some crime so that his feeling of guilt can be made 
concrete, delimited, classified and thus anchored. For, the biggest suffering is that which has no 
clear object. That is why he plans to commit the crime (of killing, or expulsion) in order to pin the 
situation down, to identify it, to identify Bartleby and himself. Is Bartleby a responsibility that the 
narrator feels  it  is too late to assume? And yet which he cannot not assume? Or which he has  
already assumed from the very start? We are used to judging someone for what he has done, and 
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based on that  for which he is  absolutely responsible.  For,  as many existentialists  say,  acts  and 
actions create a self. However, such assumptions cease to work in the case of Bartleby. Bartleby 
does not seem to trespass any law, for he both assumes and does not assume the space of the law 
office (and, perhaps, symbolically the law) as a locus in which he may or may not act. He functions 
as a blank screen, reflecting the identities of others, having none himself. He obviously does not 
throw himself  into the future  as  a  project  of  possibilities.  Bartleby makes the action of  others 
impossible, he immobilizes the attorney with his pallid face. He blocks actions and the workings of 
logic, LOGOS and performance of law with his formula "I would prefer not to" to which he clings 
with all his might. He shows how rhetoric constitutes law and the everyday language denaturalizing 
thus the constructions and categories which are presented to us as natural.  Can he do this within 
language only? As we mentioned above, his power is also in his calm presence, strange corporeality. 
He opposes and yet prefers not to, which, in the traditional logic of presupposition, means a rational 
impossibility. His logic of preference seems to offer a different ethical program. What might that 
be?  The ethics  of  selfless,  non-violent  constitutions?  Can any  ethical  stance  be  based on such 
Bartlebian selfless, sliding constituting, on such abandonment and lack of willpower? My answer 
would be positive, and it would not be far from what Emerson suggested regarding the leaving of 
norms, tradition, paternal functions, rigid languages and selves. Is Bartleby responsible for what he 
does? Does he respond to any need, lack within his society? 
We need to find out first whether we can be sure that Bartleby does not feel obliged to 
anyone. He resists all ideologies, all beliefs. That is perhaps what makes him inhuman. The feeling 
of obligation of the attorney, on the other hand, does not proceed from any subjective, "prefered" 
position but draws on the laws of Christianity and generalizable imperatives of duty. He clearly 
applies these to everyone, and quite blindly. His ethical stance falls flat very soon, however, and the 
doctrine of utility and of "what the others would say to this" overrules his humane intentions. The 
body of Bartleby still shines its appeal on the attorney, but he decides to follow the "they" self, the  
common sense rationality.
4.5  Kafka's "Not Yet"
         The case of Kafka´s man who is stopped by the formula "not yet" which is pronounced by the 
doorkeeper also revolves around performativity and selfhood. The priest tells Josef K that the fable 
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about the doorkeeper concerns self-deception.292 What kind of delusion does he suggest? The story 
concerns a man from the country who asks for entry to the Law. Yet, the doorkeeper tells him that it 
is not possible now. Perhaps later. So the man waits in front of the door for years and keeps asking 
the doorkeeper how to get in, bribing him and bothering him, until he dies. During the process, he 
learns that the door is meant only for him, and that the doorkeeper is only one of many, i.e. that 
there are other doorkeepers further on who are even more powerful than he. Thus, the doorkeeper, 
through repetition of his "not yet", holds the man in check, letting him wait in suspense for the rest 
of his life. The performative "not yet" obviously defers action and makes the man hang in suspense. 
The priest  argues about the meaning of the story with Josef K who thinks that the doorkeeper 
cheated on the man. His suggestion, on the other hand, is that the doorkeeper is a subordinate of the 
free man who decides to wait in front of the door. Does one freely decide or does the repetition of a 
formula make him obey?  
It is noteworthy that the attorney from "Bartleby, the Scrivener" is  also torn between the 
obligation, duty, he feels towards the concrete fellow man, and between the debt he has to Bartleby 
(as to common humanity). The second option, debt to humanity, soon falls flat. Yet, the first option, 
the feeling of duty, the law one gives to oneself (in a Kantian way), is still in force; it just seems to 
be something beyond possibility. Bartleby is a responsibility which the attorney cannot take upon 
himself nor evade. In this sense, Josef K is similar to the attorney because he also evades his issue 
of guilt. Like the attorney, Josef K is a reasonable, businesslike individual who instead of choosing 
defers  any  particular  action  and  goes  for  a  walk  (or  to  the  church)  instead.  Unlike  Bartleby, 
however, Josef K obeys the performatives of the law, without questioning them or himself.  
4.6  Kafka´s Performatives and the "Law"
To evaluate the performative´s success, we need to explore the "law" that the doorkeeper 
refers  to  first.  The  doorkeeper  cites  the  "law,"  the  forbidding  formula,  yet  it  is  the  words  he 
pronounces that are really performative – they create the "content" of the law which is otherwise 
only an empty form. It is the performative statement of the doorkeeper that keeps the man in his 
place, that stops him from fleeing, from passing through the door. The question of the law, of moral 
law, is central to Kafka´s work. While trying to jump on his father's shoulders, laugh and thus evade 
all thinking of duty and guilt, Kafka at the same time shows the dangers of the objective approach to 
292  Kafka, Trial, 129.
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the law which disregards singularity. The target of his critique may be the value systems of Kant 
and other "formalists" who understand the "law" as something transcendent, as a pure form, as an 
imperative that one gives to oneself. The main idea, which we can glimpse in the "backstage" of the  
process, is  the idea that language "makes" certain things happen and that language,  when used 
performatively "defers" action. As we can see, it defers both action and any final meaning for we 
simply move from one signifier  to  another,  never  getting  to  any transcendental  signified.  This 
constant deferring leads to immense frustration. We can then ask: Why did not the man in the fable 
risk it? Why did not he go through the door? We realize that words are the main obstacle together 
with  the threat of more powerful words which would come next time. Words which are able to 
present themselves, to act as a "law" which cannot be trespassed. The more often the formula is 
repeated the stronger it gets, leaving finally no space for any free action of the man. Kafka suggests 
that there can be no "law" as an essence which could be subsequently filled with content and which 
would function universally. For, "the law" is being enacted only in the words (of the doorkeeper) 
that are spoken. Is it therefore completely subjective, expressing the desire of the majority? Is it 
completely immanent in convention, in the action of speaking? 
The objective approach is related to objective values, the ability to give oneself a law (moral 
imperatives in Kant´s ethics), to rely on pure practical reason that exerts our decisions. We have a  
will  that  is  able  to  "want"  a  maxim that  could be embraced by anybody.  Kant´s  ethics  is  thus 
founded on transcendental grounds, on the normative, law-giving powers of reason which can create 
universal laws (laws transcending individual desires).   Such is the Kantian transcendental stance. 
Let us now turn to the immanent ethical stance. 
4.7  Deleuze: The Politics of Involuntarism
When talking about desire and action, Deleuze explores the notions of expression, absence 
of  will,  and  possibility.  Concerning  the  nature  of  possibility,  he  refers  to  two  discourses  of 
possibility, that of  1) the exhaustion of possibility (where the same schemes are repeated) and that 
of 2) possibility which creates: the opening of the possible, enabling dynamic emergence of the 
new. What is at stake in the second case is to create/open the realm of possibilities of life, and not to 
actualize the forms and schemes that were already there (even though in the mode of potentiality).  
The possibility of life is not a set of acts which is to be realized, or a choice of vocation. Low, 
limited possibilities  refer  to  the modes of  existence.  We have seen many cases  when Life  and 
Knowledge were opposed to one another in an individual. However, if one wants to express new 
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forces which give thought a new sense, one has to realize that Life and Thought should not be 
opposed. Thought needs to affirm Life, not counter it. Deleuze claims: "Thinking would then mean 
discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life."293 The possibility of life therefore expresses the 
mode of existence, according to Deleuze, that is, the expression or agency of life. For, expression is  
never in the mode of signification, or in a set of significations. It consists in evaluation, that is, not 
in the evaluation of the possibilities of life but the possibility of life as an evaluation, the singular 
mode of evaluation of the good and bad, of distribution of affects. Deleuze claims that to live is to 
evaluate. He says: "there is no truth of the world as it is thought, no reality of the sensible world, all 
is evaluation, even and above all the sensible and the real."294 Following Emerson and Nietzsche, he 
stresses that what we get are appearances from which there is no way out. Yet, one can test the 
limits of life, the limits of the systems of signification and of law as Bartleby does.  
What  Deleuze  does  then,  in  his  analyses  of  characters  who  exemplify  the  growth  of 
nothingness  of  the  will,  the  power  of  sign  and  encounter  -  such  as  Melville´s  "Bartleby,  the 
Scrivener," or Dostoyevski´s Idiot295 - is that he criticizes the senso-motorical schemes, the clichés, 
which can be actualized and yet nothing new emerges in the world. What occurs is that the old 
forms of conformity are repeated and they only gain more force. That is the case of the possible 
(which  realises,  actualizes  a  series  of  discretive  alternatives)  which  Deleuze  does  not  praise, 
because no new field, or opening of the possible, is created. The potentialities he calls for are pure 
forces, pure dynamisms emerging independently of all spacio-temporal coordinators.296 
Bartleby is not, according to Deleuze, a symbol of militancy, or revolutionary resistance but 
his action announces a process, a potentiality and reveals the pure force of encounter. That is also 
the moment when Deleuze´s thought resonates with Emerson´s metamorphosis. Where Emerson 
talks  about  transformation  (which  the  poet  embodies),  Deleuze  talks  about  social  deformation 
(which Bartleby, as a blank screen, reflects and embodies). Bartleby, in Deleuze´s interpretation297 
rejects the mode of alternatives, of possibilities which exclude one another, a regime which ensures 
the solution and closure of a situation, or a conflict. All of these activities are, in my view, still 
within the Socratic process of testing, which has no clear, final conclusion. According to Deleuze, 
Melville’s story is not symbolic but exemplary. Unlike in the case of Peirce´s semiotic approach, 
293 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 94.
294 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 174.
295 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 166.
296 Francois Zourabichvili, "Deleuze et le possible," 337.
297 Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, 73.
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Deleuze suggests a literal reading of Bartleby by means of which he develops a whole array of 
political  categories.  For,  political  categories  in  Deleuze's  interpretation  of  Bartleby include  the 
notions of authority, democracy, equality and power. Analyzing Bartleby from the perspective of 
will  to  power,  including  nothingness  of  the  will,  Deleuze  distinguishes  between  dominating 
monomaniacs  (Ahab),  saintly hypochondriacs  (Bartleby)  and other  characters  whose action has 
political  consequences  (at  least  for  their  readers)  and  whose  interiority  is  not  revealed.  While 
acknowledging the interiority of Bartleby as mysterious, he claims, however, that the interiority 
may  be  empty,  stupid,  or  merely  a  sign  whose  affects  and  effects  are  of  a  different  order. 
Incompatible  codes  thus  correspond  to  incompatible  affects,  which  are,  nevertheless  quite 
contagious. By preferring the growth of nothingness of will within himself, Bartleby re-establishes 
his relationship with the potential and with situation as the force of encounter. What an event as 
such does is that it makes one think, according to Deleuze. The sign affects us as well; it falls on us 
with all its weight. Encounter is not an action which makes one see or gain a new perspective on 
things; it is the correlate of action. It is performative. Similarly to Dostoyevski´s Idiot, Bartleby no 
longer responds to the requirements of a situation, because it makes reaction insupportable and out 
of place. Both characters have seen something which transcends the facts of the situation. 
Bartleby´s repetition of his formula goes against the law of the law office and common sense 
rationality  in  general.  Deleuze  says  that  "if  repetition  exists  it  expresses  at  once  a  singularity 
opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular … In every respect, repetition is a 
transgression.298 It puts law into question. What does Bartleby communicate outside of his speech? 
Is there any outside,  or does pragmatics (and the context of power as domination, or power as 
potentiality) belong to linguistics? 
4.8  Deleuze, Pragmatics and Performatives 
Deleuze stresses the importance of pragmatics and the necessity to expand its realm within 
linguistics. He criticizes linguistics for its exaggerated emphasis on universals, invariants. Instead 
of invariants, Deleuze introduces a continuous, immanent process of variation which is inherent 
(neither extrinsic, nor mixed) to any system.299 What is also relevant for our analysis of language 
298 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 3.
299 Gilles Deleuze,  Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi  
(Minneapolis: University of Minessotta Press, 1987) 103.  
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and law is that he distinguishes between minor and major languages. Both Melville and Kafka 
could be termed minor authors. They both conquer the major language in order to delineate within it 
unknown languages. They send the major language fleeing, racing.300  What majority implies is a 
constant serving as a standard measure, manifesting for instance the standard of an "adult-white-
heterosexual-European-male." It is clear, according to Deleuze, that  "man" holds the majoritarian 
power because the term appears twice in the hierarchy of power – as a constant and as a variable. 
As a universal signifier- a constant, and as a concrete male signifier – a variable. All that which is  
different from that of the constant is therefore minoritarian.301 That is the case of Bartleby as well. 
While "Kafka submits German to creative treatment as a minor language, constructing a continuum 
of  variation  ….  he  makes  it  stutter,  wail,  cry,  shout,"302 Melville  introduces  the  minoritarian 
perspective with the help of Bartleby. His variation is more than surprising to everyone around. 
Deleuze claims that "minor languages are characterized by sobriety and variation. ...that are 
like  a  minor  treatment  of  major  language,  a  becoming  minor  of  the  major  language."303 Such 
becoming can be again felicitous or infelicitous. 1) We can witness Bartleby's success regarding his 
surroundings. Several of his colleagues caught the preference virus and started to repeat it, with 
variations,  becoming  thus  independent  subjects,  2)  Bartleby's  performative  deconstructs  the 
performative (orders) of the attorney who loses his sovereignty, his self, which was to a great extent 
based on the order-words.  His identity is  thus revealed as  unstable,  performatively constituted, 
rhetorical identity. It is in the end the attorney (and not Bartleby) who is a performative failure. 
Without conventional use of language and its laws, he is nobody. That corresponds to what Deleuze 
says  about  majority.  Majority  is  never  anybody,  "it  is  always  Nobody-Ulysses  -  whereas  the 
minority is the becoming of everybody, one's potential becoming to the extent that one deviates 
from the  model."304 Minoritarian,  in  our  case  Bartlebian,  thus  refers  to  potential,  creative  and 
created, becoming. Bartleby managed to seduce the majority to become minority for a while. That, I 
believe, is what art should do to its surroundings. To make others aware of presence, of what is 
happening around them. In this sense, Bartleby is the artist of presence, of awareness who, as a 
"seed, crystal of becoming, triggers uncontrollable movements … of majority."305








which are from a different realm than Power or Domination.306 That is the Bartlebian autonomy 
which frightens everyone. For he triggers new movements, making the Law space move, slide under 
the commands of  the attorney.  The world is  made of  sliding surfaces,  as  Emerson claims,  and 
Bartleby can send into process, transition even the most rigid ones, those of the law. For, the order-
words of the law are those variables of enunciation which make language possible and which define 
the usage of its elements.307 By opposing them, Bartleby shows that every order-word is a death 
sentence for one's original personality which receives the order.308 The line of escape that Bartleby 
selected, however, leads to death. The question then is: "How to evade the death sentence?"
             4.8.1  Bartleby the Non-linguistic
        
 The issue whether and how "the Bartleby effect" transcends linguistics is a complex one. 
That is why we will only hint at several possible ways of approaching the problem. Deleuze claims 
in  A Thousand Plateaus  that linguistic and nonlinguistic elements are inseparable in enunciation 
from  the  very  start. Pragmatics,  which  deals  with  the  nonlinguistic,  should  be,  according  to 
Deleuze,  considered  a  part  of  linguistics,  and  the  most  constitutive  one.  Deleuze  opposes 
Chomsky's abstract machine which retains the tree-like model and linear ordering of "linguistic 
elements in sentences and sentence combinations"309 and which excludes the nonlinguistic. Instead, 
he introduces superlinearity, thinking about language without any fixed linear order. A true abstract 
machine of language,  according to him, needs to be imagined with even more abstraction than 
Chomsky's linear model because it needs to involve nonlinguistic factors, variables, and not only 
the traditional linguistic set of "constants." The abstract machine, in Deleuze's view, belongs not to 
a deep syntactical structure (as Chomsky would have it) but to assemblage which is not language 
based but diagrammatic and superlinear. It is quite difficult to imagine, let alone diagram this tree-
less model drawing on the indiscernible, on the assemblage, potentiality, rhizome or however else 
we may call this indescribable element. What Deleuze seeks to ensure is that external pragmatics of 
nonlinguistic factors be taken into consideration because "linguistics is inseparable from an internal 
pragmatics  involving its  own factors."310 Instead  of  fixed,  unchangeable  constants  in  language, 







signified nor expression a signifier; rather both are variables of the assemblage.311 Thus, Deleuze's 
notion of language emphasizes variables, assemblages and makes space for shifts of various kinds. 
As to Bartleby, I will try to show now how Deleuze's conception of content, expression and 
the  indiscernible  can  illuminate  Bartleby's  subversive  function.  Deleuze  distinguishes  between 
expression  and  content,  between  linguistic  and  nonlinguistic  aspects,  to  show  how  they  are 
connected by means of their corresponding contour-shifting function. As to content, Bartleby's body 
is a screen, it lacks content, yet he shifts the bodily contours (at least of his body, and the fleeing 
body  of  the  attorney)  and  turns  them  into  fluid  limitless  forces.  As  to  expression,  Bartleby's 
linguistic signs also, like those of Emerson, make language plastic, fluid, boundless. The boundary 
that Deleuze sees as imposed between people, between classes and words is death. Death as the 
expressed of the statement constitutes the first aspect of the order word, of the performative (i.e. 
"He is dead."). It is a pure act; a pure incorporeal transformation that "enunciation fuses with the 
statement, the sentence." The performative, the order-word "That man is dead" shows death as the 
ideal boundary which is everywhere separating bodies.312 These clear contours are preserved by the 
Master, in our case the attorney, who does not want transformations. He limits them, prohibits them. 
Yet,  Bartleby  enacts  several  metamorphoses  anyway.  The  second  aspect  of  the  order-word, 
according to Deleuze, is flight. What we experience with Bartleby is a passage to the limit "in order  
to reduce death, to make it a variation. Flight pushes language to its limits."313 Flight from contours 
and rigid schemes in favor of fluid forces is exactly what Emerson's Poet  and Emerson himself 
does. His body or his words do not end on a precise point. The question is, however, how exactly 
one develops the power to escape. We have seen that neither ascension to the ideal,  imaginary 
fullness, nor diving into the abyss could account for the experimenter. It was rather the creation of 
transitory words and movements within language that were able to shift the commands coming 
from European tradition,  Puritanism,  or  the Church.  It  is,  in  my view,  through the  mastery of 
elements of minoritarian language that both Emerson and Melville create their landscapes, offering 
new subject positions, new orders of affects. 
         5.  Conclusion





composed,  willful,  appropriative,  and  self-reliant.  Instead,  thinking  of  subjectivity  stressing 
transition,  power  as  potentiality,  flux  and  metamorphosis  was  explored  in  both  Emerson  and 
Melville. Similarly to the selfless Bartlebian constitutions, Emerson's poet is ready to abandon any 
category, norm, relationship, position or political ideology. Such a radical move-away, disappearing 
from the pre-defined tracks every time the self feels too much confinement is a sign of originality. It 
resonates  with  poststructuralism  (Culler,  Butler,  Deleuze)  and  its  never-ending  process  of 
difference, deferral, but it still relates to the forces of nature, bringing them into language and law-
giving.  The  process  of  bringing  ideas,  affects  to  light,  to  reflection  reguires  a  pre-reflective 
perceptiveness/receptivity/affectivity of the mind and body. Something is written on the "walls of 
intellect" but it takes some time before intuition actualizes the image as a word that just occured to 
us. In this way, words or new thoughts occur to us, happen to us as events. That reminds us of 
William James' claim that truth happens to an idea. Likewise, Emerson realized that one often sees 
the truth as sudden revelation even though the images, impressions could have been stored in him 
or her for a long time. It is the light of intuition which enables the transfer from the subliminal to  
the conscious and personal realm of the self. Such drawing of images out of the darkness of the 
abyss  corresponds to what  we have mentioned before about Emerson's  activity of diving.  As I 
argued, such bringing of ideas into light is not based on will.  Bartleby is the Drummond light, 
functioning as a carriage, as Intuition. Emerson's poet, like Bartleby with his conceptual nomadism, 
never knows what will occur when a performative formula is pronounced. It often transcends the 
realm of traditional linguistics. While Emerson's poetry ends in music, Bartleby's "expression" ends 
in silence. What they both share is the emphasis on potentiality, on waiting in silence. For, the main  
capability is first of all to make space for the non-articulated sense, for the body (and forces of 
nature). In other words, one needs to stop talking, asking, trying to contact the other. After a long 
silence one can simply start to speak. We are used to the constant projecting of ourselves when we 
are  thrown into situations,  that  is,  we supplant  our  already actualized interpretations  with  new 
interpretations of the world, with ideas, concepts, maps of how things should occur and what they 
should mean. It is therefore necessary to de-focus our vision sometimes, to deactivate our desire, 
the laws and analytical thinking and simply be/experiment/play. For, the (Bartlebian) body-world 
can act only when it has some space for its action. It comes into being only in the moment when the 
space for its emergence is created; it comes into being together with its place. Only then can one 
create, in an Emersonian or Melvillean way, instead of mere translating, or moving along the sphere 
of symbols.  It is possible to live from these elemental forces, be it in the affirmative, joyful mode, 
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or the de-activated/deactivating one. 
As to Austinian performativity, it was shown that the force of Bartleby's performative does 
not depend on any ceremonious circumstances,  position of authority,  sincerity,  or iteration of a 
longtime-existing powerful formula. What affects the attorney and others is first of all Bartleby's 
strangely  inhuman  silent  presence  which  suggests  a  possible  leaving,  a  destitution.  That  is  an 
important  context  of  Bartleby's  formula  which  constitutes  the  logic  of  preference.  One  of  the 
reasons why it is so contagious could be the subconsious desire of his colleagues for independence, 
freedom from the law and the binding schemes of language and logic of assumptions. This unsaid, 
underground preference for a possible preference could add to the force of the formula and its 
infectious nature. Yet, Bartleby does not represent anyone; he may not be aware of the effect of the 
formula at all. For, if he were, that would suggest that there was a decision coming from his self as 
opposed  to  others.  As  we  have  shown,  however,  Bartleby's  constitutions  are  selfless  and 
indeterminate.  Any  definitions  of  the  self  as  a  separate  subject  –  as  an  autonomous  resolute 
individual – or any delimitations of the subject through the relationships with another not-Me in the 
social network are determinations based on mistrust toward oneself. The opposite of this mistrust, 
however, is not to confide in one's self and to find oneself but to confide in the world whose part I  
am, as someone who cannot be delimited individually.  
Power as potentiality, as I have tried to show, expresses itself in experimenting, in play, in 
selfless  constitutions.  Emerson's  experimenting ends in  music.  Music  and poetry,  for  Emerson, 
connect us to the pre-linguistic forces; they are expressions of playfulness for adults. Such joyful, 
selfless thinking abandoning all fixity stands in contrast to power as an attempt at fulfillment of a 
lack, of deficit, often through domination of others. The negative side of this philosophy idealizing 
the unified, well-formed self is frustration, anger, despair. Lack of form, lack of willfulness and 
selfhood is a problem for this approach to the world. We have seen that Bartleby tested (deferred) 
both of these approaches. He himself was the process of pure difference, embodying the deferral of 
both action and meaning. Such deferral is typical of poststructuralism (Derrida). We pass from one 
signifier to another ad infinitum. There is no transcendental signifier or signified, no stable identity 
or meaning one could hold on to. That sounds like another philosophy leading to frustration. As I 
have argued above, however, power as potentiality can be effectuated in the affirmative way as 
well. Selfless constitutions are possible and do not have to lead to frustration. It does not matter if  
we do not arrive at  definitive answers or transcendental signifiers. The rhetorical nature of our 
becoming,  the  obsession  with language,  can be transcended,  transgressed.  In  experimenting,  in 
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playing, in music, one attunes oneself to the elemental forces. In that way, laws of nature and laws 
of convention can come into contact. In creative experimenting, one lets the body attune itself to the 
non-linguistic forces, bridging the soul-body split, getting new ideas and affects while changing the 
contours of the majoritarian approach to the world.  
 An extreme interpretation, which I did not support, would presuppose that Bartleby knows 
that the repetition of the performative will prevent him from writing, working, eating and lead to 
death  eventually.  He  knows  that  it  shatters  the  possibility  of  communication,  of  sharing,  of 
humaneness (which is based on sharing). Such decision, based on the will to nothingness, would 
manifest a resolute self.  His disappearing, in this interpretation,  would then be effectuated as a 
series of conscious steps outside of the symbolic order, away from identity, language and from life.  
What I have tried to argue instead was that both Emerson's poet and Melville's Bartleby 
embodied power as potentiality, potentiality of transformation or deformation of the majoritarian 
discourse. In this interpretation, the force of Bartleby's performative shows the difference of idioms, 
where one cannot  be translated to  the other.  Bartleby's  experience (be it  a past  experience,  for 
instance a trauma, or current experiencing of the world) cannot be articulated within the idiom of 
the attorney. His life or death is not something that could be argued about, agreed upon or solved 
within the discourse of the attorney. Yet, the effects of Bartleby's formula do reach the conventional 
language and provoke movements from the center to the periphery, from majority to minority. As 
Deleuze  suggests,  the  lines  of  escape  can  be  creative  or  evasive  (moving  into  the  imaginary, 
"beyond" or "below"). As we have shown, however, Deleuze still works within language, using 
dialectical oppositions, even though he, like Emerson, tries to make language fluid and transform its 
order-words into pass-words. Although he extends the domain of pragmatics, he cannot account for 
Bartleby whose performative presence and silence transcend the realm of rhetoric, showing us that 
there is much we can do and understand thanks to language, and much that we cannot.   
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Abstrakt Dizertace
Dizertace se soustředí na Melvillovy postavy jako je Písař Bartleby, které jsou 
výzvou pro americký Emersonovský vitalismus, rétoričnost a performativitu. Melvilovo 
ticho, deaktivace, narušení diskurzu stálo už v Melvillově době v opozici k americkým 
mýtům úspěchu, síly vůle a soběstačnosti. Možnosti Melvillových "antihrdinů" útočí na 
rétorickou  sílu,  performanci  a  jednotu  izolovaného  já,  které  je  v  těchto  mýtech 
reprezentováno. Zatímco Emersonovo rané dílo se týká předevěím spolehnutí se na síly 
"zhůry" (platonismus) a "zdola" (gnoze), které ale často nelze odlišit, jazyk Emersonova 
pozdního  díla  na  mnoha  úrovních  rezonuje  s  dílem pozdního  Melvilla.  Dynamický 
vztah  mezi  Melvillem  a  Emersonem  podle  mého  názoru  utváří  už  od  Mellvilova 
revivalu ve dvacátých letech dvacátého století americkou kulturu a debaty o ustavování 
subjektivity, problémy jednání a performativity. Ačkoli je Emerson často představován 
jako "krásný nepřítel"  Melvilla,  snažím se  zde  ukázat,  že  se  oba zabývají  stejnými 
tématy – zvláště otázkami moci, řeči, vůle, ticha, protestu proti otcovským autoritám – a 
oba zdůrazňují potencialitu. 
V poslední  době se  o  postavu Bartlebyho rozhořel  nový,  intenzivní  zájem. 
Můžeme  ho  podle  mého  názoru  nahlížet  -  oproti  americké  ideologii  aktivního 
sebetvoření a praktické síly - jako případ performativního "jednání" nebo "ukazování" 
pomocí  mizení.  Soudobý  zájem o  "otázku  Bartleby"  je  spojen  s  problémy jednání, 
potenciality, zákona a difference (jak ukazují C. S. Peirce, J. Derrida a G. Deleuze) a s 
protestem proti způsobu, jakým se osobní identita performativně ustavuje pomocí řeči 
(což  lze  vidět  v  Emersonově  pozdním  díle,  teorii  pragmatismu  a  performativity). 
Bartleby ale není ve všech ohledech nečinný a nehybný. Tvrdím, že Bartleby něco dělá, 
a to jak lingvisticky – v rámci jazyka, znaků, performativních konstrukcí, kde má jeho 
formule "já bych raději ne" velkou účinnost, tak nelingvisticky – prostřednictvím ticha, 
odcházení, přítomnosti, smrti). Jak Bartleby tak Emersonův básník svými ustavováními 
mimo  jáství  ukazují  jistou  prázdnotu,  jedinečnost,  sílu  jako  potencialitu.  Bartleby 
ukazuje limity řečových médií a rétoriky jako takové. Zpochybňuje platónskou distinkci 
mezi nomos a physis, dále distinkci mezi já, které mizí v nábožensko-mýtických silách, 
a já, které je vedeno silami  vůle k moci) a navíc celou americkou rétorickou tradicí 
zahrnující  Austinovu  teorii  performativity,  Jamesovo  pragmatické  já  a  Emersonův 
  148 
výmluvný  hlas,  koncepty  vůle,  moci,  potenciality  a  jednání.  Metody,  které  pro 
argumentaci těchto bodů využívám, zahrnují close-reading a performativní a kritické 
teorie. 
V  první  části  této  práce  krátce  načrtávám  genealogii  amerického  já  v 
protikladu k evropskému pojetí subjektu. Interpretuji Bartlebyho jakožto vzdálené já, 
identitu a jednání z perspektivy Emersonova raného díla ("Circles," "Self-Reliance," a 
hlavně "Transcendentalist"-  pravděpodobný  zdroj Melvillova "Bartlebyho"). 
Zkoumáme zde duchovní  (platónskou a gnostickou) úroveň Emersonova myšlení.  V 
návaznosti na Platónovu distinkci z Gorgia mezi dvěma silami ustavujícími subjektivitu 
(nábožensko-mýtickými silami a  osvícenskými silami  vůle a  moci)  prozkoumáváme 
jáství  včetbě  jeho  duchovní  cesty  vzhůru,  a  jeho  sestup,  noření  se  do  hloubek. 
Performativní síla Emersonových slov zde umožňuje transformaci, odblokování nebo 
dokonce úplné opuštění já.
Ve  druhé  části  jsou  hlavními  tématy  Melvillův  "Bartleby"  a  síla  rétoriky, 
performativita,  opakování  a  přítomnost  (interpretované s pomocí  J.  L.  Austina a  G. 
Deleuze). Diskutují se zde moc a následky Bartlebyho formulky "Já bych raději ne," 
spolu s otázkami vzdálení se od těla, originality a oběti. Jak Melvillův Bartleby, tak 
Emersonův básník mluví cizím, minoritním jazykem v rámci jazyka většiny, což může 
odhalit nové možnosti a subjektové pozice.
Ve třetí části se vůle, řeč a jáství rozebírá z perspektivy Emersonova pozdního 
díla,  tzn.  z  perspektivy  imanence,  která  byla  do  jisté  míry  později  rozvinuta 
Nietzschem, Heideggerem,  Foucaultem, Deleuzem, Butlerovou a dalšími. My nicméně 
Emersonovy  a  Melvillovy  koncepty  moci  a  vůle  nebudeme  interpretovat  ani  z 
Nietzschovské linie ani z linie esencialistických interpretací Bartlebyho rezistující vůle 
(jak to dělá např.  John B. Williams v knize White Fire: The Influence of Emerson on  
Melville).  Půjde  nám o perspektivu,  která  přesahuje  pragmatismus i  teorii  řečových 
aktů. Analyzujeme proto jak v Melvillově "Bartlebym" tak v Confidence-manovi důvěru 
a klam, rétoriku, potencialitu, ticho, propast, smrt a sílu já ve vztahu k poetické tvorbě, 
gnozi, a sémiotice expresívních symbolů (Charles Sanders Peirce). 
Nakonec srovnáváme pojetí zákona a jednání v Melvillově "Bartlebym" a v 
Kafkově  kapitole  z  Procesu  s  názvem  "Před  zákonem." Zkoumání  Kafkova 
performativu "Ještě ne" a  Melvillova "Já bych raději ne," spolu s analýzou odkládaného 
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jednání, slovy rozkazu, otcovskou funkcí, a pragmatickými aspekty v obou dílech by 
nás mělo dovést do bodu, kdy je třeba přehodnotit Austinovy performativní teorie.  
V  poslední  části  dizertace  se  rozebírá  nelingvistický  aspekt  Bartlebyho 
"performance." Jazyk se prezentuje jako pohyblivý, nadlineání. Čerpám zde především 
z Gilla Deleuze, který v Tisíci Plošinách tvrdí, že lingvistické a nelingvistické prvky se 
v  promluvě  nedají  oddělit  už  od  samého  počátku.  Pragmatika,  která  pojednává  o 
nelingvistickém, by měla být podle Deleuze považována nejen za součást lingvistiky, 
ale přímo za její nejvíce konstitutivní část. Deleuze tak stojí v opozici k lingvistickému 
abstraktnímu stroji Noama Chomského, který si udržuje stromovitou metodu a lineární 
řazení lingvistických prvků ve větách a větných spojeních a který vše nelingvistické 
vylučuje. Deleuze zavádí místo takovéhoto modelu nadlinearitu, myšlení o jazyce bez 
pevného lineárního řádu; místo "konstant" mluví o proměnných obsahu a proměnných 
výrazu.  Abstraktní  lingvistický  stroj  nenáleží  podle  Deleuze  k  hlubinné  syntaktické 
struktuře (kterou zastává Chomsky) ale k uspořádání (assemblage), které není založeno 
na jazyku, ale je diagramatické a nadlineární. Přemýšlet o Bartlebym v Deleuzových 
pojmech vede člověka k jinému náhledu na tělo a jazyk jako takový. Co se týče obsahu, 
Bartlebyho tělo je plátno; chybí mu obsah. I přesto ale Bartleby přesouvá kontury těla (a 
to  minimálně  svého  vlastního  a  těla  svého  nadřízeného,  právníka)  a  obrací  je  do 
tekutých sil  bez  hranic.  Co se  týče  výrazu,  Bartlebyho jazykové znaky,  stejně  jako 
Emersonovy, činí jazyk plastickým, tekutým, bezmezným. 
Současní  poststrukturalištičtí  myslitelé  jako  Judith  Butlerová  nebo  výše 
zmíněný Gilles Deleuze (kteří jdou ve stopách Emersona, Nietzscheho a Spinozy) jsou 
často kritizováni za své teorie subjektivity, které se zaměřují příliš mnoho na identitu 
jako proces, jako účinek různých sil a nikoli na člověka jako zodpovědného konatele. 
Gilles Deleuze se snaží myslet ne-identitu a ukazuje různé aspekty opakování v řeči a 
obrazech. Jak Deleuze tak Butlerová se ale nicméně stejně zabývají mocí řeči/diskurzu 
a  její  důležitosti  pro  já/identitu.  Téma  moci  diskurzu  významně  rozvinul  i  pozdní 
Emerson a Nietzsche. Proto zde zkoumáme Melvillovy postavy jako "Drummondovy 
světla," která osvětlují vše kolem sebe a nabízejí tak jiný způsob myšlení o identitě a 
jazyku.  Takové  postavy  totiž  testují  hranice  pojmu  identity/vědomí  jakožto 
performativně konstruované prostřednictvím řeči, pojmu já jako neoperativní moci, jako 
diference,  nebo  jako  vzdáleného  enigmatu,  což  jsou  témata,  která  jsou  v  centru 
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současného  diskurzu  o  subjektivitě.  Je-li  Emerson  jeden  z  největších  vitalistů  v 
americké  kultuře,  pak  Melville  ukazuje,  jaký  význam  a  implikace  má  pro  osobní 
identitu ne-aktivita a mezery či trhliny v diskurzech.    
V případě  Bartlebyho jsme svědky zvláštního druhu duševního i  fyzického 
vzdálení  se.  Vypadá  to,  jako  by  bylo  jeho  hlavním  přáním  odejít,  uniknout  ze 
symbolického  řádu  jazyka  a  společenských  praktik.  Bartleby  nicméně  jazyk  velmi 
ovlivňuje, a to i přesto, že jeho performativní moc není na jazyce výhradně založena. 
Co se týče Emersona a jeho možné odpověďi na Bartlebyovskou výzvu, je důležité si 
uvědomit, že Emersonovo já se nevztahuje pouze k transcendentnímu "nad," k Nad-
duši,  k  Síle,  ale  také  k  "pod,"  k  propasti,  potencialitě,  neurčité  zóně/hloubce,  která 
člověka přesahuje jak díky svému místu (bezmezný prostor potenciality), tak díky času 
(před časem, jazykem a Stvořením). Emerson by se v rámci svého raného díla mohl s 
Bartlebym vyrovnat podle mého názoru právě z onoho předlingvistického "podzemí." 
Oba pojmy "nad" i "pod" odkazují k Emersonovým činnostem stoupání a potápění se. 
Právě s aktem potápění se Melville ztotožňuje.
Dalším  cílem  této  dizertace  je,  kromě  analýzy  Bartlebyho  výzvy  vůči 
performativitě, vitalismu a pragmatismu, znovu definovat Emersonovské já, které bylo 
tradičně vnímáno (i když Emerson sám je tak nevnímal) jako ucelené, plné síly vůle, 
přivlastňující si a soběstačné. My jsme oproti tomu nabídli pohled na subjektivitu, který 
zdůrazňuje přechod, sílu jako potencialitu, tok a proměnu, a to jak u Emersona tak u 
Melvilla. Emersonův básník je, podobně jako v případě Bartlebyovských konstitucí vně 
jáství,  připraven  kdykoli  opustit  jakoukoli  kategorii,  normu,  vztah,  pozici,  nebo 
politickou ideologii. Tak radikální odklon, mizení jáství z předem definovaných kolejí, 
kdykoli  pociťuje  přílišné  věznění,  je  znakem  originality.  Tím  rezonuje  s 
poststrukturalismem (Culler,  Butler,  Deleuze)  a  jeho neustálým procesem diference, 
odkladu; přesto má ale stále vztah k čerpání sil z potenciálních sil vlastní přirozenosti, 
které přivádí do jazyka a zákonodárství. Proces přivádění idejí a afektů ke světlu, k 
reflexi,  vyžaduje  předreflexivní  vnímavost/receptivitu/afektivitu  mysli  a  těla.  Je  to 
právě světlo intuice, které člověku umožňuje přejít od podvědomé k vědomé a osobní 
rovině  já.  Takovéto  vytahování  obrazů ze  tmy propasti  odpovídá  tomu,  co jsme už 
zmínili ohledně Emersonovy aktivity potápění. 
Tvrdím tedy, že přivádění idejí na světlo není založeno na vůli. Bartleby je 
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Drummondovo světlo, které má funkci nositele, či intuice. Emersonův básník, podobně 
jako Bartleby, nikdy neví, co se stane, když někdo performativní formuli prosloví; často 
se tím jazyková rovina tradiční lingvistiky úplně překročí. Zatímco Emersonova poezie 
končí  v  hudbě,  Bartlebyho "výraz"  končí  v  tichu.  Co oba  sdílejí  je  smysl  hodnoty 
neurčitosti, nepředpověditelnosti a potenciality, toho, co může z jakékoli činnosti nebo 
nečinnosti  povstat.  To v určitém smyslu ospravedlňuje a  tvoří  prostor  pro svobodu, 
možnost  kontrafaktuality,  naději.  Pro  oba  je  nejdůležitější  schopností  především 
vytvoření prostoru pro neartikulovaný smysl, pro tělo. Jinými slovy, člověk musí přestat 
mluvit,  ptát  se,  snažit  se  kontaktovat  druhého.  Po dlouhém tichu prostě  může začít 
mluvit.  Jsme  zvyklí  se  neustále  projektovat  do  ostatních,  když  jsme  vrháni  do 
každodenních situací. To znamená, že nahrazujeme naše už uskutečněné interpretace 
novými interpretacemi světa, idejemi, koncepty a mapami, jak by se věci měly dít a co 
by měly znamenat. Proto je důležité někdy rozostřit vidění, deaktivovat touhu, zákony i 
analytické  myšlení  a  jednoduše  být,  experimentovat,  hrát.  (Bartlebyovské)  tělo-svět 
totiž dokáže jednat, jen pokud má pro své činy místo. A to povstává ve chvíli, kdy je 
vytvořen prostor pro jeho vyvstávání; vzniká spolu se svým místem. Teprve poté může 
člověk, po Emersonově a Melvillově způsobu, tvořit namísto toho, aby pouze překládal 
a pohyboval se ve sféře symbolů. Z elementárních sil je tedy možné žít, ať už v  modu 
afirmativním, radostném, nebo v de-aktivovaném/de-aktivujícím. 
Co  se  týče  Austinovské  performativity,  ukazuje  se,  že  síla  Bartlebyho 
performativu  nezávisí  na  žádných  ceremoniálních  okolnostech,  pozici  autority, 
upřímnosti,  nebo opakování  nějaké  dlouho existující  formule.  To,  co  na  právníka  a 
ostatní doléhá, je především Bartlebyho zvláštně nelidská přítomnost, která naznačuje 
možný  odchod,  neboli  destituci.  Jde  o  důležitý  kontext  Bartlebyho  formule,  která 
ustavuje logiku preference. Jedním z možných důvodů, proč je formule tak nakažlivá, je 
i podvědomá touha Bartlebyho kolegů i čtenářů po nezávislosti, svobodě od zákona a 
od  svazujících  schémat  jazyka  a  logiky  předpokladů.  Toto  nevyřčené,  podzemní 
preferování  možné  preference  může  přidat  sílu  Bartlebyho  formuli  a  dodat  jí  na 
infekčnosti. Bartleby ale přesto nikoho nereprezentuje; možná si účinek své formule ani 
neuvědomuje. Pokud by si ho totiž byl vědom, šlo by o rozhodnutí pocházející z jeho já 
v opozici k ostatním. Jak jsme ale ukázali, Bartlebyho ustavování je neurčité a na já 
nezaložené.  Jakékoli  definice  já  jako  odděleného  subjektu  –  jakožto  autonomního 
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rozhodného  jedince – nebo jakékoli určování subjektu skrze vztahy k ostatním ne-Já 
jsou určení založená na nedůvěře vůči sobě. 
Moc  jako  potencialita,  jak  se  snažím  v  dizertaci  ukázat,  se  vyjadřuje  v 
experimentování,  ve hře, v ustavování bez já. Emersonovo experimentování končí v 
hudbě. Hudba a poezie nás totiž, podle Emersona, spojují s předlingvistickými silami; 
jsou  výrazy hravosti  pro  dospělé.  Takové radostné,  na já  nezaložené  myšlení,  které 
opouští  vše  fixní,  stojí  v  přímém  kontrastu  proti  moci  jako  pokusu  o  vyplnění 
nedostatku, realizované často skrze ovládání ostatních. Negativní stránka této filozofie 
idealizující  ucelené,  dobře  zformované  já  spočívá  ve  frustraci,  vzteku,  zoufalství. 
Nedostatek formy, síly vůle a jáství je pro tento světonázor problémem. Viděli jsme, že 
Bartleby otestoval (odložil)  oba tyto přístupy. Sám byl  procesem čistého diferování, 
čímž ztělesňoval  odklad  jak  jednání  tak  významu.  Takové odkládání  je  typické  pro 
poststrukturalismus (Derrida). Přecházíme totiž od jednoho označujícího k druhému ad 
infinitum. Není zde žádný transcendentální označující nebo označovaný, žádná stabilní 
identita  nebo význam, kterého by se mohl  člověk chytit.  Zní  to  jako další  filozofie 
vedoucí k frustraci. 
Je  nicméně  možné  nalézt  moc  jako  potencialitu  i  v  afirmativním  modu. 
Ustavování nezaložené na já je možné a nemusí vést k frustraci. Nevadí, že nedojdeme 
k  definitivním  odpovědím  nebo  transcendentálním  označujícím.  Rétorická  povaha 
našeho  nastávání,  stejně  jako  obsese  s  jazykem,  může  být  překročena.  V 
experimentování, v hraní, v hudbě, se člověk naladí na elementární síly a tím se tyto 
mohou spojit se zákony konvence. V tvořivém experimentování nechá člověk své tělo 
naladit se na nelingvistické síly, překračujíc tak rozdělení duše a těla; získá nové ideje a 
přitom promění kontury většinového přístupu ke světu. 
Jedna z extrémních interpretací Bartlebyho konání, kterou jsem ale v dizertaci 
nepodporovala, by předpokládala, že Bartleby ví, že opakování performativu ho donutí 
přestat  psát,  pracovat,  jíst  a  povede  nakonec  ke  smrti.  Ví,  že  jeho  formule  otřásá 
možnostmi  komunikace,  sdílení  a  lidskosti  (která  je  na  sdílení  založena).  Takové 
rozhodnutí,  ukotvené  ve  vůli  k  nicotě,  by  poukazovalo  na  rezolutní,  rozhodné  já. 
Bartlebyho mizení by pak podle této interpretace bylo realizováno postupnými kroky 
mimo symbolický řád, pryč od identity, jazyka a života. 
Náhled, který zde naproti tomu předkládám, tvrdí, že jak Emersonův básník 
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tak Melvillův Bartleby ztělesňují moc jako potencialitu, potencialitu transformace nebo 
deformace většinového diskurzu. Podle této interpretace síla Bartlebyho performativu 
ukazuje rozdíl řečí, kdy jedna nemůže být přeložena do druhé. Bartlebyho prožitek (ať 
už jde o minulý zážitek, například o trauma, nebo o současné prožívání světa) nemůže 
být artikulován v právníkově řeči. Jeho život i smrt nejsou něčím, o čem by se dalo 
argumentovat, shodnout se, nebo co by se dalo vyřešit v rámci právníkova diskurzu. 
Přesto se účinky Bartlebyho formule konvenčního jazyka dotýkají a vyvolávají pohyby 
z centra do periferie, z většiny do menšiny. Linie úniku, jak tvrdí Deleuze, mohou být 
tvořivé nebo vyhýbavé (pohybujíce se do imaginárního "nad" nebo "pod"). Jak jsme již 
ale ukázali, Deleuze stále pracuje v rámci jazyka. Užívá dialektické protiklady, a to i 
přesto, že se snaží, stejně jako Emerson, jazyk zkapalnit a transformovat jeho rozkazy 
do hesel pro vstup,  pro průchod.  Ačkoli  rozšiřuje doménu pragmatiky,  nemůže plně 
vystihnout Bartlebyho, jehož performativní přítomnost a ticho překračují oblast rétoriky 
a ukazují tak, že je hodně věcí, které můžeme díky jazyku pochopit, a hodně těch, které 
nemůžeme.       
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 Abstract of the Dissertation
The dissertation focuses on Melville's characters - such as Bartleby the Scrivener 
-  who  challenge  American  Emersonian  vitalism,  rhetoricism  and  performativity. 
Melville's silence,  deactivation,  ruptures  in  discourse,  and subjectivities  have  stood, 
even in  his time, in contrast  to  American myths of success,  force of will, and self-
reliance.  The  potentialities of  Melvillean  "anti-heroes"  contest  the  rhetorical  force, 
performance, and unity of the isolated self represented in these myths. While Emerson's 
early work manifests his reliance on the powers of the "beyond" (Platonism) and the 
"below" (Gnosis), which, however, often cannot be clearly distinguished, the language 
of Emerson's late work, which has been frequently disregarded, resonates with that of 
the  late  Melville  on  many  levels.  The  dynamic  relationship  between  Emerson  and 
Melville has been, in my view, shaping American culture since the “Melville Revival” 
in 1920s and continues to do so in contemporary debates regarding both the formation 
of  subjectivity and issues  of  performativity and agency.  Although Emerson is  often 
portrayed as "the beautiful enemy" of Melville,  it can be  shown that they address the 
same  topics  -  especially  the  issues  of  power,  speech,  will,  silence,  protest  against 
paternal authority -  while emphasizing potentiality.
Recently,  there has emerged  an intensified interest concerning the character of 
Bartleby who might, in contrast to the American ideology of self-creation and practical 
power,  provide  an  instance  of  a  performative  "showing"  or  "acting"  by  means  of 
disappearing. The contemporary interest in "the Bartleby question" is connected with 
the  issues  of  agency,  potentiality,  law,  and difference  (as  shown in C.  S.  Pierce,  J.  
Derrida and G. Deleuze),  as well  as with a major protest  against  the way in which 
personal identity is performatively constituted by means of speech (as seen in Emerson's 
late work, the school of pragmatism, and theories of performativity). Yet, Bartleby is not 
immobile  and  inactive  in  all  respects.  I  argue  that  Bartleby  does  something,  both 
linguistically - within the realm of language, signs, performative constructions (where 
his formula "I would prefer not to" has profound effects) - and nonlinguistically (by 
means  of  his  silence,  leaving,  presence,  death).  Both  Bartleby and  Emerson's  poet 
manifest,  in  their  selfless  constitutions  certain  vacancy,  blankness,  singularity,  and 
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power  as  potentiality.  Bartleby  shows  the  limits  of  rhetoric  (while  questioning  the 
Platonic  distinctions from the  Gorgias between  nomos  and  physis,  between the  self 
disappearing in religious-mythical forces, and the self led by the forces of will to power) 
and  the  American  rhetorical  tradition,  including  Austin's  theory  of  performativity, 
James'  pragmatist  self,  and  Emerson's  eloquent  voice,  notions  of  the  will,  power, 
potentiality,  and agency. The  methods that I use to argue these points involve close-
reading, plus performative and critical theories. 
In the first part of this work, then, the genealogy of the American self as opposed 
to the European notion of the subject is briefly sketched. Secondly, the self, its agency, 
and Bartleby as the detached self are interpreted from the perspective of Emerson's early 
work ("Circles," "Self-Reliance," and mainly his "Transcendentalist"- a probable source 
of Melville's "Bartleby").  Here, the spiritual (Platonic and Gnostic) level of Emerson's 
thought is explored. Following the Platonic distinction from the Gorgias regarding two 
kinds  of  forces  constituting  subjectivity  (the  religious-mythical  forces  and  the 
enlightenment forces of will and power), the spiritual ascension and diving of the self 
are  examined.  The  performative  force  of  Emerson's  words  aims  here  to  enable  the 
transformation, unblocking and even complete abandonment of the self. 
In  the  second  part,  the  main  topics  are the  power  of  rhetoric,  performativity, 
repetition and presence (interpreted with the help of J. L. Austin and Gilles Deleuze) in 
Melville's  "Bartleby."  The  power  and  consequences  of  Bartleby's  formula  "I  would 
prefer  not  to"  are  discussed,  together  with the issues  of detachment  from the body, 
originality, and sacrifice. Both Melville's Bartleby and Emerson's poet speak a foreign, 
minoritarian language  within  the  language  of  the  majority,  which  may reveal  new 
possibilities and/or positions for personal identity/self.
In  the  third  part,  the  self,  its  will,  speech,  and  power  are  analyzed  from the 
perspective of Emerson's late work, that is, from the perspective of immanence, which 
was, to a certain extent, later developed by Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault,  Deleuze, 
Butler, and others. However, Emerson's and Melville's notions of power and will are 
interpreted  neither  in  the  Nietzschean  lineage  nor according  to  the  essentialist 
interpretations of the resistant will of Bartleby (John B. Williams in White Fire: The  
Influence  of  Emerson  on  Melville)  but  from  a  perspective  which  goes  beyond 
pragmatism and speech-act theory. Apart from the issues of confidence and forgery in 
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Melville's  "Bartleby,  the  Scrivener" and The  Confidence-man,  rhetoric,  potentiality, 
silence,  abyss,  death,  and  the  power  of  the  self  are examined  in  relation  to  poetic 
creation, gnosis, and the semiotics  of expressive symbols (Charles Sanders Peirce). 
Finally, the notions of the law and agency in Melville’s "Bartleby" are contrasted 
with their use in Kafka's "Before the Law." The exploration of Kafka's performative 
"Not Yet" and Melville's "I would prefer not to," together with an analysis of deferred 
action,  order-words,  paternal  function,  and pragmatic  aspects  in  both  works,  should 
bring us to the point where we see the necessity to revise Austin's performative theories. 
What is then analyzed in the last part of the dissertation is the nonlinguistic 
aspect of Bartleby´s "performance." Language is presented as fluid, superlinear. I draw 
on Gilles Deleuze who claims in A Thousand Plateaus that linguistic and nonlinguistic 
elements are inseparable in enunciation from the very start.  Pragmatics, which deals 
with the nonlinguistic, should be, according to Deleuze, considered a part of linguistics, 
and  the  most  constitutive  one.  Deleuze  thus  opposes  Noam  Chomsky's  language 
machine, which retains the tree-like model and linear ordering of linguistic elements in 
sentences  and sentence  combinations  and which excludes  the  nonlinguistic.  Instead, 
Deleuze  introduces  superlinearity,  thinking  about  language  without  any fixed  linear 
order; he talks about variables of content and expression instead of "constants."  The 
abstract  machine  of  language,  in  Deleuze's  view,  belongs  not  to  a  deep  syntactical 
structure (as Chomsky would have it) but to  assemblage which is not language-based 
but diagrammatic and superlinear. To think about Bartleby in Deleuzian terms provokes 
one to adopt a different view of the body and language as such. As to content, Bartleby's 
body is a screen, it lacks content. Yet, Bartleby shifts the bodily contours (at least of his 
body, and the fleeing body of the attorney) and turns them into fluid limitless forces. As 
to expression, Bartleby's linguistic signs also, like those of Emerson, make language 
plastic, fluid, boundless. 
 Contemporary poststructuralist thinkers such as Judith Butler or  Gilles Deleuze 
(following  Emerson,  Nietzsche,  Spinoza)  are  often  criticized  for  their  theories  of 
subjectivity which focus  too much on identity as  a  process,  as an effect  of  various 
forces, and not on stable responsible agents.  Gilles Deleuze  actually  attempts to think 
non-identity  and  shows  various  aspects  of  repetition  in  speech  and  images.  Both 
Deleuze  and  Butler  are,  however,  still  somehow  preoccupied  by  the  power of 
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speech/discourse and its importance for self/identity, which was significantly developed, 
if not introduced, by the late Emerson and Nietzsche. That is why Melville's characters 
– such as Bartleby –  are explored and seen  as "Drummond lights" which illuminate 
everything  around  them,  offering a  different  way  of  thinking  about  the  self  and 
language. For such characters test the limits of the notions of identity/consciousness as 
performatively  constructed  through  speech,  of  the  self  as  an  inoperative  power,  as 
"different," or as a detached enigma, all of which are at the center of contemporary 
discourse on subjectivity. If Emerson is one of the greatest vitalists in American culture, 
Melville shows  the implications and significance  of inactivity,  gaps and ruptures for 
personal identity.  
What we witness in Bartleby's case is a strange kind of spiritual and bodily 
detachment. It seems as if his main wish were to leave/escape the symbolic order of 
language and social  practices altogether.  Yet, Bartleby does influence language a lot 
even  though  his  performative  power  is  not  based  on  language  exclusively.  As  for 
Emerson and his possible response to the Bartlebian challenge, it is important to realize 
that Emerson's self does not relate only to the "beyond," to the Over-soul, Power, but 
also  to  the  "below,"  to  the  abyss,  to  the  potential,  indeterminate  zone/depth  which 
transcends one both because of its place (limitless space of potentiality) and its time 
(before time and language, before Creation).  As to his early work, it is only from the 
pre-linguistic "below," I believe, that Emerson could account for Bartleby. The beyond 
and the below refer to the respective Emersonian activities, that of ascension and diving. 
It is the act of diving with which Melville identifies.  
Another aim of the dissertation, apart from analysis of the  Bartlebian challenge to 
performativity, vitalism, and pragmatism, is to redefine the Emersonian self which was 
traditionally (but not by Emerson himself) seen as all-composed, willful, appropriative, 
and self-reliant.  Instead,  the view of subjectivity which stresses transition,  power as 
potentiality,  flux  and  metamorphosis  is  explored  in  both  Emerson  and  Melville. 
Similarly to the selfless Bartlebian constitution, Emerson's poet is ready to abandon any 
category, norm, relationship, position, or political ideology. Such a radical move-away, 
disappearing  from  the  pre-defined  tracks  every  time  the  self  feels  too  much 
confinement, is a sign of originality. It resonates with poststructuralism (Culler, Butler, 
Deleuze) and its never-ending process of difference, deferral; but it still relates to the 
  158 
drawing on the potential forces of one's nature, bringing them into language and law-
giving. The process of bringing ideas and affects to light, to reflection, requires a pre-
reflective perceptiveness/receptivity/affectivity of the mind and body. It is the light of 
intuition which enables the transfer from the subliminal to the conscious and personal 
realm of the self. Such drawing of images out of the darkness of the abyss corresponds 
to what we have mentioned before about Emerson's activity of diving. 
As I argue, the bringing of ideas into light is not based on will. Bartleby is the 
Drummond light, functioning as a carriage, as Intuition. Emerson's poet, like Bartleby, 
never  knows what  will  occur  when a  performative  formula  is  pronounced.  It  often 
transcends the realm of traditional linguistics. While Emerson's poetry ends in music, 
Bartleby's "expression" ends in silence. What they both share is the sense of the value of 
the indeterminacy, the unpredictability, of potentiality, of what might result from any 
action,  or  from any inaction.  This,  in  a  sense,  vindicates  and creates  the  space for 
freedom, for the possibility of contrafactuality, for hope. For both, the most important 
capability is first of all to make space for the non-articulated sense, for the body. In 
other words, one needs to stop talking, asking, trying to contact the other. After a long 
silence  one  can  simply  start  to  speak.  We  are  used  to  the  constant  projecting  of 
ourselves when we are thrown into situations, that is, we supplant our already actualized 
interpretations with new interpretations of the world, with ideas, concepts, maps of how 
things should occur and what they should mean. It is therefore necessary to de-focus our 
vision sometimes, to deactivate our desire, the laws and analytical thinking and simply 
be/experiment/play.  For,  the (Bartlebian) body-world can act only when it  has some 
space for its  action.  It comes into being only in the moment when the space for its 
emergence is created; it comes into being together with its place. Only then can one 
create, in an Emersonian or Melvillean way, instead of mere translating,  or moving 
along the sphere of symbols. It is possible to live from these elemental forces, be it in 
the affirmative, joyful mode, or the de-activated/deactivating one. 
As  to  Austinian  performativity,  it  is  shown  that  the  force  of  Bartleby's 
performative does not depend on any ceremonious circumstances, position of authority, 
sincerity, or iteration of a longtime-existing powerful formula. What affects the attorney 
and others is first of all Bartleby's strangely inhuman silent presence which suggests a 
possible leaving, a destitution. That is an important context of Bartleby's formula which 
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constitutes the logic of preference. One of the reasons why it is so contagious could be 
the subconsious desire of his colleagues for independence, freedom from the law and 
the binding schemes of language and logic of assumptions. This unsaid, underground 
preference  for  a  possible  preference  could  add  to  the  force  of  the  formula  and  its 
infectious nature. Yet, Bartleby does not represent anyone; he may not be aware of the 
effect of the formula at all. For, if he were, that would suggest that there was a decision 
coming from his self  as opposed to others.  As we have shown, however,  Bartleby's 
constitutions are selfless and indeterminate. Any definitions of the self as a separate 
subject – as an autonomous resolute individual – or any delimitations of the subject 
through the relationships with another not-Me in the social network are determinations 
based on mistrust toward oneself. 
Power as potentiality, as I try to show, expresses itself in experimenting, in play, 
in selfless constitutions. Emerson's experimenting ends in music. Music and poetry, for 
Emerson, connect us to the pre-linguistic forces; they are expressions of playfulness for 
adults. Such joyful, selfless thinking abandoning all fixity stands in contrast to power as 
an attempt at fulfillment of a lack, of deficit, often through domination of others. The 
negative side of this philosophy idealizing the unified, well-formed self is frustration, 
anger,  despair.  Lack of form, lack of willfulness and selfhood is  a problem for this 
approach  to  the  world.  We have  seen  that  Bartleby tested  (deferred)  both  of  these 
approaches. He himself was the process of pure difference, embodying the deferral of 
both action and meaning. Such deferral  is typical of poststructuralism (Derrida). We 
pass from one signifier to another ad infinitum. There is no transcendental signifier or 
signified, no stable identity or meaning one could hold on to. That sounds like another 
philosophy leading to frustration. 
As I argue in the thesis, power as potentiality can be effectuated in the affirmative 
way as well. Selfless constitutions are possible and do not have to lead to frustration. It 
does not matter if we do not arrive at definitive answers or transcendental signifiers. 
The rhetorical nature of our becoming, the obsession with language, can be transcended, 
transgressed.  In  experimenting,  in  playing,  in  music,  one  attunes  oneself  to  the 
elemental forces. In that way, "elemental forces" and laws of convention can come into 
contact. In creative experimenting, one lets the body attune itself to the non-linguistic 
forces, bridging the soul-body split, getting new ideas and affects while changing the 
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contours of the majoritarian approach to the world.  
 An extreme interpretation,  which  I  do not  support  in  the  dissertation,  would 
presuppose that Bartleby knows that the repetition of the performative will prevent him 
from writing, working, eating and lead to death eventually. He knows that it shatters the 
possibility of communication, of sharing, of humaneness (which is based on sharing). 
Such a decision, based on the will to nothingness, would manifest a resolute self. His 
disappearing, in this interpretation, would then be effectuated as a series of conscious 
steps outside of the symbolic order, away from identity, language, and from life.  
What I try to argue instead is that both Emerson's poet and Melville's Bartleby 
embody  power  as  potentiality,  potentiality  of  transformation  or  deformation  of  the 
majoritarian discourse. In this interpretation, the force of Bartleby's performative shows 
the  difference  of  idioms,  where  one  cannot  be  translated  to  the  other.  Bartleby's 
experience (be it a past experience, for instance a trauma, or current experiencing of the 
world) cannot be articulated within the idiom of the attorney. His life or death is not 
something that could be argued about, agreed upon, or solved within the discourse of 
the attorney. Yet, the effects of Bartleby's formula do reach the conventional language 
and provoke movements from the center to the periphery, from majority to minority. As 
Deleuze  suggests,  the  lines  of  escape  can  be  creative  or  evasive  (moving  into  the 
imaginary,  "beyond" or "below").  As we have shown, however,  Deleuze still  works 
within language, using dialectical oppositions, even though he, like Emerson, tries to 
make  language  fluid  and  transform  its  order-words  into  pass-words.  Although  he 
extends  the  domain  of  pragmatics,  he  cannot  fully  account  for  Bartleby  whose 
performative presence and silence transcend the realm of rhetoric, showing us that there 
is much we can do and understand thanks to language, and much that we cannot.   
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